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H I
INTRODUCTION
Fyodor Dostoevski asserts, via the Grand Inquisitor, that tne fundamental 
insight into human nature (what he describes as the secret of numan nature) 
is to understand that humans crave uniformity in beliefs and actions. The 
Grand Inquisitor proclaims, "This craving for community of worship is the 
chief misery of every man individually and of all humanity from the beginning 
of time."^
John Stuart Mill evidently ^ared  Dostoevski's fear of this flaw in human 
nature, this human weakness for uniformity and similarity, for he says in the 
"Introductory" to On Liberty, "The rules which obtain among themselves 
appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion 
is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, 
as the proverb says, a second nature but is continually mistaken for the 
first."*' Later, in Chapter IV, he remarks concerning the public, "In its 
interferences with personal conduct it  is seldom thinking of anything but the 
enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself; and this standard of 
judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion 
and philosophy by nine-tenths of all moralists and ^jeculative writers,"^
In re^wnse to this despotic tendency in human nature, and other 
concerns as well. Mill proposes the following principle as the absolute limit to 
coercive control of individuals:
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as 
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the 
individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the 
means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the 
moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole 
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, 
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is 
self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully 
be compelled to do or forbear because it  will be better for him to 
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions 
of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good 
reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or 
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or 
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, 
the conduct from which it  is desired to deter him must be 
calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the 
conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that 
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, 
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
This passage has from time to time been referred to as the harm 
principle, or the harm to others principle. Mill himself referred to it  as the 
liberty principle. He recognized the fact that he was not advancing a single 
principle, but two related principles.^ The first states that actions that are 
prejudicial to the interests of others may properly be subjected to the 
coercive power of the law or public opinion. This principle governs what is 
generally described as other-regarding actions, actions that may harm others. 
The second principle addresses what is usually regarded as self-regarding 
conduct; this principle maintains that society is absolutely forbidden from 
interfering with the actions that concern the interests of the individual alone; 
this position is referred to as antipatemalism.
Both principles have been the subject of much controvert. Mill has been 
criticized for not being sufficiently clear about what counts as harm to 
others. In other words, where do we sensibly draw the line between
otner-regarc3ing and self-regarding behavior? It is widely held that the first 
principle is subject to counter-examples such as the following:
Consider then the man who walks down the main street of a town 
at mid-day. In the middle of a block in the central part of town, 
he stops, opens his briefcase, and pulls out a portable folding 
camp-toilet. In the prescribed manner, he attaches a plastic bag to 
its under side, sets it on the sLde-walk, and proceeds to defecate 
in it, to the utter amazement and disgust of the passers-by. Whiie 
he is thus relieving himself, he unfolds a large banner which reads 
"This is what I think of the Ruritanians" (substitute "niggers," 
"Kikes," "Spies," "Dagos," "Polacks," or "Hunkies"). Another placard 
placed prominently next to him invites ladies to join him in some 
of the more bizarre sexual-excretory perversions mentioned in 
Krafft-Ebbing and includes a large-scale graphic painting of the 
conduct he solicits. For those who avert their eyes too quickly, he 
plays an obscene phonograph record on a small portable machine, 
and accompanies its raunchier parts with grotesquely lewd bodily 
motions. He concludes his public performance by tasting some of 
his own excrement, and after savoring it slowly and thoroughly in 
the manner of a true epicure, he consumes it. He then dresses, ties 
the plastic bag containing the rest of the excreigent, places it 
carefully in his briefcase, and continues on his way.
I believe it  is plausible enough that on a straight forward definition of 
harm the sort of behavior described above does not harm anyone, yet 
intuitively i t  strikes one as the sort of activity that a com munity ought to be 
permitted to prohibit on the grounds that it  is an extreme nuisance. What is 
not clear is whether or not MiU meant to include or exclude this sort of 
behavior under the harm principle. In On Liberty Mill uses various terms to 
denote the proscribed actions, "harm," "damage," "interests" and "nuisance." 
So, Mill's exact meaning and application of this principle remains the subject 
of debate. This is an interesting and important issue in its own right, 
e^jecLally for the liberal view; but my interest in this paper is the other 
a ^ c t  of the liberty principle.
With the second part of the liberty principle, without ever using the 
word "paternalism" (although he does use the phrase "paternal government")
Mill sets out the problem of paternalism. The problem of paternalism is 
roughly the problem of justifying interference with autonomy, usually in the 
form of liberty, on the sole ground that the interference benefits the 
individual whose autonomy is restricted. Mill's position is that an autonomous 
person should never be coerced when only his own interests are a t stake. I 
shall argue that Mill is right.
Since the writing of On Liberty the issues surrounding paternalism have 
become more complex and, while distinctions have multiplied. Mill himself 
recognized many of the most useful and important ones. Before proceeding, it 
will be useful to delineate some of these distinctions. One important 
distil,ction is between strong and weak paternalism. This distinction is 
impoitant because it is argued by a number of philosophers, including myself, 
that weak paternalism is more easily justified than strong paternalism. This is 
also a distinction that Mill recognizes; clearly he intends the antipatemalism 
principle to apply to mature adults who reside in civilized nations. Strong 
paternalism is the interference in the life of someone who is believed to be 
competent, capable of making autonomous decisions. Common examples of 
strong paternalism are mandatory seat belt laws, mandatory helmet laws for 
motorcyclists, laws restricting dangerous hobbies or sports, e.g., laws 
requiring boxers to wear protective head gear. Of course there is some 
controversy over the proper criteria for competence. So cases of strong 
paternalism shade into cases of weak paternalism. Weak paternalism is 
interference in the life of an individual when i t  is thought that the individual 
is not competent, or at least not fully competent or not competent in the 
appropriate sense. Paternalism toward young children, the mentally retarded 
or mentally disturbed are examples of weak paternalism. A probable case of
weak paternalism is one like the following: A priysicdan had been treatina a 
sixty-nine-year-old man for a number of years and knew him to be neurotic. 
He had a history of depression and one attempted suicide. Additionally, the 
man had recently experienced tne death of his wife. He was recovering from 
this tragedy when he got an opportunity to travel to Australia, an adventure 
he was happily looking forward to. During a physical examination in 
preparation for this trip, the physician discovered the man had cancer of the 
prostrate gland. It was untreatable in its present stage, but later, it could be 
treated. After extensive and conclusive tests, the man asked the physician, 
"Am I O.K.? I don't have cancer, do I?" The physician answered, "You're as 
good as you were ten years ago."^ The physician believing it to be in the best 
interests of his patient, lied to him regarding his physical condition. This kind 
of paternalism is a t least arguably weak; since the elderly man is neurotic, he 
•is not fully competent.
Another important distinction to make is between direct and indirect 
paternalism. This, too, is a distinction thought relevant to the justification of 
paternalism, and, again, this is a distinction recognized in On Liberty. Direct 
paternalism is an action that restricts the autonomy of the intended recipient 
of the benefit; whereas indirect paternalism restricts one individual for the 
benefit of another. Examples of indirect paternalism are laws requiring 
automobile manufactures to install seat belts in cars, laws setting a maximum 
allowable interest rate for loans and so on. Most paternalism that is of 
philosophical interest to Mill is direct, some writers even restrict the use of 
the term to those cases which can be appropriately described as direct.
Mill's treatment of indirect paternalism is instructive. In order to 
properly understand Mill's position on paternalism it  may even be essential to
g ra^  Mill's point here. Mill poses this question, "Tin cases of personal conduct 
supposed to be blamable, but which r e je c t  for liberty precludes society from 
preventing or punishing, because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the 
agent; what the agent is free to do, ought other persons to be equally free to
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counsel or instigate?" Mill has in mind cases of prostitution and gambling. He 
maintains that while fornication and gambling must be allowed, it  is not clear 
that persons who induce others to engage in these practices should be 
unrestricted by the state. He further maintains that it is a t least defensible 
to claim that if society in general believes that these activities are bad, then 
the question is dilutable, and society ought to be permitted to at least 
punish the instigation in the interests of the 'victim.' This strategy might be 
extended to cases of exorbitant interest rates and the manufacture of cars 
without seat belts by arguing that while it  may be required, out of re^»ect 
for individuality and liberty, to allow persons to enter into unfavorable 
contracts and operate motor vehicles without seat belts, it  is not required 
that society allow some persons to tempt others to do so. Hence, the 
instigators may be subject to legal punishment. Mill decides that these kinds 
of cases are too close to call, so he does not provide us with a conclusive 
position on indirect paternalism.
The value of making these distinctions, however, is that they help 
clarify Mill's main thesis. Employing the terms I have been defining. Mill's 
target in his antipatemalism is a limited range of behaviors; his view is that 
coercive strong direct paternalism is always wrong. Thus, paternalism that is 
appropriately described as coercive, strong and direct might aptly be 
characterized as employing an illicit triad. It is just this comDonation that Mill 
objects to in the strong or absolute way. Within this classification, his main
target is legal paternalism. My thesis is that Mill's position is correct. It is 
my purpose to develop an interpretation of Mill's arguments against, 
paternalism and defend them against some common criticisms.
9
Mill's antipatemalism is sometimes referred to as radical But once it is 
understood that his arguments really focus on a narrow range of what tends 
to be designated as paternalism, his view seems somewhat less extreme. He 
makes several remarks to indicate that his real concern is with strong, not 
weak paternalism. First, there is the often cited case of the man approaching 
the unsafe bridge, he is a fair subject for coercive interference due to his 
ignorance (a form of incompetence). Also, in considering the question of 
whether or not the laboring class should be treated patemalistically with 
regard to the sale of stimulants. Mill replies that they should not, "unless 
after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern 
them as freemen, and it has been definitely proved that they can only be 
governed as cmldren."^^ If paternalism can be demonstrated to be properly 
described as weak rather than strong. Mill would allow even legal paternalism 
toward a large group. Indeed, his attitude toward the paternalistic treatment 
of children illustrates this point.
I shall proceed to develop my thesis along the following lines, in the 
first chapter I lay out what I take to be the most fruitful way of thinking 
about paternalism. Le., as a violation of individual autonomy. I consider 
challenges to this view, e^^ecially those of Bernard Gert and Charles Culver. 
I argue that all cases appropriately described as paternalism should be 
understood as a denial of autonomy and, quite frequently, a denial of liberty. 
In the remainder of the chapter I consider a variety of issues that apparently 
conflict with the way that I characterize paternalism, e.g., that one can
behave patemalistically toward oneself. Then I argue that certain issues in 
paternalism would be more clearly understood and more easily resolved if we 
attend to the distinction between paternalism and fratemalism.
In chapter 2 I develop the notion of individuality that is found in On 
Liberty. I argue that individuality is a fundamental idea for Mill, not 
withstanding that this reading of Mill may not be consistent with the 
traditional understanding of utilitarianism. Individuality must be seen in light 
of Mill's unique utilitarianism where he maintains that utility is always to be 
understood in the largest sense for man as a progressive being. Once Mill's 
use of individuality is perspicuously understood, it is then possible to advance 
three arguments for antipatemalism. One based on rights; one based on the 
supreme value of individuality and one based on the lack of objective 
certainty with regard to certain preferences.
In the third chapter I develop a notion of autonomy as a concept that is 
captured by five dimensions. Consequently, a person can be autonomous along 
one dimension, in one sense, but not another. I argue that autonomy, at least 
for practical purposes, is individuality. This is a t least true in the sense that 
whatever can be said to diminish or enhance autonomy also can be said to 
diminish or enhance individuality; likewise, whatever can be said to diminish 
or enhance individuality can be said to diminish or enhance autonomy. The 
result of this identity between autonomy and individuality is that the 
arguments developed in chapter 2 against coercive strong direct paternalism 
based on individuality have parallel arguments based on autonomy. In the final 
section of this chapter I defend my characterization of paternalism as a 
violation of autonomy against arguments that this is not a useful way to 
construe paternalism.
In the fourth chapter I explore Mill's arguments from chapter IV of On 
Liberty. There are four obvious arguments contained in that chapter and, I 
believe, a fifth rather obscure and undeveloped argument which I refer to as 
the dilemma of paternalistic punishment; and which I contend is fatal to the 
justification of legal paternalism toward autonomous persons. I further 
contend that the other four arguments, while not sufficiently persuasive to 
establish Mill's absolute prohibition against the illicit triad, are stronger 
arguments than most paternalists are willing to admit. Next I defend MiH 
against the allegation that he is inconsistent. Tne claim is made by a number 
of philosophers that Mill's position on slavery contracts, that a state should 
not recognize them, is inconsistent with his antipatemalism. In other words, 
the claim is that Mill has given in to paternalism after alL Then I re^xrnd to 
the claim that society's need for drug control laws and laws not allowing 
consent of the victim as a legal defense against assault or murder charges 
proves that Mill's antipatemalism is indefensible. I conclude that even without 
the arguments for antipatemalism based on individuality or autonomy Mill has 
a powerful case against patemalism, especially against legal patemahsm.
In the final chapter I consider a variety of challenges bo antipatemalism 
that are not ^ecifically directed against Mill, but, if sustained, would tell 
against his position. Three of the strongest and most discussed issues are laws 
requiring motorists to wear seat belts, motorcyclists to use helmets and laws 
against dueling. I argue that there is no dear sense in which failing to wear 
a seat belt or use a helmet while riding a motorcyde are irrational, thus, 
there is no justification for coerdon over these matters. Patemalistically 
motivated laws against dueling fall prey to the same arguments that I 
developed in chapter 4 with regard to slavery and drug usage laws. Tnen I
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consider a case in which the state must decide whether or not to 
institutionalize an elderly woman or allow her to remain in society where she 
incurs some personal risk. In the second section to this chapter I appraise a 
strategy for defeating antipatemalism offered by John Kleinig which 
maintains that i t  is possible to treat persons in just the way that the 
antipatemahst objects to and still maintain that person's integrity.
My conclusion is that there are powerful and persuasive reasons to 
uphold Mill's antipatemalism and that there are no clear counter-examples nor 
counter-strategies that should persuade us to withdraw moral objections to aH 
paternalism that is coercive, strong and direct.
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ANTIPATERNALISM AND JOHN STUART MILL
CHAPTER I
HOW TO THINK ABOUT PATERNALISM
Gerald Dworkin defines paternaüsrr. as "...roughly the interference with a 
person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the 
welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being 
coerced."^ Jeffrie Murphy also identifies paternalism with actions that coerce 
persons for their own good.'  ^ This definition has been t±je subject of a great 
deal of criticism both for construing patemalism as an intei.ference with 
liberty and for the description of patemalism as coercive. I shall argue that 
while focusing on the coercive element in paternalism does make the 
definition too narrow, it  is substantially correct to construe paternalism as 
restrction of liberty. In fact, Dworkin states the definition more nearly 
exactly later in his article when he says "I said earlier that I meant by the 
term, roughly, interference with a person's liberty for his own good."^
The central moral issue in patemalism is justifying the restriction of 
liberty for reasons of beneficence. Although, as I maH argue, i t  probably 
creates less misunderstanding if we use the term "autonomy" in place of 
"liberty." My own view is that person P acts patemalistically toward 
individual I (by definition) when and only when, (i) P believes his action
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(interference) benefits I, (il) P does not have nor can he reasonably expect to 
obtain I's permission to interfere with I's liberty and autonomous control of 
I's own life, and (iii) P acts so as to interfere with I's autonomy. This 
interference may assume various forms, as we shall see: deception, physical 
restraint and so on; and, while liberty of action is typically the ultimate 
issue, liberty (broadly understood) is always violated in some form. D: strikes 
me that the term that best captures the general character of this 
interference is interference with autonomy; so, in short, patemalism 
constitutes a violation of autonomy. Conditions (ii) and (iii) of course need 
clarification. This will be one of my aims in the remainder of this chapter. In 
section I of this chapter I elaborate on my characterisation of patemalism. In 
the second section I consider challenges to my characterization of patemalism 
as restricting autonomy and consider an altemative characterization offered 
by Bemard Gert and Charles Culver. In the final section I consider a variety 
of issues, for example, the difference between fratemalism and patemalism, 
patemalistic behavior toward oneself and consent theories of justified 
patemalism. Consideration of these issues wiH, I conjecture, help clarify what 
patemalism is and make more plausible my characterization of patemalism.
The model of patemalism that I have suggested reads: B, who considers
himself a benefactor, interferes, by any number of means, with thie
automomous decision process of A solely in the interests of A, but without 
concem as to whether or not A desires this interference. By "decision
process* I have in mind a more or less organized and reflective process by
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which an autonomous individual gathers and assesses facts, considers 
available opportunities in light of his desires, goals or plan of life, and 
selects actions and activities based on his assessment. This process can be 
interrupted at any point by a putative benefactor who distorts the facts, 
deceives, limits opportunities, penalizes the contemplated action or even 
physically restricts an individual or group of individuals. At the heart of 
patemalism is a lack of re^>ect for the outcome of a particular decision 
process, or possibly only the expected or feared outcome. A paternalist may 
think that some individual has poorly assessed his opportunities, misunderstood 
his situation, has incoherent goals or is not competent to make a rational 
decision. For whatever reason, the paternalist thinks he is justified in taking 
at least some control of another's life.
Tiiere is, of course, a difference between interfering in someone's life in 
a patemalistic way and attempting to persuade him to pursue a different 
course of action. For example, if I, as a physical therapist, lie to a patient by 
exaggerating the consequences of not taking the physical therapy sessions 
seriously in order to get the patient to try to maximize the beneficial effects 
of the sessions, I treat him patemalistically by showing no respect for his 
own capacity to make a decision based on the actual facts. However, if I 
reason with him by providing an accurate account of the value of the 
phi’sLcal therapy sessions, then I am appealing to him as a rational and 
autonomous person.
It may also be interesting to note the patemalist sometimes, rather than 
attempting to prevent a person from acting, attempts to require her to act. 
This point is illustrated in the following case:
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CASE 1: Mrs. B will undergo surgery in two or three dal’s for a 
malignant tumor of her right breast. She has obviously understood 
her situation intellectually, but her mood has been rather blase 
and she appears to be rather inappropriately minimizing the 
emotional gravity of her situation. Dr. T's experience is that 
women in Mrs. B's situation who before mastectomy do not 
experience some grief and a t least moderate concem about the 
physical and cosmetic implications of their operation often have a 
very severe and depressive post-operative course. Though Mrs. B 
has insisted that she does not wish to talk about the effects of 
the surgery. Dr. T talks with her about such effects prior to 
surgery in ord|r to facilitate her emotional preparation for her 
impending loss.
So, contrary to the common view of patemalism in general and medical 
patemalism in particular, i t  is not just the physician who withholds 
information against the wishes of the patient who behaves patemalistically, 
but also the one who forces the patient to face a situation, as in this case, 
for her own good. On my view, we find the essential elements of patemalism: 
the intention to benefit another and the refusal to r e ^ c t  the decision of the 
individual It is interesting to note that this may also provide a clear case 
where the individual genuinely does not know her own interest.
n
Probably the most extensive and exhaustive attempt to develop a 
definition of patemalism is that of Bemard Gert and Charles M. Culver in 
their article "Patemalistic Behavior" and again in their book. Philosophy in 
Medicine.  ^ In both of these works they argue that the liberty of action clause 
and the coercion requirement of Dworkin's definition make the definition of 
patemalism too narrow. Gert and Culver propose the following definition of 
"patemalism:"
16
A is acting patemalistically toward S if and only if {A's behavior 
correctly indicates that A believes that ):
1. his action benefits S
2. his action involves violating a moral rule with regard to S
3. his action does not have S's past, present, or immediately
forthcoming consent g
4. S is competent to give consent (simple or valid)
In this section I will respond to the challenge by Gert/Culver that 
paternalism is not in general an offense against autonomy but violates a 
variety of moral rules and, also, offer a general critique of their model of 
paternalism. In criticizing the Dworkin View, and in order to explicate their 
own definition, Gert,^Culver detail a numiber of cases which they argue 
demonstrate the essential features of patemalism. I agree that the examples 
they provide are instructive; however, I will argue that different conclusions 
follow from them tnan the ones they draw.
There does not seem tu be a great deal of disagreement among writers 
on the subject over wrhch caz^ es are paternalistic, although there is some, but 
the arguments center around the proper description or the most noteworthy 
features of a patemalistic act. While i t  may strike one as a bit tedious to 
review numerous cases, I do not see any better way to clarify the concept 
and arrive a t an understanding of how to think about paternalism. The 
following cases are provided by Gert and Culver in their article "Paternalistic 
Dehavior." Each case is meant to be a counter-example to the idea that 
paternalism restricts liberty or that patemalism is coercive.
CASE 2: Mr. N, a member of a religious sect that does not believe 
in blood transfusions, is involved in a serious automobile accident 
and loses a large amount of blood. On arriving at the h o ^ ta l, he 
is still conscious and informs the doctor of his views on blood 
transfusion. Immediately thereafter he faints from loss of blood. 
The doctor believes that if Mr. N is not given a transfusion he will
17
die. Thereupon, while Hr. N is still unconscious, the doctor 
arranges for and carries out the blood transfusion. (Similar .^ases 
may easily be constructed using antibiotic drugs or vaccines.)
Gert and Culver argue that this case demonstrates that patemalism need 
not involve coercion, that i t  need not interfere with liberty of action, and 
that it  need not involve an attempt to control behavior. While their first 
point, that coercion is not essential to paternalism, seems substantially 
correct, it should not be forgotten that most strong paternalism, especially 
paternalistic laws, will involve coercion, so that any justification of 
paternalism in law will need to justify the coercive actions necessary to 
enforce the patemalistic laws.
Their second argument, that Mr. N's liberty of action has not been 
impaired is not so clear, and is perhaps based on an unnecessarily restrictive 
understanding of liberty of action. Presumably the reason this act is 
paternalistic is that i t  meets the four criteria for patemalistic behavior. 
Condition 2 requires the violation of a moral rule. While Gert/Culver argue 
that no moral rule is violated by the physician at the time of the 
administration of the transfusion, condition 2 is still met because subsequently 
the physician will be required to violate a moral rule, either by lying to Mr. N 
about what has transpired, thereby violating the rule against deception, or by 
telling Mr. N the truth and causing him pain, thereby violating the rule 
against causing pain. But this ignores the fact that Mr. N's liberty to choose 
his own fate has already been violated. Mr. N has clearly stated his choice or 
desire (bizzare as i t  may seem to many of us) not to have a blood transfusion. 
A transfusion was administered in spite of his stated desire. If he was awake 
and physically resisting no one would be tempted to say that his liberty of 
action was not being violated. But what difference can it  make that in these
18
particular drcuinstances he is unable to resist? Kis choice at tu wiidu sort of 
actions are and are not to be exercised with regard to his medical treatment 
have not been respected, and I cannot see what difference it makes whether 
or not at some later time the physician who acted patemalistically will eitner 
have to deceive or cause Mr. N pain.
Actually i t  is not clear to me that telling Mr. N the truth, which he is 
likely to find distressing, violates a moral rule. If it  does, then we must 
violate a moral rule every time we break bad news to someone; for example, 
when a physician informs a patient he needs major surgery. This just seems 
wrong to me; that is, there are no grounds for such a rule. Surely no one 
thinks that a dentist breaks a moral rule with each tooth that he fills, but is 
justified in his action because restoring health to the tooth outweighs the 
pain he causes. The pain in this case would be incidental and unintended. 
There is a difference between knowingly and intentionally causing pain. In the 
case of the dentist, the fact that the pain is incidental and unintended means 
he is not violating a rule against causing pain; although there may be cases 
where knowingly causing pain violates a moral rule. The moral rule 
Gert/Culver mention must, if it  is plausible, prohibit the intentional, not 
incidental, causing of pain. If this is so, then informing Mr. N. about his 
transfusion does not violate a moral rule and, on the Gert/Culver model of 
paternalism, the physician is not behaving patemalistically toward Mr. N.
Now consider a slightly modified version of this case. Suppose that later 
we discover Mr. N suffers from irreversible amnesia due to the accident and 
has no recollection of the blood transfusion discussion and that it  never 
occurs to him that he may have had a blood tranfusion. On such an 
eventuality must we say that the physician is deceiving Mr. N? I cannot see
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how. If anyone is tempted to think that the physician is deceiving Mr. N (by 
not informing him) this can only be because he acknowledges that Mr. N's 
decision has been ignored and it  is precisely this action that requires 
justification. We do not normally expect physicians to go through the details 
of treatment unless asked. Even if it  is insisted that the physician is 
deceiving Kr. N, this cannot be a morally objectionable kind of deception. 
Gert/Culver hold that there is a moral rule against all deception, but 
universal condemnation of deception is surely too strong. This is so because if 
there is such a moral rule, then things like wearing makeup to cover a 
blemish or lifts in shoes to make one appear taller would require justification. 
But that would be absurd; also, i t  would trivialize morality. Without a general 
moral rule condemming all deception (the rule should be against lying not 
deception) I see no basis for an objection to not bringing up the subject of 
blood transfusions to Mr. N if he does not bring it  up himself. So now 
(assuming amnesia), on the Gert/Culver model, i t  again looks like this is not a 
case of paternalism at all, since no moral rule is subsequently violated.
Perhaps i t  could be argued that this would still be a case of 
paternalism because the physician must reasonably suppose that he will be 
required to either lie to Mr. N or cause him pain as a result of his giving Mr. 
N a blood transfusion and the amnesia is merely an unexpected and, in this 
case, fortuitous event. But this assumes that telling Mr. N. the truth, which 
win distress him, violates a moral rule, an assumption which I find 
implausible. This also assumes that prediction of future violation of moral 
rules is relevant to whether or not this is a case of paternalism, which I find 
equally implausible. The physician must realize at the time of the transfusion 
that he is violating Mr. N's expressed preference, his choice, as to how his
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life is to proceed at this point, and it  is precisely this element, plus his 
benevolent motive, that makes this a case of paternalism.
I am inclined to think that this is also a case of restricting action where 
action is broadly conceived to include the freedom to be left alone (not to 
have action taken on one's person without permission), or in other words the 
liberty to determine how others will act toward oneself where those actions 
have the kind of impact that medical treatment is apt to have. In mosc of our 
choices i t  is ultimately actions that concern us. So, I conclude, contrary to 
Gert/Culver, that this kind of example fails to show that paternalistic actions 
do not violate the liberty of an individual.
CASE 3: Suppose a doctor lies to a mother on her deathbed when 
she asks about her son. The doctor tells her that her son is doing 
welU although he knows that the son has just been killed trying to 
escape froim prison after having been indicted for multiple rape 
and murder.
This case is offered to demonstrate, again, paternalism without coercion, 
attempts to control behavior, or interference with liberty of action. As 
Gert/Culver suggest, there is not any attempt to control behavior in the 
sense of restraint. Furthermore, the act is not coercive in any direct sense. 
Yet in this case, unlike case 2, the lie is the direct instrument of the 
paternalistic act; whereas, in case 2 a lie, if involved at aU, was indirectly 
involved.
Sissela Bok, however, finds a striking parallel between certain kinds of
9
deceit and coercion. Both can be used to obtain illegitimate power. The 
person who deceives and the person who coerces both exercise a power over 
an indLvidual that she does not willingly give up. Both deception and coercion
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are often used to cover other kinds of wrongdoing; for example, lying to 
cover a theft or attempting to coerce someone into helping with a theft.
I do not wish to digress into a lengthy discussion of coercion, but 
perhaps a bit of exploration into "coercion" would be appropriate. Synonyms 
typically mentioned for "coercion" are "force" and "compulsion." A person may 
be physically coerced with regard to some action, as in an arrest, or 
psychologicaly forced as with threats. Sometimes the tnreat may even be with 
physical force or violence. What are the important features of phonological 
coercion? It may well be impossible to ^)ecdfy necessary and sufficient 
conditions for "coercion. It will be sufficient for my purpose here to get 
the gist of what a typical coercive move involves. So, as a working 
description of phchoLogical coercion I will say that one person coerces 
another when he threatens to inflict a harm or withhold a benefit in order to 
"persuade" the other person to undertake or refrain from some action. It is an 
attempt to exercise power without actual use of force. Coerch'e acts are 
unjustified where in ordinary circumstances the person being coerced should 
legitimately expect better treatment. The element of exploitation is often 
present. What is morally objectionable about unjustified use of threats is that 
the person being threatened deserves to be treated in a different, presumably 
better, way.
The parallel here between deceit and coercion is that both manipulate 
the decision process in some morally objectionable way. There is a prima 
facie case that everyone deserves the truth; also, everyone deserves not to 
be threatened. So, the manipulator, via the lie or the threat, seeks to exploit 
the advantage of his position; knowing the truth or having the power.
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I would not want to push the analogy too far and claim that a lie is a 
kind of coercive force, but like coercion, it accomplishes the same effect and 
does exert influence, sometimes powerful, in the decision making process. In 
as much as information is required to make a decision and formulate 
attitudes, deliberate misinformation, if successfully deceitful, manipulates the 
decision making process, presumably in some way seen as suitable to the 
manipulator, or, as in the case of paternalism, in some way the manipulator 
thinks beneficial to another person. There does, then, seem to be some sense 
to the claim that misinformation forces certain decisions upon us in that we 
might say of some decision, "I was forced to make the decision the way that I 
did since I had no choice," and later I discover that the reason I thought I 
had no choice was that I had been deceived. This may not be coercive in a 
straight forward sense because it lacks the element of threat, but, to borrow 
a phrase from Wittgenstein, there is a certain "family resemblance". The 
resemblance focuses on manipulation and denial of autonomy. The morally 
objectonable features of both are a lack of respect for the individual, perhaps 
even to the point of being insulting or humiliating.^^
Given tlie analogous kinds of objections that can be advanced against 
paternalism effected by coercion and paternalism effected by deception, one 
may ask, why not an absolute prohibition against deceptive strong direct 
paternalism as well as coercive strong direct paternalism? The answer lies, I 
believe, in a certain kind of dissimilarity that exists between deceptive 
manipulation and coercive manipulation. In coercive strong direct paternalism 
the paternalist directly confronts an autonomous individual who has been 
informed of the paternalist's concerns over the lack of wisdom, risk, 
foolishness, etc...and the possii e consequences that the paternalist is
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attempting to prevent. Given that the individual is genuinely autonomous, this 
raises a question about the truth of the paternalist's claim that the behavior 
at issue really is unwise, excessively risky or foolish. But in deceptive strong 
direct paternalism, as in case 3, there is no direct confrontation with the 
intended recipient of the paternalistic interference. Furthermore, often it is 
the case that deception is intimately connected to obtaining the benefit in a 
way that coercion is not. In these cases i t  is senseless to confront the 
individual with a choice, e.g., in case 3 i t  is not realistic to inform the dying 
woman of the ill fate of her son and then either attempt to persuade or 
corece her not to be depressed and saddened over this news. If the physician 
intends to ^ a re  this woman the anguish over her son, he can hardly ask her 
if she would like to be deceived or told the truth. In this kind of case the 
benefit cannot be djtained by persuasion or coercion. The critical differences 
between the coercive cases and at least some deceptive cases are: (1) In the 
deceptive cases the paternalist is not necessarily directly refusing to abide by 
the choice of an autonomous person and (2) in at least some deceptive cases 
the paternalist has no alternative method by which to c±)tain the benefit. In 
specific cases where these differences do not obtain, deceptive methods of 
paternalism may well be as objectionable as coercive methods. But the point 
is that in at least some deceptive cases of paternalism the relevant 
differences permit a line of justification for deception that is not available 
for coercion.
In case 3 i t  does not seem that the primary objective is to control 
behavior, although, no doubt, the physician would like to prevent a tearful 
outburst. It is primarily the emotion of sadness, depression and added 
psychological stress that the physician wishes to prevent. He has decided,
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without consulting his patient, that i t  would be better for her not to know 
certain facts concerning important events relating to her life. In so acting he 
has seized control of an important a ^ c t  of her life, knowledge of a person 
for whom she cares a great deal- She may wish to change her wiH given that 
her son is dead, or to pray for him. Additionally, to whatever extent it  makes 
sense to say that dealing with grief is an action, the patient here is 
prevented from dealing with her grief. If this strikes one as unlikely, I would 
amply point out that Fritz Peris complained a t his death about being given 
pain relievers because they did not allow him to deal with his pain. Such 
examples are not unheard of. If this dying woman is a strong willed person 
and independent minded she may well prefer to know about such events, even 
under her present circumstances. I am not suggesting that it would be wrong 
to withhold this kind of information in all such cases, or even in this one; I 
am merely pointing out that interference with autonomous control of her life 
smacks of manipulation and coercion, which require strong justification..
The physician's aim, of course, is merely to relieve sorrow, but his 
method of doing so withholds information that is of some importance to the 
patient; and information is intimately connected to choice and action in that 
we usually base decisions to act on available information. In totalitarian 
countries (and on some occasions even in this country) one common method of 
restricting freedom, restricting choice, is by controlling information. Although 
all that I  am arguing for in this case is that i t  involves a violation of 
autonomy by withholding information we would think should be provided, and 
because of this, interferes in the normal decision making process in matters 
concerning oneself. There need not be a direct restriction of action in a case 
for i t  to be paternalistic, nonetheless, controlling action does seem to be the
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ultimate goal of the paternalist. So this case does illustrate a violation of 
liberty of action in a broad sense in that it  restricts the options the patient 
is realistically likely to consider or the behavior she is likely to exhibit. 
Reflecting back on the Dworkin definition of paternalism, his "liberty of 
action" requirement doesn't seem so blatantly wrong as much as that it  
merely misleads us into expecting some more direct interference in an agent's 
action than we sometimes find in paternalistic actions.
CASE 4: Mr. K is pacing back and forth on the roof of his
five-story tenement and appears to be on the verge of jumping off. 
When questioned by the police he sounds confused. When 
interviewed by Dr. T in the emergency room, Mr. K admits to 
being afraid that he might jump off the roof and says that he 
fears he is losing his mind. However, he adam.antly refuses 
ho^talization. Dr. T decides that for his own protection, Mr. K 
must be committed to the hôpital for a period of forty-eight 
hours."'"
This is intended as a straight forward case of deprivation of freedom. No 
doubt it  is; ^«cifically, this means that Dr. T deprives Mr. K of his liberty of 
choice by depriving him of his freedom. The more interesting aspect of this 
case is whether Mr. K meets the competency requirement (condition 4) of the 
Gert/Culver model Even if Mr. K does meet the competency requirement, it  
would be easy to construct similar cases where he would not; and still I would 
argue that Mr. K is being treated patemalistically. Condition 4 requires that 
Mr. K be competent to give simple or valid consent in order for the action of 
Dr. T to be considered paternalistic. By "simple consent" Gert/Culver mean 
the ability to understand the nature of the decision that is to be made, to 
consent to medical treatment or whatever is appropriate for a given case and 
realize what one has consented to. For "valid consent" Mr. K, or any 
prospective recipient of paternalism, needs to be able to apprehend or
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"appreciate" adequate information and not be coerced in his d e c i s io n . I t  
appears that in the present case Mr. K is clearly unable to give valid consent. 
However, it  does appear that he understands the nature of the request made 
of him, so he is competent to give or, in the present circumstances, refuse 
simple consent. But suppose that he was not; suppose that Mr. K could not 
even comprehend the nature of the questions put to him by Dr. T. In that 
eventuality, this would not be an instance of paternalism by virtue of failing 
condition 4 of the Gert/Culver model Condition 4 of this model results in 
ruling out certain kinds of cases usually referred to as weak paternalism.
But this seems peculiar to me. If we take as the model of paternalism,
as some writers have suggested, the broader notion of parentalism; that is,
acting as a parent would act to include both the nurturing (maternal) function
of parents and protection (paternal) function, then it  just seems wrong not to
include as paternalistic actions those that deny an individual autonomy on
14grounds of incompetence. In this broad sense these kinds of actions are 
typical of the kind of thing a parent would do for a child, including an infant 
who is not capable of making or understanding the nature of decisions. In fact 
some philosophers (including myself) argue that i t  is just in these cases of 
incompetence that strong paternalism is justified. If condition 4 of the 
Gert/Culver model is allowed, then such justifications become irrelevant to 
paternalism. I t seems wrong to arbitrarily define such views out of the game. 
In fact, intuitively, i t  seems that the paradigm cases of justified paternalism 
may just be those cases where someone is mentally childlike, in need of a 
parent. It seems that even Mill would give in to this kind of case.
CASE 5: Professor B tells his wife that he has had a brief afair 
with her best friend. On hearing this, his wife becomes very 
depressed and says that she wants to kill herself. In fact, she once
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took an overdose of sleeping pills when she was depressed. Before 
leaving for a class that will be over in two hours h ^  without 
t elling her, removes all the sleeping pills from the house.
The Gert/Culver position is that this is more accurately described as a
case of depri'ving of opportunity rather than freedom. No doubt, it  is a case
of depriving a person of opportunity, but it also restricts freedom. As I have
previously argued, one way to manipulate, control or attempt to determ i^ne
the attitudes someone will hold, choices she will make, or actions she will
take is to control information; another way is to control opportunity.
Controlling opportunity is instrumental in controlling actions, m this case the
objective is to prevent suicide, the method or means by which this objective
is accomplished is to limit opportunity.
I think that it should be clear from this case and the others offered by 
Gert/Culver that there is constant confusion in their analysis between the 
objective of the paternalist and the method used to obtain the objective.
There are three elements in a paternalistic act which need to be
distinguished. First, there is the motive, which is always the same for any 
paternalistic action, that is, to benefit the individual who is the recipient of 
the paternalism. Second, there is the specific objective that the paternalist 
adopts because he believes i t  will benefit someone, thus satisfying his motive 
or desire. These objectives include things like preventing suicide, sparing 
someone sorrow or distress, saving a life and so forth. The objective should 
be understood as whatever answers the question the putative benefactor may 
ask himself, "How can I benefit this person?" These actions only become
paternalistic of course when the person receiving the help doesn't want it.
The third element is the means or steps required to accomplish the objective.
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These vary depending on the circumstances and the particular objectives, e.g., 
deception, coercion, or, as in the present case, deprivation of opportunity.
This explanation may look a little odd in the transfusion case. Normally, 
if  the patient doesn't pass out, we would expect this person to continue his 
protest, perhaps even to resist ph\’sically. Then the steps required to 
administer the transfusion would include ph^'sical restraint, or at least, 
refusing to listen to his complaints. I have already explained why I don't think 
his passing out substantially changes the nature of that example. In any case, 
each paternalistic action requires some ^jecdfic means or mechanism by which 
a putative benefactor seeks to achieve his objective. The means adopted are 
often violations of moral rules themselves, e.g., lying, coercion etc... and this 
is perhaps what has led Gert/Culver to identify this element as the moral 
element of the paternalistic act rather than, what I take to be the essential 
feature, unwelcomed interference in the decision process of an individual. 
Le., a denial of autonomy. But case 2 shows that this is not so. In that case 
the means themselves did not constitute a violation of a moral rule, the only 
moral rule violated was one upholding individual autonomy.
In the present case, deprivation of opportunity is the mechanism by 
which liberty is restricted. It is a common complaint of minorities that they 
are not free (economically), not because they are physically restrained, but 
rather simply on account of limited opportunities. It is by ignoring these 
distinctions that Gert/Culver are led to consistently offer cases which 
supposedly do not involve interference with liberty. But in fact, as we have 
seen, these cases so far always have interfered with liberty in one sense or 
another; Le., choice, autonomy and ultimately (in principle) action. The
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description of these cases by Gert/Culver is correct (as far as it goes), but 
incomplete.
CASE 6: A mother, convinced that her son will be killed if he
joins the. ^arines, breaks his arm in order to prevent him from 
doing so.‘‘
The Gert/Culver argument here is that this is suitably described as a 
case of behavior control, but not behavior control obtained by depriving 
someone of freedom; it  is they argue, properly described as disabling. But 
again we are confronted with a case where a person (the mother) thinks that 
someone else (the son) has made a bad decision, so bad that she thinks that 
she knows best and has a right to interfere with her son. It is a clear case of 
not respecting the decision and autonomy of one individual by another who 
claims to be acting in what she "knows" is that individual's best interests. 
Here again we find confusion between the instruments or means of 
paternalism and the objective of paternalism. The mother's objective is to 
benefit her son by preventing him from joining the marines. Rather than talk 
him out of his decision (as her means of controlling him) she physically 
disables him.
CASE 7; Knocking someone out by a blow, as one.i^ght do to a 
friend who seemed about to attack an armed robber.
The point argued here is that this can be a paternalistic act, but is, like 
case 6, really more accurately described as a temporary disabling rather than 
as deprivation of freedom. Clearly this is a case of disabling, but this merely 
illustrates again the confusion between the method or mechanism by which 
the paternalistic act is carried out and the objective. It is not my primary 
purpose to Knock my friend out in such circumstances; my primary purpose is
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to prevent what I take to be a foolhardy decision and the knockout blow is 
perhaps the only means I can think of on the spur of the moment.
CASE 8: Mrs. P, on her first visit as an out-patient, is insistent 
during the last few minutes of her session that Dr. T give her 
some medicine for her nerves and for the vague, poorly localized 
pains which she describes. He feels there is no medical reason for 
her to have medication but judges that if he refuses her request 
outright, a useful and productive initial interview will end on a 
very sour note. However, he believes strongly in not administering 
acrive drugs when there is no medical reason for doing so; 
therefore, he writes a prescripti on for a week's supply of a 
placebo and makes a note on her chart to discuss the issue, ^ f  
medication with her in detail at their next week's appointment.
This case is actually presented by Gert/Culver to illustrate a clear case 
of paternalism as determined by their four point criteria rather than as a 
counter-example to an account of paternalism as necessarily restricting 
liberty. But they do argue that this case neither restricts liberty nor controls 
behavior. On the surface the case of prescribing a placebo may not look like 
a case of paternalism at all because the patient insists on a prescription and 
the physician ostensibly concedes to this request by providing the patient 
with what she wants. If this is all there was to the case, i t  would not be a 
case of paternalism. But of course the patient isn't really getting what she 
thinks or has requested. Gert/Culver tacitly assume all placebos are inactive 
prescriptions, this is apparently not so. For Gert/Culver i t  is the deception 
that fulfills the moral element in the four point criteria of paternalism. But 
on the view I have proposed, whenever a person is deceived for his own good, 
the result of the deception is always, in some sense, to interfere with the 
normal informed and autonomous choice of the individual who is deceived. In 
this particular case i t  is not clear that the physician is providing the 
prescription for the patient's benefit; a t least i t  is not clear to me how the
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patient benefits in any important way from the session not ending on a "sour 
note." I can imagine circumstances in which a sour ending may benefit the 
patient, e.g., cause her to face reality.
It is clear how her choices, or opportunities, are restricted by the 
deception. If she was aware that sie was not getting what sie requested she 
might desire a second opinion. The deception denies her this choice. In 
addition, by prescribing a placebo the physician reinforces in this patient the 
notion that she does need an active prescription. In the usual manner of 
prescribing placebos, deception is inherent in the act of prescribing the 
placebo itself. But even if it  were not, the act would require justification 
because one person has interfered with the autonomous choice of another.
As an interesting aside, recent studies indicate that there is an often
successful procedure for prescribing placebos that does not require
dishonesty. Historically i t  was believed that placebos worked only on the
mind. More recently, however, i t  has been learned that placebos work on the
body by stimulating an internal pain relief system that is capable of relieving
even severe pain. Furthermore, the placebos can work even when patients
know they might be getting a placebo. The non-deceptive procedure for
prescribing placebos is as follows: (1) The patient is informed about placebo
therapy and that some persons can achieve pain relief re^wnses without pain
relieving medicines. (2) The patient is then given a medication realizing that
it may or may not be a placebo. (3) The patient is told to report the results
to the physician and assured that she will not be left to suffer if the
19"prescription" is unsuccessful.
Now I want to return to the four point definition of paternalism 
proposed by Gert/Culver. If I am right in my analysis, they have failed to
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properly identify the essential moral element in a paternalistic act. The 
reason for this is their failure to distinguish the method or mechanism by 
which the act is accomplished from what I have been calling the objective 
(perhaps I should say immediate objective) of the paternalistic act, le .,  to 
prevent some harm from occurring and to ensure that some benefit does. 
Always implicit in such acts is the belief on the part of the paternalist that 
he, for some reason, is in a position to know the interests of another better 
than that other person.
Some writers argue that paternalism always implies a superior to inferior
relationship such that the superior perceives in the inferior a lack of
rationality, understanding, maturity, etc...The superior in this relationship,
then, in some sense possesses a greater insight or perhaps even a more fully
20rational and autonomous grasp of life than the inferior.
This seems a bit too strong an accusation to level against the 
paternalist since a putative benefactor may think that someone is making a 
serious (or perhaps even trivial) error, or is apt to if allowed to proceed as 
he apparently will if not prevented, and yet acknowledge that the individual 
about to err is Q^cally brighter and more rational than himself; but in this 
particular instance this usually brighter and more rational person is making a 
serious blunder in his life which warrants paternalistic interference. So, even 
a child could behave patemalistically toward a parent. There is no reason to 
think that the paternalist assumes an attitude of general superiority, rather 
merely that he has superior insight in a particular circumstance.
Gert/Culver offer a final objection to a view of paternalism similar to 
the one I have been advocating, one held by James Childress.^^ The Childress 
account of paternalism emphasizes two aspects: first, the motivation for a
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paternalistic act is always to benefit another individual, and second, a
paternalistic act usurps the right of decision making in order to benefit the
individual Gert/Culver offer a counter-example to this account: "..oppose a
hypochondriacal patient requests that a surgeon perform an operation on him
22which the surgeon feels is unnecessary and contraindicated." Their point is 
that if the refusal of the surgeon is based on the interests of the patient, and 
presumably it  is, then the surgeon has refused to accept the decision of the 
patient on grounds of benefit to the patient which, according to Gert/Culver, 
satisfies the Childress definition of paternalism. But, obviously, this is not a 
case of paternalism. I really do not understand this objection either directed 
at the Childress view or the view I have suggested. Childress emphasizes 
usurping control of an individual's life; I emphasize interference and 
restriction of liberty and autonomy. The surgeon has not attempted to usurp 
control of the patient's life, nor has he denied liberty nor interfered in the 
decision making process. He has merely refused to help the patient obtain 
what he considers unnecessary surgery. If the surgeon proceeded to attempt 
to restrict the patient's activities, or dissuade him by drugs or deception, 
then he would be behaving patemalistically toward the patient. As it  stands, I 
cannot see how either Childress or I have difficulty with this example.
Now I want to focus on a variety of issues that I believe will further my 
argument that the best way to capture what takes place in a paternalistic act 
is to characterize paternalism as an interference with or denial of autonomy. 
The issues I will consider are first, the distinction between fratemalism and
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paternalism; second, the question "Can someone behave patemalistically 
toward himself?" and, third, the useful boundaries of paternalism. On the 
Gert/Culver model condition three specifies that if the paternalist either has 
or expects he could get the consent of the recipient of the action, then the 
act is not paternalistic. This requirement is obviously bound up in the 
conception of paternalism, that I am suggesting. So if I push some foolish 
person who is running beside the road in the direction of traffic and wearing 
a radio headset out of the way of a car, this is a beneficent action; but not a 
paternalistic one, because I am only doing what I believe he would want me 
to do. This was Mill's point with the bridge example. Even on Mill's strong 
opposition to infringement of liberty of action, where the interests of the 
individual are the only concern, i t  is permissible to interfere in such 
circumstances. It is allowable to perform such actions as illustrated in the 
runner and bridge cases because i t  is reasonable to assume that no one wants 
to be runover by a car or fall into a canyon; hence, their real desires are not 
interfered with. So if we act only in such a manner as we believe an 
individual would consent to, the action is better described as fraternalistic 
rather than paternalistic. In paternalistic actions we interfere in the free and 
autonomous decision matdng process of individuals. In fraternalistic actions we 
only do what we think the individual would ask us to do if he understood the 
situation; we behave as a brother, helping a person get what he wants. In 
paternalistic actions we behave as a parent, imposing our 'wisdom' on another 
person.
The implication of this distinction between fratemalism and patemahsm 
is that consent arguments for justifying patemalistic interference with 
autonomy are wrongheaded. This is so because in fratemalism one is simply
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doing what he believes a person would ask of him if the person realized what 
the fratemalist realizes. Thus, the fratemalist can legitimately argue that he 
has or will get, or should get the consent of the individual whose actions or 
decisions are being interfered with. But in strong paternalism the paternalist 
is willing to act in a more forceful fashion; he is willing to override an 
individual's judgments about his own good. It would seem, then, that aH the 
hypothetical consent theorist is asking is whether or not he is reasonable and 
right in his judgment about the real interests of another; thus, it  is not 
consent that is important, but merely who is right. But this alone cannot 
justify patemalistic interference. Again, if the paternalist is only asking, as 
the consent theorist seems to suggest, if i t  is morally permissible to act 
benevolently toward a person who wants to be the beneficiary of such 
benevolence, then he is asking a trivial question. If the paternalist is asking 
if a person should (in the sense of "a reasonable person would even though a 
given individual may not") welcome interference, then he needs to show the 
connection between a person's being unreasonable and justification for 
interfering with that person's autonomy. And more seriously, if violating 
autonomy is morally objectionable, then that person's consent to having his 
autonomy impaired does not, by itself, justify the impairment anymore than a 
person's consent to a beating justifies the beating. My s u r d o n  is that at 
this point the consent theorist just becomes another version of the 
competency theorist, i.e., a person who holds that incompetency is the only 
grounds for justifying coercive strong direct paternalism. The idea of consent 
is probably meant to capture a form of incompetency, i.e., if a reasonable 
person would consent to coercion, deception etc..., but this particular person
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does not, then this person is incompetent. The point is that consent is not 
important to the paternalist, but justification for violating autonomy is.
This may also indicate that there are moral problems with fratemalism 
as well The consent of another to help or hinder his activities may make that 
help or hindrance welcome, but does not make it  morally permissible. I 
suspect that fraternalistic actions are based on the assumption that the 
desired goal for which the aid is enlisted is itself morally permissible.
An interesting and related issue in paternalism is the question: "Can 
someone behave patemalistically toward himself?" Douglas Husak, and others, 
argue that some cases of patemalism are justified in ^nte of the fact that 
they violate autonomy because the agent consents to the interference. He 
further maintains that no conceptual problems are created by the notion that 
an agent can treat himself patemalistically. Obviously, if Husak is right then 
Gert/Culver, Mill and I are wrong in holding that consent of the agent who is 
the recipient of the "protective" action negates the patemalistic 
characteristics of the action.
Husak supports his position by pointing out that a person can make a 
decision now to intentionally restrict his liberty or autonomy at some later 
time. For example, Odysseus orders that he be physically restrained to 
prevent him from yielding to seduction, a taxpayer overpays his taxes so that 
he can be certain not to incur a tax debt that he cannot pay, and an 
individual refuses to accept credit cards to control temptation to over^nd  
or create debt, a person asks feiends to restrain him when tempted to smoke 
or drink alcoholic beverages. So, Husak concludes, "An agent who acts from 
this reason treats himself patemalistically in voluntarily  consenting to
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measures which subsequently interfere with his liberty to act according to his 
desires."^ ^
But are such actions really patemalistic? Using the Gert/Culver model, 
even eliminating condition 3 as Husak suggests, how could condition 2 be met? 
In order that these kinds of actions actually be paternalistic, there would 
need to be moral rules prohibiting them. This means it would be immoral to 
refuse credit cards on grounds of fear of abuse, and there would need to be 
similar moral rules against the other actions. But what reasons could be given 
for such rules? On the view I have been advocating there is an analogous 
problem with the notion of patemalistic action against oneself. There is a 
sense in which an individual can restrict a future choice by making certain 
decisions and commitments now; and, of course, this is what tempts Husak to 
call these instances of patemalism. But individual autonomy is not really 
restricted. In cases where we attempt to control future moments of weakness 
by making arrangements to restrict our own liberty we are attempting to 
carry out our most reflective and serious desires by guarding against failure 
(in some future less rational moment) to adhere to our previous commitments 
or choices . It would be odd, as previously noted, to call any of these actions 
immoral But there is nothing odd a t aH about raising moral questions when 
someone else interferes in our life in this way. The cases are not analogous, 
and it  is not useful to say that I can behave patemalistically toward myself.
Up to now I have only considered cases suggested by Gert/Culver, which 
are mostly in the medical context. There are other kinds of cases that need 
to be considered that win, I believe, help to illuminate the precise nature of 
patemalism. There are a variety of cases which are sometimes offered as 
examples of patemalism which I think are not. For example, govemment
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advertising the harmful effects of tobacco, providing food stamps in place of
cash to welfare recipients and control of the use and sale of habit forming
drugs. There are non-paternalistic reasons for each of these practices. It is
part of the government's re^x>nsibiiity to advise its citizens of dangerous
enterprises such as the use of tobacco. Food stamps are provided in lieu of
cash, I suspect, to protect the taxpayer from the unscrupulous welfare
recipient. And control of dangerous drugs is more likely to protect the
general population from harm caused by the drug user/addict than to simply
24benefit the potential addict.
Perhaps a more interesting possible counter-example to my account of 
patemalism is provided by certain kinds of incentive programs, for example, 
savings incentive programs offered by some large corporations. Such programs 
offer to match an employee's regular savings dollar for dollar up to some 
dollar limit, say $100.00 per month. In practice this may actually be a 
corporate device to recruit and retain good employees, but suppose that i t  is 
not. Suppose that a company adopts such a policy simply on grounds that it 
fears its employees will not provide for their own future, so that the offer is 
made on grounds of employee interests alone. I can not see anything morally 
objectionable about this kind of incentive program. On my view there needs 
to be some interference with autonomy. However, there does not seem to be 
any such interference.
But doesn't this kind of incentive, intuitively at least, seem 
paternalistic, or a t least parentalistic (characteristic of parental actions)? We 
can easily imagine a parent offering monetary incentives for grades to her 
children in order to encourage good study habits. More gsecifically, we can 
even imagine an exact anaolog where a parent offers a savings incentive
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program to her children to encourage good savings habits. What this kind of 
case may show is that what tends to get identified as patemalism outside the 
family context is what even inside the family context would often be 
considered poor parenting.
We may ask, what would be considered the proper model of a good
parent? Well, a parent, among other things, is a teacher. So we may begin
with this: whatever makes a good teacher will aid in good parenting. Some of
these attributes are: patience, reflective listening, ability to articulate and
persuade rather than coerce, order or warn. Parents, and teachers, who are
able to manage children without threats of reward or punishment are to be
admired; and, I subject, are more effective than those who use threats. A
parent has the re^)onsibility for the moral education of the child, and so
would do well to set an example of honesty. A good parent is perhaps better
25described as effective consultant rather than authority figure. With this 
model in mind, it is eas^' to correlate what antdpatemalists complain about 
most, coercive denial of autonomy, with poor parenting. Governments, 
physicians, and others who resort to deceit and coercion are open to criticism 
just as are parents who have neglected the model of a good parent.
In the case at issue, there are other options open to the parent; she, for 
example, can lie, threaten, or otherwise coerce her children. It is clear that 
the parent, or company, does enter into the decision process with incentives. 
What is not clear is that this is properly described as an interference with 
autonomy. In fact, my intuitions tell me that this is not interference. 
Furthermore, it  is unlikely to be unwelcomed by the recipients of such 
incentives. If it  is parenting at all, i t  looks like good parenting. So on my 
view, this is not patemalism. If anyone is inclined to argue that it is, then I
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would simply point out that there is nothing morally objectionable about it 
and would further want to distinguish this kind of patemalism (perhaps it 
should be called benign patemalism) from the kind I have been identifying as 
interference with autonomy (I ^aH  simply refer to this as patemalism). 
Clearly, i t  is not coercive patemalism. As long as individuals are given a 
legitimate choice, even if some are made more attractive via incentives, this 
docs not constitute a violation of autonomy and is not, on my view 
patemalism. Not everything we might imagine parents doing for their diildren 
need be called patemalism. This characterization of patemalism sets it off as 
a Ha-cy; of cases that involve the special moral problem of justifying the 
denial of autonomy on grounds of beneficence.
In conclusion, it  now appears that the Dworkin definition of patemalism, 
"roughly ti.e interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons 
referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or 
values of the person being coerced," while not quite correct does seem to 
capture most of what we regard as patemalism. It is ultimately action that 
we are concemed with, although patemalism actually interferes with 
autonomy or liberty in a broader sense than merely liberty of action. And 
coercion is not the only device by which the patemaüst interferes with 
lüDerty, although coercion is of major concem, and I might note that the 
other patemalistic methods, lying, limiting opportunity and so forth belong in 
the same family of objectionable interferences with coercion. So the task of 
justifying patemalism is just the task of giving plausible and convincing 
arguments for denying individual liberty and autonomy on grounds of the 
interests of the person concemed. The outcome of these arguments will 
depend on the nature and value of liberty and autonomy weighed against the
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interests and well being of the individual in a given context. To arrive at a 
defensible principle of justifiable paternalistic interference it will be 
necessary to give an adequate account of these concepts.
In the next chapter I examine Mill's use of the concept of individuality. I 
argue in chapter 3 that "individuality" is the word Mill uses for what has 
come to be called "autonomy." In order to fully appreciate and understand the 
strength of Mill's position, i t  is necessary to examine his treatment of 
individuality.
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CHAPTER H
INDIVIDUALITY
It will be useful to begin my discussion of individuality with a discussion 
of individualism. "Individualism" is a word with a curious history. In America 
it is probably safe to say that i t  is a popular word that elicits positive 
attitudes. I suspect that most associate individualism with independence, 
freedom, liberty, strength of character, self reliance, worth of the individual, 
individual rights and so forth. On this view the concept is an appealing one. 
However, such favorable ascriptions have not always been associated with this 
concept.
The word "individualism" first appeared in France as "individualisme" and 
the conservative r e ^ n s e  to i t  was quite critical It was thought by Burke, 
and others, that individualism undermines the commonwealth. It is not 
difficult to follow this line of thinking. If individuals are, in an important 
sense, of supreme worth, and each the judge of what is tight and wrong, then 
how can society impose social or civic duties on the individual who does not 
want them? individualism in this sense suggests a withdrawal from public life, 
antisocial competition of each individual against other individuals, a 
subordination of the good of the group to the interests of the individual and 
was thought to be the harmful product of democracy. The fear was that 
individualism would lead to anarchy and egoism. In the words of one
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Frenchman, all that remains under individualism is "a terrifying confusion of 
interests, passions and diverse opinions."^ In France even today the word 
apparently still has a pejorative connotation, that of being an egoistic 
philosophy destructive of social unity.
One way to combat the negative a ^ c t s  of individualism, while
preserving something of the appealing aspects that attribute importance and
value to each individual, is to distinguish individualism from individuality.
Individualism, on this line of thinking, stresses the central value and
importance of the individual to the extent that it  does entail a certain
amount of egoism, even to the detriment of society at large. Individuality, on
the other hand, stresses the importance of each individual as an object of
respect capable of independence and self-development, while insisting that
each individual maintain a cooperative existence with other individuals.
Perhaps something like the latter is the attitude taken in China. There
individuals are encouraged to develop individual talents. Persons with natural
ability in athletics or science are provided ^«cial training to enhance their
gifts and are encouraged to develop themselves for the good of society, un
this line of thought a form, of individuality is maintained as a value, but
2egoistic individualism is not.
It seems, then, that any account of morality that upholds individualism 
as an important value must deal with the dual reputation of this concept and 
attempt to separate the good aspects of individualism from the less desirable, 
e.g. egoism and anarchy. I believe that i t  would be possible to construe 
individuality as one form of individualism broadly understood, ie . ,  as a 
doctrine stressing the importance of the individual Nevertheless, I shall use 
the term "individuality" as the term for the point of view I am defending.
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One of the attractive features of the endorsement of a concept of 
individuality (as defined here) is that it implicitly recognizes individuals as 
the only moral entities that there are. Saul Kripke once observed in one of 
his lectures that the history of nations is not something in addition to the 
history of individuals. Thus, a complete account of indi'vidual actions in a 
nation would constitute a complete history of that nation. In a similar vein, 
when the claim is made that actions should primarily be judged by their 
impact on society as a whole, not solely the individual agent, this is nothing 
more than a claim that the interests or rights of other individuals must be 
considered as morally relevant to any act. There is no reason to think that 
this kind of claim is at odds with individuality.
In this chapter I shall address three topics. First, I will sketch what I 
take to be Mill's view of individuality. I will make some attempt to explicate 
the historical Mill because I think that the historical issue is interesting and 
important in its own right, but my main purpose shall be to develop an 
account of individuali'.y that has its roots in Mill, is plausible, attractive and 
will help illuminate issues in paternalism. Second, I will propose an 
interpretation of the "progressive being," a conception of human nature that 
Mill seems to take as fundamental Third, I will offer an evaluation of Mill's 
objective criterion of value, which is important for his concept of man as a 
progressive being, and make some suggestions for improving upon his line of 
argument.
47
There is general disagreement among philosophers as to what role 
individuality plays in Mill's thinking. Does individuality have intrinsic value as 
well as utility? This is an important question for my purposes since I have 
defined paternalism as a violation of individuality and autonomy. If 
individuality is valuable only for its consequences, then paternalistic acts will 
need a different sort of justification than if individuality is intrinsically 
valuable. For example, if individuality is not intrinsically valuable, but only 
valuable for its effects, then in circumstances where these effects are not 
present i t  would seem permissible to deny individuality. On the other hand, if 
individuality is intrinsically valuable, or has strong rights-generating 
characteristics, then every violation of individuality will require justification. 
I believe that MiU correctly considers individuality as valuable in itself apart 
from its usually beneficial consequences. Isaiah Berlin, and others as well, 
argue that Mill, much to his credit, abandons a purely utilitarian approach to 
morality in his defense of liberty and individuality by holding that 
individuality has intrinsic value. The fallowing, taken from chapter 3 of On 
Liberty, are but some of the passages that seem to indicate something other 
than a purely utilitarian thinker a t work.^
Where not the person's own character but the traditions or 
customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting 
one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the 
chief ingre&ent of individual and social progress.(p.54)
But the evil is that individual qsontaneity is hardly recognized by 
the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth, or 
deserving any regard on its own account.(p. 54)
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But it  is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, 
arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret 
experience in his own way.(p. 55)
It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what 
manner of men they are that do it.(p. 56)
Human nature is not a machine to be built after a models and set 
to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree which requires 
to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency 
of the inward forces which make it  a living thing.(pps. 56-57)
Having said that individuality is the same thing with development, 
and that it  is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, 
or can produce, well-developed human beings, I might here close 
the argument; for what more or better can be said of any 
condition of human affairs than that i t  brings human beings 
themselves nearer to the best thing they can be?(p. 61)
If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and 
experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, 
not because i t  is the best in itself, but because i t  is ) is own 
mode.(p. 64)
Mill's argument seems to be that liberty is necessary for individuality, 
and that individuality is intrinsically valuable itself. His argument for this is 
quite complex, involving a complicated conception of happiness and human 
nature. MiH informs us early in his essay that when he ^jeaks of utility he is 
thinking of "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests 
of man as a progressive being." He is apparently arguing from some 
conception of an ideal of human excellence, and development toward this 
ideal is intimately connected to morality, or human well-being. Furthermore, 
Mill attacks what he takes to be the character ideal of his time, conformity 
to custom, as being like the Chinese lady's foot, simply molded by the 
environment. As Isaiah Berlin once observed, it  is difficult to believe, when 
we look at Mill's activities, that it was not liberty and justice as such that he
4
valued but utility, m other words, there are a number of intrinsic values at
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work in Mill's thought, not just one, pleasure. "Utility" seems to be used as
the collective name for the group taken together.
I will spend some time in the remainder of this chapter attempting to 
explicate a reasonable interpretation of what Mill's arguments are, and then 
offer some suggestions that I beHeve will strengthen the general approach 
taken by MilL My aim is to arrive at a defense of individuality as an intrinsic 
value that is Mülian in ^ârit. I think that a profitable way to begin my 
inquiry into Mill's arguments for individuality is to consider the arguments of 
Robert Ladenson that Mill is a consistent utilitarian.^ So I will begin with his 
arguments.
Ladenson defends Mill as a consistent utilitarian, that is, as advocating
individuality for purely utilitarian reasons, on two grounds. First, everything
that Mill says about individuality can be understood as a utilitarian appeal 
And since Mill himself affirms that the ultimate standard of morality is 
utdlity, we ought to read him as always making utilitarian appeals. Second, if 
Mill is taken, as he often is and as I tend to read him, as holding a view of 
human excellence based on a natural end, then he must hold a teledogical 
view of nature. But this would be inconsistent with Mill's philosophy of 
science.
I will concentrate on the first point and make only the following 
comment about the second. Mill's view of man may well be inconsistent with 
his philosophy of science. However, there is textual evidence that Mill does 
hold such a view of man. Also, Mill holds Wilhelm von Humboldt up as a man 
of keen insight into human nature and human affairs and takes i t  as a great 
loss to all of us that this man has had such little influence. Since it is dear 
that von Humboldt holds a teledogical view of man, and given that Mill makes
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no attempt to divorce himself from this a ^ c t  of von Humboldt's view, it is
reasonable to believe that Mill agrees with it. But, of course, the best way to
decide this issue is by appealing to  what Mill says.
The main thrust of Ladenson's contention that Mill appeals to purely
utilitarian grounds for individuality is that there is a series of utilitarian
arguments in chapter 2 of On Liberty for freedom of expression, and MüL
claims in chapter 3 that he intends to see if similar arguments do not also
apply to liberty of action. So, on this reading of Mill, we should allow liberty
for the sake of individuality and individuality is valuable for utilitarian
reasons alone, i t  is most productive of happiness.
I want to begin my evaluation of Ladenson's arguments by first.
examining the context in which Mill says, in chapter 3, he will use the
utilitarian arguments of chapter 2. He opens chapter 3 with this remark:
Such being the reasons which make it  imperative that human
beings should be free to form opinions and to express their 
opinions without reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the 
inteiiectuai, and through that to the moral nature of man, unless 
this liberty is either conceded or asserted in ^ i te  of prohibition; 
le t us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that 
men should be free to act upon their opinions-to carry these out in
their lives without hindrance, either physical or mcgal, from their
fellow men, so long as i t  is their own risk and peril.
First, it  should be noted that the arguments Mill is referring to in
chapter 3 that are parallel to chapter 2 are for liberty, not individuality. No 
one, I suspect, would not believe that many of the arguments for liberty of 
thought, expression and action are grounded on some further value. In chapter 
3 this value is individuality. Further, if we take the title of this chapter
seriously , "Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being," and
well-being or happiness being intrinsically valuable in Mill's view, so too is
individuality. Second, i t  looks as though the arguments in chapter 2 are
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deeper and less clearly purely utilitarian than one might suppose; for Mill says 
that the offense against free expression is an offense against the intellectual 
and moral nature of man. The intellectual and moral nature of man is part of 
Mill's notion of man as a progressive being, a concept I wiH attempt to 
develop shortly. Mill claims in chapter 2 as he summarizes his arguments for 
feeedom of thought and expression, that such freedoms are required for the 
"mental well-being of mankind." Mill seems to have in mind by "mental 
well-being" roughly the same aspects of human nature that he attempts to 
capture by the phrase "intellectual nature." Both of these ideas are directly 
tied in with man as a progressive being and with individuality. So it appears 
that individuality is operating on Mill's thought even in chapter 2, though not 
explicitly. Finally, returning to Ladenson's point about the parallel arguments 
between chapter 2 and chapter 3, even if Mill meant to strike a parallel 
between pure utilitarian arguments, i t  wouldn't follow from this statement 
alone that there will not be other arguments as well In fact i t  seems to me 
that Mill rather quickly runs through some arguments that look parallel to 
some of the arguments of chapter 2. For example he criticizes those who rely 
exclusively on custom and tradition for not realizing that traditions may be 
too narrow, unsuitable to another individual and that conformity to custom 
for custom's sake does not educate. From here Mill proceeds to argue in 
diverse ways for individuality, the developed individual So liberty is justified 
because it is necessary to provide individuality. But what establishes the 
worth of individuality?
Ladenson maintains, correctly I believe, that to fully understand the 
arguments for individuality one must understand Mill's arguments in chapter 4 
of Utilitarianism. Ladenson's understanding of Mill's explanation of happiness
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is that various things Isad to happiness, among them virtue. So, for example, 
virtue is originally regarded as a means to happiness, then by continual 
association of virtue with happiness, we come to value virtue itself. Thus, the 
claim that "Y regards X as having intrinsic worth" is to be understood as 
amounting to "Y desires X because he considers it a source of pleasure in its 
own right." Hence, Mill's contention that individuality has intrinsic value is 
compatible with pleasure as the only desirable end. However, what Mill 
actually says is that virtue is desired "not as a means to happiness but as 
part of their happiness." This tells us that happiness is not a simple thing, but 
has elements, and that it  is a mistake to think of these elements as means to 
happiness. Then he says that virtue must be desired "disinterestedly, for 
itself." The picture Mill is portraying is apparently something like this. 
Originally, when we humans formulate a desire, i t  is either because we think 
that the thing or activity we desire leads to pleasure or avoids pain. But, 
through habit or proper training, or ma}t)e both, we can come to intrinsically 
desire other things than pleasure. If we expect our children to love virtue we 
must connect i t  with pleasure and avoidance of pain. But, as they mature, if 
they do so rightly, they will come to love "virtue for itself. Mill provides us 
with an example that illustrates this principle, that is, a desire exhibited, by 
some individuals at least, for money. Originally they desire it only for what it 
can buy, but subsequently they come to value the money itself regardless of 
its potential buying power. The same is true for power or fame. Likewise for 
virtues, living a principled life rather than a self-interested one and for 
individuality. Individuality and the principled life are not means to happiness, 
but the fundamental elements of happiness.
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Perhaps the following analogy wiH help explain the difference between 
the way i read MiH and one traditional (and I take it, Ladenson's) reading of 
MHL Suppose I needed to obtain one dollar and am able to devise a plan 
whereby I can earn a dollar. My plan requires that I earn the dollar in parts, 
50 cents, 35 cents and 15 cents a t a time. Once I have obtained each of 
these I have a dollar. But it  would be misleading to say that obtaining the 50 
cents, then the 35 cents and then the 15 cents led, or were means, to my 
obtaining the dollar. The work is a means to c^>taining the dollar, and even a 
means to obtaining the parts, but the parts of the dollar themselves are not a 
means to obtaining the whole dollar. They, taken collectively are the dollar, 
and further, they are the same kind of entity that we call the dollar, i.e., 
money. In a similar fashion, obtaining the elements of happiness does not lead 
to obtaining a different entity called happiness. Each of the parts of 
happiness (and the dollar) are of the same kind as the whole. Happiness, for 
Mill, is not something sepxtrable and in addition to its parts. Mill even goes so 
far as to say that if we love virtue only for the pleasure i t  may bring, then 
we love i t  for the wrong reason, and worse, this instrumental love of virtue is 
actually counter-productive to the general happiness. MHL may be giving in to 
something like the hedonistic paradox here, that is, happiness is impossible to 
obtain if pursued directly. In order to get happiness we must more or less 
ignore happiness and pursue its elements as intrinsic values themselves. Mill 
further says in his essay on Bentham that happiness is:
too complex or indefinite an end to be sought except through the 
medium of various secondary ends, concerning which there may be, 
and oftei^ is, agreement among p)ersons who differ in the ultimate 
standard.
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So far, on Mill's view, almost anything can be viewed as an element of 
happiness: living a just life, virtue, individuality, love, fame, power, money 
and so on, but only some of these elements are correctly conceived as 
elements of happiness. Mill's criterion for distinguishing genuine happiness 
from some counterfeit is the pronouncement of the competent judges. This 
appeal to quality of pleasure indicates a standard at work other than 
pleasure. Clearly i t  is not simply pleasure Mill values. The much criticized 
argument at the opening of chapter 4 of ut-iiii-j r^ianism that argues from the 
fact that pleasure is the only thing desired to the claim that pleasure is the 
only desirable thing, must be understood in light of the later remarks of that 
chapter. Otherwise, we must hold that MiH, within a very few pages, is guilty 
of the most blatant contradiction. To say that Mill holds that pleasure is the 
only thing mankind is capable of desiring is true only in this limited sense, 
be., pleasure plays a key role in acquiring desires. Mill may or may not be 
right about this, i t  really does not matter for my purposes here. If one 
maintains that Mill is a hedonist, i t  is only so in an attenuated sense of the 
term. For Mill claims that man can, does and should desire other things 
besides pleasure.
n
To fully understand and appreciate Mill's value of individuality, and his 
comment at the opening of chapter 3 of On Liberty about the offense against 
man's intellectual and moral nature, the point of which is linked to the value 
of individuality, i t  is necessary to get a clearer picture of what Mill means by 
■progressive being." It should always be remembered that when Mill ^ a k s  of
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utility it is utility "grounded on the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being." Unfortunately, Mill provides no clear and comprehensive 
account of this notion which he evidently takes seriously, so we are left to
Q
try to piece together an account from his writings. No doubt a number of 
different accounts could legitimately claim to rest on Mill's writings, but it  is 
a t least doubtful that each would be drastically different from the others. In 
what follows I shall attempt to articulate an account of the progressive being 
that connects to what MiH says about the nature of man. The "progressive 
being" is probably best understood as the phrase Mill uses to capture his 
views about human nature, especially the intellectual and moral aspects.
First, the progressive being is an intelligent creature capable of 
formulating an opinion based on evidence. Mill thinks that there is no such 
thing as absolute certainty or final truth in the important affairs of life, but 
there is s u ffic ient certainty so that we can carry on our lives without 
constantly wondering if  we know what we are doing. The progressive being is 
the perron who, by critically reflectin g  on the data of experience and the 
views of other informed individuals, progressively increases his understanding 
of life and values. In fact, this process of critical reflection is the sole path 
to wisdom. The progresâve being, then, has a certain amount of potential for 
developed rational capacity. It is intrinsically preferable that this capacity be 
developed rather than lay dormant. Persons without such developed capacities 
are apt to be those who conform to custom merely because they cannot think 
of any options; and neither do they understand the rationale behind the 
custom. Such persons lack a significant human aspect, a unique expression of 
themselves; they are in an important sense less than the best they can be. 
Recall that Mill quotes and praises this passage from Wilhelm von Humboldt:
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The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal 
and immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and 
transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development 
of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.
This passage seems to capture a t least one of Lie a ^ c t s  that Mill has in
mind for the progressive being. Development is the major ingredient in the
personality of the progressive being. Later Mill will identify self-development
with individuality. The claim is that this is the true end of man and it is
prescribed by reason. Precisely why this is so is not yet clear.
The second distinguishing feature of the progressive being is that he has
character. Mill says that:
A person whose desires and impulses are his own-are the 
expression of his own nature, as i t  has been developed and 
modified by his own culture-is said to have a character. One 
whose desires and impulses are not his o\jn has no character, no 
more than a steam engine has a character.
So having our own desires is important on Mill's view. He draws an analogy 
between having our own understanding and having our own desires. We can 
easily see the advantage of having our own understanding. I take having our 
own understanding to mean roughly, being able to give an account of why a 
proposition is true (or false), the conditions that make it true and the 
conditions that make it  false. The appeal here may be similar to the 
Aristotelian appeal that the man of wisdom knows causes, or reasons as well 
as facts. The same reasoning is to apply to desires. Mill correctly sees the 
importance of desires. What desires we acquire and cultivate determines to an 
enormous extent our personality and character. Mill argues that these should 
be our own. By this I take i t  he means that we should consciously adopt and 
cultivate our desires having reasons for cultivating some desires and not
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others. Of course having our own desires does not mean that we choose 
whether or not we will have basic human desires; we do not choose, for 
example to be hungry. Nor do we choose to have a natural inclination to love 
the sea, or fear heights. But within the context of basic human desires, which 
sometimes can be willfully controlled, and natural inclinations and gifts, we 
can govern our lives quite extensively by consdou^y choosing to cultivate 
some desires or inclinations and suppress others. It is in this sense that we 
are able to choose our desires. And just as an informed and reflective opinion 
is valued over mere preference, consciousiy chosen desires are valued over 
those acquired in an unthinking fashion. Persons who reflectively choose their 
desires possess character, and are a benefit to society and themselves. Here 
Mill provides a metaphor. He compares human nature to a tree, as 
distinguished from a machine that is built, which needs space to grow and 
develop in accordance with its inward force. This is probably a further 
indication of the von Humboldt influence. For von Humboldt compares human 
nature to a flower, and adds that “the highest point of human existence is 
this fLowering."^^
The third feature of the progressive being is that he is a social 
creature. Mill thinks, like Hume, that humans have social feelings, but that 
these feelings need to be encouraged. The progressive being is a moral being 
who recognizes that the interests and desires of others count equally as do 
his. Actually, he does not merely recognize this, he feels it.
Mill addresses the issue of training, or encouraging the formation of 
certain tendencies, desires and impulses while discouraging others on two 
occasions in On Liberty; first, he says that youth should be taught the 
"ascertained results of human experience," and second, the desires and
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impulses that are to be our own are modi&ed and developed by culture. This 
raises two difficult problems. First, which desires and impulses are to be 
encouraged? And, why these and not others? The second problem arises from 
Mill's claim that our desires should be our own. How do we resolve the 
tension between having our own desires, which creates individuality, and the 
socialization and educational processes that are going to encourage, perhaps 
even inculcate, certain desires over others? I will postpone consideration of 
the latter question until chapter 3 of this work.
r c r
How might Mill answer the first question? I think that i t  is dear how 
Mill would re^x>nd: we inculcate desires and impulses consistent with and
perhaps even a prerequisite for Mill's brand of utilitarianism. Since Mill has a 
healthy respect for virtues, justice ana tne higher or intellectual pleasures, 
socialization and education should encourage these kinds of things. The 
criteria by which we know that these are the right kinds of things to 
encourage are the pronouncements of the competent judges. The criterion 
works like this:
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost aH who 
have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of 
any feeling of moi^ obligation to prefer it, that is the more 
desirable pleasure.
Mill takes i t  as unquestionable that those who are competent to judge such 
matters prefer the higher pleasures, including virtues, justice and 
individuality. His explanation is that a being with higher faculties and talents 
(a progressive being) requires more to make him happy than a lower type of
59
creature. Such a being cannot be fully satisfied with the lower kind of 
pursuits. The decision of the competent judges is the sanction which justifies 
society's encouraging one kind of desire rather than another. The judges 
constitute the objective criterion for the most desirable or best kind of life. 
Furthermore, education is required in order to develop the right kind of 
desires because the natural tendency and capacity for such desires is a 
"tender plant" and needs constant nurturing to keep it alive.
Mill needs an objective criterion of desires and happiness in order to 
justify teaching certain kinds of experiences and endeavors as more valuable 
than others. In addition, he needs this criterion to make any sense at all of 
man as a progressive being. If there was no method or standard by which we 
can say one individual has lived weU and another has not, then there would 
be no criterion for progress, and the notion of progressive being would be 
meaningless. Is his criterion adequate?
It seems to me that there is a problem with the way Mill has developed 
this criterion. The competent judges teH us which desires and impulses are 
preferable by comparing, from their own experience, the degree of 
satisfaction they obtained from satisfying the lower desires with the 
satisfaction obtained from pursuing the higher desires. One is a competent 
judge by virtue of having demonstrated the capacity to successfully engage in 
the higher human endeavors. Among these are, say, reading quality literature, 
appreciating the arts and almost certainly understanding the social sciences, 
since the progressive being must sift through the data of the social sciences 
in order to make well founded judgments about his life and about his 
participation in civic re^>onsibilities. individuals who are successful at such 
endeavors are likely to be just those who have the natural capacity and taste
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for such things, and who perhaps are encouraged by parents and teachers to 
pursue such things. Those who are not gifted this way, or not properly 
encouraged, will probably fail to develop in certain ways and, therefore, not 
be counted among the competent judges. Thus the appeal to the competent 
judges seems to come to no more than this: those who are naturally talented 
and interested in the pursuit of higher learning prefer these kinds of 
pleasures over more mundane enterprises. It now appears that the outcome of 
the decision of the competent judges is built into the selection process for 
being a judge.
A similar attack on Mill's criterion is made by Michael McPherson. His 
criticism is that the fool and Socrates are in ^m  metrical positions.^^ For 
Socrates can say to the fool, "fool, you prefer the sensual pleasures to higher 
pursuits because you have failed to develop the capaciy to enjoy the kinds of 
activities that I and my colleagues enjoy, hence your life style is inferior to 
mine." But the fool can reply, "Socrates, you have simply lost (or perhaps 
never had) the capacüy to enjoy what I enjoy, hence all your effort and 
intellectual straining is wasted in that I can enjoy life just as much without 
so much effort."
While these arguments carry some force against Mill, neither, i t  seems 
to me, demonstrates conclusively that the judgment of experienced persons is 
irrelevant to value considerations. They do show that such judgments cannot 
be as conclusive as Mill thought, a decision from which there can be no 
appeal Still the judgment of experienced persons is a relevant consideration 
in determining whether or not certain pursuits are worthwhile. If those who 
engage in higher pursuits almost universally find such activities most 
satisfying, and other experiences quite shallow in comparison, then this should
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be counted as some evidence for the higher pursuits. This is so since even if 
the judge's estimations have been colored by previous training, i t  does not 
follow from that fact that aH of their preferences can be explained by 
education and training. I t may well be that they have discovered something 
important for all humans. Those we are apt to describe as competent judges 
do have experiences others do not, hence, their preferences should be counted 
for something.
An interesting twist on this approach might be to appeal to those who 
perhaps could be described as 'incompetent judges.' Here the appeal is to 
those who Uved a large part of their Eves without any, or at least very much, 
experience with the higher pleasures; hence, they can be regarded as having 
failed to develop these capacities. We then ask, what is the judgment of these 
individuals? Do they express any regret for having failed to develop their 
capacities or feel as if they have missed out on valuable experiences? My 
suspicion is that at least some persons who would faE into this category 
would express regret.
Obviously it  may be objected that since these individuals have not 
experienced both the lower and higher pleasures, that their judgments about 
preferences are irrelevant. But the point is that they have experienced life 
without the higher pursuits. So even if their testimony is only about where 
value does not reside, this at least gives credibility to the claim that value 
resides elsewhere; perhaps in the higher pleasures. This, combined with the 
fact that the competent judges do not experience regret a t having developed 
themselves, provides a stronger consideration than an appeal to the competent 
judges alone.
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McPherson makes an innovative suggestion for Mill to improve his
argument, although the revised argument will not support as strong a
conclusion as some would Uke. The revision involves shifting the perspective
from the point of view of persons who have already formulated their primary
desires and impulses establishing their plan of life (competent judges) to the
per^jective of persons who are just now deciding on which desires and
impulses to cultivate. The argument then maintains that such persons exhibit
a strong tendency to prefer to cultivate capacities for higher pleasures. This
choice is referred to as a "metapreference," a preference for certain
preferences. On this line of argument the metapreference is not based on
expectation of more pleasure, but on the mere fact that people do in fact
14have desires for the higher pleasures. I am not sure that this is an 
argument that Mill would be able to endorse in its present form. Mill 
evidently thinks that in order to instill desires in individuals the desires, at 
least in the early development, must be connected with pleasure or pain 
avoidance (although, as I have stated, this does not seem to be an important 
feature of Mill's view). However, even if the adjustment was made to make 
the metapreference on the basis of expected pleasure, the individuals at this 
stage of life, desire formation, must be quite young and, therefore, are either 
apt to be easily persuaded by their teachers, or if they ignore the advice of 
their teachers, they would appear to lack a solid basis for their rejection of 
such advice. I t seems that persons in the ' metapreference stage' of 
development wiU either be unduly influenced by the socialization process, or 
their rejection of this process should be automatically s u ^ c t ,  since they 
lack broad-based knowledge and experience in life. What is ftrill needed is a
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justification for instilling certain preferences, and not others, via the 
socialization process.
There is another more forceful, and perhaps more promising, attempt to 
connect what is actually desired with what is desirable, thus providing an 
empirical and objective foundation, and justification, for inculcating some 
desires and not others. This argument is suggested by Kai Nielsen. 
Anthropologists, he observes, historically have been fond of noting the great 
differences that exist in the customs, beliefs and practices of the many 
societies that occupy this planet. More recently, however, some 
anthropologists have been more inclined to describe the similarities that exist 
between societies. So now we begin to find references to 'universalities in 
human needs, potentialities and fulfillments' and sometimes reference to 
'common humanity,' a universality of wants and desires. Apparently there is 
universal regulation in societies of such things as incest, property, lying and 
stealing. Also, there is universally a distinction between murder and homicide; 
human life and its preservation is seen as a good. Pain aiiu frustration are 
universally viewed as bad. Moral codes exist to preserve the success of the 
society; and some anthropologists claim that values are based on universal 
human needs. But, Nielson asks, why should these needs be fulfilled? It is 
always possible to scrutinize a need, even if universal, and argue for its 
suppression rather than satisfaction. So cross cultural uniformity does not 
guarantee the success of objectivism any more than cross cultural differences 
entaü relativism.^^
Nielsen hedges a bit, and correctly I think, on the denial of a connection 
between the establishment of objectivism and uniformity in nature. He thinks 
that if all normal people desire X, i t  would be odd if X were not good or
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desirable. It may actually be that Mill had something like this in mind in the 
opening argument of chapter 4 of Utihtananism. I am somewhat ^mpathetic 
to this argument if supplemented with a qualification. As previously noted, it 
is a legitimate function of moral philosophy to question human nature, to ask 
if certain aspects of human nature should not be resisted. Hence, even if 
some desires are universal, it  cannot be the bare fact of the desire alone that 
establishes a thing as desirable. For example, i t  may well be that there is a 
universal desire for revenge as a re^xonse to a felt injustice. But there are 
good reasons to forego revenge, suppress the desire, and submit instead to 
rule of law and impartial judgment. So here, a universal desire for revenge, if 
it  exists, would not establish revenge as desirable. However, if there is a 
universal desire, as I s u ^ c t  there is the desire to avoid pain, and reflection 
coupled with other relevant empirical considerations cannot produce any 
convincing reasons why the desite should be resisted or modified, there is a 
prima facie cas_ that the thing oesirec! is good or desirable. So, the relevant 
difference between establishing pain avoidance as desirable via the universal 
experience of mankind argument and establishing revenge (assuming it  was a 
universal desire) by the universal experience of mankind argument is tiiat, for 
the former, no reasons can be given for modifying the desire, while in the 
latter case, the desire for revenge, reasons for resisting can be given.
MiH himself recognizes the limits of the argument from desire or 
universal human experience. He advocates individuality as having intrinsic 
worth even though he acknowledges that this worth is not widely accepted. 
His claim is that those who fail to uphold individuality as valuable in its own 
right are mistaken.
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This line of argument is, I think, made even more forceful by an account 
of value and rational action provided by Bernard Gert.^^ On this view reason 
is connected to actions in that irrational beliefs and desires are irrational 
because they are likely to lead to irrational actions, hence irrational action is 
primitive, Gert explains the view this way:
I shall call a belief irrational if and only if (1) i t  is held by a 
person with sufficient knowledge and intelligence to know that it 
is false, (2) it is inconsistent with a great number of things he 
knows to be true, and (3) this inconsistency is apparent to almost 
all people with similar intelligence and knowledge. Thus an 
irrational belief must not merely be a false belief, not even an 
obviously false belief, but an obviously false belief held by a 
person who has sufficient intelligence and knowledge to know that 
it  is false. I call such a belief irrational ^cause holding it  
generally leads to what I call irrational actions.
Based on this notion of rational belief, a useful distinction can be made 
between two kinds of rational beUefe, those required by reason and those
h v  r o a c n n  Z . h o l i o f  i c  rom iiro H  h v  ro a o n n  i f  i f  i s  ir r s f in n s T  n n f  f n
beHeve it, A belief is allowed by reason if it  is neither required by reason 
nor irrational, so an intelligent and informed person could hold a belief that 
is allowed by reason to be either true or false and not be considered 
irrational The sort of actions that Gert has in mind as being irrational are 
the following (these acts are irrational unless there is some unusual 
circumstance that justifies them): to take one's life, to subject oneself to 
pain or disability, to surrender liberty and opportunity. There are ,then, some 
beliefs about ourselves that are required by reason, they are; that we are 
mortal we can suffer pain and disability, we can suffer loss of freedom and 
opportunity, and that we can be deprived of pleasure. It is also irrational to 
desire any of these without justification.
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It may be argued that this is, in a sense, a weak view of rationality; 
that it  will allow as rational many beliefe that really are not. But conceiving 
rational belief this way has the advantage of making a claim that a belief is 
irrational a very strong claim. It seems to me that this is the more important 
function of a concept of rationality, to lend a fair amount of certainty that 
those actions, beliefs and desires that are labeled irrational are really 
irrational Further, if anyone thinks that any of the desires listed above as 
irrational are rational or the corresponding actions that make the desires 
irrational are really rational he need only consider what action he would 
take if someone he cared for a great deal began to express a desire for 
death, injury, slavery, pain, or loss of pleasures. One would, no doubt, fear 
for the sanity of anyone who engaged in attempts to carry out these kinds of 
acts. I think, therefore, that this view captures an intuition we all share 
about rational acts and desires.
Are there any values required by reason? As Gert points out, i t  is easier 
to define disvalue or evil than good. The previously listed irrational desires 
designate corresponding disvalue; so that "evü" is defined as the object of 
irrational desire. This m.eans that the fundamental evils are death, pain, 
disability, loss of freedom and loss of opportunity. All rational men will want 
to avoid these evils. A rational desire is one that is allowed, not required, by 
reason. This conception of rational desire will allow quite a bit of divergence 
among positive values. While i t  is required by reason to pursue pleasure, 
opportunii^ and so forth, there is room for variance from individual to 
individual as to how much of these values is enough and exactly what form 
they should take. For exam.ple, knowledge, friendship, health, self 
development, artistic endeavors are all related to pleasure and opportunity.
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but merely holding pleasure and opportunity as values does not commit one to 
an exact recipe for life. Neither does this view make value subjective; it 
merely allows choice within a limited range of rational values. Value then is 
the object of rational choice where intrinsic values are those required by 
reason in order to avoid intrinsic evil.
Let me now summarize my position. The most important a ^ c t  of 
individuality is that the person who is characterized as possessing this trait is 
a person with his own desires, views and ambitions. They are the ones he 
wants to have; his personality is his own. To promote individuality is to 
promote a vision of humanity as a being capable of choosing his own 
personality and character, who has a concept of himself as an intelligent 
creature. I t seems to me that i t  is plausible and appealing to describe 
mankind as a progressive being, one capable of intellectual and moral 
progress, and as a being capable of defining for himself what that progress 
entails. Mill apparently uses the phrase "progressive being" to refer to 
potentialities for human growth and development. In Mill's usage, individuality 
refers to a developed individual, one who has realized, at least to some 
extent, his potential as a human being. The phrase "intellectual and moral 
nature" and the phrase "m.ental well-being," which are scattered throughout 
On Liberty, are apparently used to capture the idea of the progressive being 
who is progressing toward fulfillment and, thereby, excellence. The claim is 
that we know how humans should develop, we know what is good for us.
There is a connection between intellectual progress, moral progrès, 
well-being or happiness and rational desires. It is fairly clear what 
intellectual progress is, movement toward a more knowledgeable and wiser 
race of persons. Moral progress is more difficult to define and to defend.
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Moral progress is possible because there is an objective criterion for good and 
evü. As a progressive being mankind is capable of increasing the good aspects 
of his environment and decreasing the bad, hence increasing his well-being. 
But more importantly, he is capable of improving himself. The objective 
criterion that defines progress and improvement is established via three 
arguments. First, the argument from both the competent and incompetent 
judges. The appeal to the experience of these kinds of persons is at least a 
consideration indicating that the development of intellectual capacities and 
tastes is preferable to not developing such tastes. Second, the argument from 
the universal experience of mankind which suggests that such things as pain 
and frustration are undesirable, whüe rule of law and cooperation among 
individuals is preferable to anarchy. Third, the argument from irrational 
action which shows that certain kinds of desires just are irrational This I 
take to be a fundamental datum of human experience, or what Mill might 
refer to as one of the "ascertained results of human experience." Man as a 
progressive being is capable of recognizing the difference between irrational 
hence undesirable, actions and those that are rational This being is capable 
of charting his own course in life, capable of working out his own view of a 
happy and satisfying life. Furthermore, a positive conception of happiness is 
person unique.
This last comment will be made clearer by a distinction between two 
kinds of factors, those that make us happy and those that make us unhappy. 
Perhaps it  is commonly thought that happiness and unhappiness are mutually 
exhaustive, but this does not seem to me to be so. The factors that make a 
person happy are different factors from those that make one unhappy. There 
is, I think, a parallel here that will help clarify this point. Studies by
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Frederick Herzberg indicate that the factors for job satisfaction and job
dissatisfaction are different; that is, those things which prevent job
dissatisfactLcn (for example, clean work and good pay) do not lead to job
satisfaction (an example of a job satisfaction factor is thinking that the work
one is doing is important). Hence, i t  makes sense for someone to say of his
job that he is not dissatisfied with it, but neither is he satisfied with it, that
18is, he does not find it particularly satisfying.
I maintain that an analogous condition holds for happiness. The factors 
that lead to unhappiness are those associated with irrational desires, death, 
pain, disability, loss of freedom and loss of opportunity. But merely avoiding 
these does not guarantee one a happy or meaningful Hfe. Har#ness is a 
condition that may result from satisfying those desires that fall into the class 
of rational desires. But there is no certainty here, for we are often 
disappointed with obtaining our goals. Further, i t  cannot be determined 
without consulting each individual what sort of life wüL make him happy. We 
are on firmer ground when making claims about those experiences that are 
likely to lead to unhappiness than when making claims about experiences that 
lead to happiness. In addition, the most troublesome kinds of moral arguments 
are those trying to show that one among competing goods is better, or one 
among competing evils is worse.
Individuality is important because each person must conduct his own 
experiments in living and decide for himself what course of action best suits 
him. It is not merely that individuality leads to or maximizes the chances for 
happiness, rather i t  is as Mill suggested, an essential part of happiness. 
Individuality is as much being something as doing something; i t  is being a 
person of a certain sort, the person I desire to be. An important part of life
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is spent in determining, choosing, and planning. This is an intimate part of 
what i t  means to be a person and is, at least in part, happiness itself. It is 
basically satisfying for most persons to be the author of their own existence, 
and this is closely tied to a sense of worth and self-esteem.
Ti. should now be evident that there are three lines of argument against 
paternalism based on individuality. First, one could daim that individuality is 
an integral part of being a person. Thus, it is axiomatic that we ought not 
interfere with the free expression of personhood which is purely 
self-regarding. The language of rights could be invoked here. Everyone has a 
fundamental right to act unrestricted in self-regarding conduct . All strong 
paternalism impairs individuality in some way, either by coercion, deceptive 
manipulation or physical restraint. The right of a developed individual is 
absolute in these matreis. Consequently, the proper justification of strong 
paternalism is to establish that the recipient of the paternalistic interference 
is not really developed in the appropriate sense. In other words, the recipient 
is not competent either due to ignorance or mental impairment of one sort or 
another. Perhaps another way to capture this strategy for developing 
antipatemalism is to argue that the position is analytically true. Once the 
nature of individuality is understood, that a person properly described as 
developed is one who is fully competent, has charted her own course in life 
and does not welcome interference, then it  is evident that one ought not 
coerce such an individual on purely self-regarding grounds. It is impossible to 
believe both of the following: that person P is properly characterized by the 
term "individuality" and person P should be coerced for her own good. 
However, this is not a useless analytic truth. Perhaps it  belongs in the same 
category as claims like, "Always act in accordance with right reason" and "Do
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good and avoid evil" These truths, while not immensely helpful do point out 
a direction for proper action. The first one designates proper action as that 
which is based on reason; thus ruling out as illegitimate appeals to prejudice, 
false beliefs and so on. The second espouses what might be described as the 
moral point of view. Admittedly, neither claim is rich in content, but they 
give us a starting point for justifying our actions as rational or moral In the 
case of paternalism the first step in justification is to show that the 
contemplated action does not fall within the boundaries of the illicit triad, 
le .  paternalism that is coercive, strong and direct.
The second line of argument based on individuality maintains that 
individuality is an intrinsically desirable state for human beings. To mature to 
this state is to be a developed, rational and capable individual with regard to 
managing and directing one's own life. Further, the developed individual will 
have a sense of this development, a self-awareness, that is associated with a 
sense of worth and self-esteem. Strong paternalism conflicts with this state 
of individuality. The paternalist in effect says of an individual, in this 
situation you are not able to judge your own interests, someone else is. If this 
is true, and no doubt sometimes it will be, i t  needs convincing evidence. The 
evidence will be tantamount to showing that the paternalism is weak, not 
strong. In the case of strong paternalism the offense is especially severe, 
^ c e  a developed individual is treated as though he is not, which is an insult 
to that person's sense of worth or esteem. The argument further maintains 
that living a life free of paternalistic restrictions, that is, living as an 
independent operator in the world, is immensely desirable; perhaps even of 
supreme value. So, even if there are competing values, e.g„ safety, when the 
disvalue of the coercion is factored into the moral equation, the balance is
always in favor of allowing unrestricted expression of individuality. Thus, 
coercive strong direct paternalism is always wrong.
The third line of argument against paternalism is that the paternalist 
often claims to know what she in fact does not know, i.e., what is best for 
the individual If one interferes with a suicide, where the motive for the 
suicide is to avoid a brief continued existence ending in a painful death, one 
is interfering with a judgment between competing evils where one evil is 
accepted in order to avoid another. There is no dear best course of action 
here and, hence, no solid grounds for the interference. In other words, the 
paternalist often claims to know what, in a given set of circumstances, he 
cannot know; that, for example, i t  is better to Eve with severe pain than to 
die. It is in this kind of case that the paternalist forces his preferences on 
others in a particularly offensive way.
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C H A P T E R  n i
AUTONOMY
Perhaps the clearest and most direct explanation of the meaning of 
"autonomy" is captured in its literal root meaning, self-rule or self-governing. 
The earliest usage of this term that I know of was to refer to a Greek 
city-state that made its own laws. Le., was not under the dominance of a 
foreign power.^ The advantages and desirability of being in an autonomous 
state are obvious; the citizens do not pay tribute to another government, can 
make laws and social arrangements to suit their own purposes and conception 
of well-being, citizens are not forced to participate in military alliances not 
in their own interests and the citizens gain a sense of nationality, security 
and independence. It is easy to see the attraction of attributing an analogous 
attribute to individuals who are self-directing, who determine their own fate 
free of certain restrictive influences. What is not so obvious is exactly what 
the appropriate description of the autonomous individual is.
My purpose in this chapter is fourfold: first, to provide what I take to 
be the appropriate description of the autonomous individual; second, to argue 
that Mill's concept of individuality as I developed that concept in chapter 2 
of this paper is the same concept as autonomy; third, to address an issue 
raised in chapter 2, that is, to explain how individuality and autonomy are 
compatible with an education process that inculcates certain values; and
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fourth, to explain further how it is useful and plausible to construe 
paternalism as a violation of autonomy.
Rather than define "autonomy," I think it  is more useful to simply 
describe its relevant features. The intuitive notion I am attempting to cash 
out is the autonomous indi\ûdual as self-governing or self-directing. It seems 
to me that this notion is captured by what might appropriately be described 
as the five dimensions of autonomy. The five dimensions are awareness, 
cognition, intentionality, independence and instrumentality. Hence, autonomy 
is not an all or none phenomenon, but is possessed in degrees depending on 
how one scores on the various dimensions. Also, an individual can be 
autonomous in one sense (dimension) while not in others. Further, one can, 
and often does, trade one dimension of autonomy for development in another. 
I shall now attempt am explanation of what I have in mind for each dimension.
The dimension I call awareness includes self-awareness or self- 
consciousness as well as awareness of the possibilities and realities that exist 
in the external environment. To be autonomous an individual must be aware of 
himself as an autonomous agent and also aware of the possible courses of 
action and opportunities available. Hence, a certain amount of imagination 
and creativity are required in order to see the possible kinds of interaction 
with one's environment that are open. Further, awareness incorporates the 
ability to integrate different courses of action and see how one course 
affects another, how some choices open new possibilities while closing off 
others. For example, the decision to enlist in the Army closes certain
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opportunities until the period of eriiistment terminates, while it  opens other 
possibilities, pernaps travel and achievement of a sense of adventure. The less 
one is aware of herself and how the environment, social, political, family, 
physical and so on, influence her, the lower she scores on the awareness 
dimension.
The second dimension of autonomy is what I caU the cognitive dimension. 
This dimension includes what might be described as intelligence and use of 
human reason. To be autonomous a person must be rational, able to connect 
ways of achieving goals and purposes with the means to these goals and 
purposes. This individual must understand what her interests are. The 
autonomous person must have at least some ability to gather information and 
evidence, determine if i t  is relevant to the issue or decision at hand and 
provide some logical evaluation of what conclusions follow from the gathered 
information. I understand this aspect of autonomy to include rational 
reflection, some ability to conceptualize; in short, autonomy requires a 
minimal degree of intellectual competence. There is, no doubt, overlap 
between this dimension and awareness. The overlap is indirect in that the 
more intelligent a person is the more apt she is to be creative in thinking 
about her choices in life.
By intentionality, the third dimension of autonomy, I have in mind 
purposive behavior, behavior directed toward a goal Obviously this dimension 
overlaps a bit with the cognitive dimension, since part of what is included in 
the cognitive dimension relates directly to means-end relationships. However, 
intentionality emphasizes, not merely intelligent pursuit of ends, but 
formulation of ends themselves, to consciously aim a t some goal The 
autonomous individual must consdousiy intend her action, choice or decision.
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Evidently this dimension also overlaps with awareness, for if the really 
important choices about our life, what education to pursue, what occupation 
to have, whether or not to marry and so on, are to be autonomous they must 
be intended and the individual must be aware of the likely consequences of 
such endeavors.
The fourth dimension of autonomy I call independence. By independence I 
understand a kind of psychological power to divorce oneself from certain 
internal (drives, instincts, desires) or external (societal or family) influences 
in order to assess one's beliefs and desires. Additionally, independence 
includes the capacity to adopt a different perspective from, the one presently 
held. An individual who scores high on the independence dimension of 
autonomy is self-directive in a way that a t least some animals are not. 
Consider, for example, the migratory habits of some birds. There is a sense in 
which the behavior pattern of these birds is self-directive; the sense is that 
there is no external person or force causing them to migrate. The 
fundamental cause of the migration is internal I say fundamental cause here 
because there may be external cues which trigger the migratory rep rise . But 
the urge to migrate is internal self-initiated. Yet this is not a 
self-determined or autonomous decision on the part of the animals. The reason 
that instinctual behavior cannot be autonomous is that the animals, a t least in 
these instances, lack what I call independence. They cannot, generally 
speaking, resist these urges or instincts; they lack that capacity. The 
autonomous individual is independent of this kind of force, internal or 
external in its origin, that is, free of neurotic obsessions and compulsions, and 
able to recognize that many of her basic desires are inculcated ty  formal 
education and parental guidance. The person who is independent is able to
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develop new and different interests, goals and desires than the ones she has 
been taught.
Here, again, we encounter overlap oetween the dimensions. In order to 
be independent a person must be aware that other life-styles exist than the 
one she currently subscribes to, and be intelligent enough to pass some 
judgment on her own preferences. So the autonomous indi'vidual has the 
capacity to change her basic plan or philosophy of life as reason and 
intelligent evaluation recommend to her. This sometimes will require a certain 
amount of courage and fortitude, as in cases where a person advocates 
unpopular views; for example, withholding income tax for moral reasons, say, 
because tax revenues are used to finance abortions for welfare recipients. 
This indicates that lack of courage too can impair autonomy.
Perhaps another illustration will be helpful in clarifying what I have in 
mind by independence as a kind of psychological power or control over 
oneself, A standard move in a counseling situation goes as follows: a client 
complains to the counselor that other people cause her to be extremely angry, 
so much so that she frequently goes into a rage. The counselor may merely 
point out that the client has given, perhaps unintentionally and unknowingly, 
others this power over her, and since she has given them this power she can 
also take it  away. The counselor may point out that it is the client who is 
responsible for the rages, not other people. Often this simple point frees 
individuals and allows them the power to control themselves in the way that 
they wish. Thus, the individual who scores high on the independence dimension 
is aware of certain forces that influence her attitudes, recognizes her 
responsibility for what and who she is and has the psychological power to be 
her own person.
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The final dimension that seems to convey a significant dimension of 
autonomy I call instrumentality. By instrumentality I mean both the liberty 
and ability to act in our environment; so instrumentality is a kind of power or 
influence. To be autonomous an individual must have some influence over the 
external world, the physical power to cause things to happen in the world. 
The possibilities for the power I have in mind here range from simply being 
locomotive to possessing great influence over the world via political or 
military force. Completely powerless individuals are unable to carry out their 
simplest wishes on their own and, hence, have autonomy restricted. In 
addition, recognition of our powerless, or relatively powerless, condition will 
undoubtedly have an influence on our preferences and most desired life style. 
The amount of power we have will likely encourage us to modify our 
expectations and aspirations. Consequently, using tnis dimension as a measure, 
things like poverty and physical disability impair autonomy.
There is, I think, a difference between this dimension and the other four 
that should be noted. It is, in general, desirable to maximize the other four 
dimensions. That is, i t  is generally desirable to be as aware as possible, as 
independent as possible and so on. But clearly i t  is not desirable to be as 
powerful as possible. There is probably some truth to the saying, "power 
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." It may have been this sort 
of thing that Mill had in mind when he suggested that there could be too 
much individuality in society, i.e., that some individuals could be too powerful 
for both their own and society's good. Mill seemed to think that this is most 
likely in a society's early development; there some individuals may have too 
much influence, too much of their own way.
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The way that I have developed autonomy, as having five dimensions, is, I 
think, useful First, it  shows that autonomy is not a simple thing that some 
persons have while others do not. Rather, nearly everyone is autonomous in 
some ways and to some degree, but not in other ways. Second, it allows us to 
make sense of the claim, tnat we sacrifice autonomy for the sake of 
autonomy. The action of Odysseus in chapter 1 can now be explained as his 
decision to sacrifice some power, in the form of liberty, in order to achieve 
more independence. Perhaps it  would be argued that he was not really getting 
independence, since he was using physical restraint he was not gaining in 
psychological capacity to control his unwanted desires. I think that i t  might 
be plausibly argued that physical restraint is one way of making a beginning 
in control of unwanted desires. Perhaps a clearer case is that of an alcoholic 
who commits herself to an institution in order to be cured. The alcoholic 
lacks independence, so she sacrifices some liberty, hopefully temporarily, to 
gain the independence she needs. The third advantage of construing autonomy 
this way is that it  demonstrates the close connection between autonomy and 
personality, mental health and self-esteem.
One of the chief characteristics of mental health is self-esteem,, and 
autonomy is clearly related to self-esteem, to an individual's self-concept and 
to the psychology of personal adjustment. Psychologists tell us that 
self-esteem is largely the product of the way we are treated, especially early 
in our development, by significant others, parents, peers and perhaps 
teachers. To be treated as an autonomous being fosters high self-esteem, to 
be deprived of autonomy conveys the idea that there is something defective 
about us. For example, one study involving two groups of parents, one with 
high-esteem children and the other with low-esteem children, revealed that
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when asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement "A child has a
right to his own point of view and ought to be allowed to express it" that
93% of the parents of high-esteem boys agreed, whereas only 9.7% of the
2parents of low-esteem boys agreed. The parents who agreed with the
statement are those who, on my view of autonomy, encourage and extend
independence, and possibly awareness, to their children.
There is reason to suppose an even more dramatic connection between
autonomy and mental health. One psychologist puts the connection this way:
We have seen that as the child develops, his behavior is 
continuously less passively and immediately reactive to the 
environment, progressively more actively directed according to his 
own plans. In a manner of speaking, he carries more weight in the 
determination of his behavior. It is, in my opinion, primarily this 
general development of the child's autonomy, in which activity will 
have played its part, rather than the direct experience of 
effective action, that is the basis of a developing sense of 
personal significance, of "being somebody," and ultimately of 
personal authority and self-re^iect. The child feels more 
significant because he has actually become so, not merely in the 
sense of being technically competent but in the deeper and more 
intrinsic sense of becoming an independent agent in the 
world....But if the development of autonomy has gone well, 
self-respect will not depend primarily on what one can do or how 
well one does it, will not require special justification, but will 
simply, reflect what one is or is becoming-an autonomous human 
being.
He then makes an even stronger connection between autonomy and 
mental health. He says, "In one form or another, a sense of insignificance or 
inferiority is pr<±>ably a part of aH neurosis. All neurosis involves some
4
impairment of autonomy and, therefore, some impairment of self-respect." 
Given that this attribution of value to autonomy is correct, and if the way I 
have explained autonomy is plausible and useful, as I think that i t  is, then it 
is evident that autonomy is necessary to be a wholesome and p^chologically
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healthy personality. Surely it  is evident that some autonomy is necessary to 
have any personality at alL
n
m this section I shall explain how and in what sense individuality, as 
developed in chapter two, is the same thing as autonomy. We must keep in
mind that the key notions in individuality are development and having one's
own preferences, desires, tastes and so on. I intend to show here that
whatever can be sensibly said of autonomy can be sensibly said of
individuality and vice versa. There are a number of actions, conditions, 
interferences that will obviously impair either the development or the 
expression of autonomy; similarly, there are a number of actions, conditions, 
interferences that will foster the development or the expression of autonomy. 
My contention is that whatever fosters or inhibits autonomy also fosters or 
inhibits individuality.
First, conditions that impair reason and a person's capacity to critically 
reflect on choice diminishes autonomy. For instance, decisions made under the 
influence of drugs that reduce a person's capacity to think clearly render the 
decision, at the very least, not fully autonomous. Likewise, brainwashing robs 
a decision or choice of its autonomous characteristic. In a similar fashion, 
decisions made under the influence of drugs or brainwashing cannot 
legitimately be interpreted as an expression of a person's individuality. In 
order to count as an expression of individuality a decision ^ould reflect one's 
own desires and wishes. Clearly brainwashing, if successful, causes individuals 
to reflect the desires and wishes of someone else. And whatever interferes
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with the rational process of evidence gathering, weighing and deciding 
interferes with the formulation of one's own desires and opinions.
It may be argued, in fact Gerald Dworkin does so eirgue,^ that if a drug 
addict wants her addiction, or if someone wants to become a drug addict, 
that this want would represent an autonomous choice. It seems to me that it 
would not, a t least not in the full sense of the word. To desire to be 
enslaved, to another person or to an unquenchable craving, is prima fade 
irrational in the same sense in which the desire for death and pain are prima 
fade irrational; this is a crazy desire. A person may want the expected 
pleasure that may result from drug usage, but she cannot rationally want the 
pain and misery that is typically caused by drug addiction. This sort of desire 
indicates a low score in the cognitive and awareness dimensions of autonomy 
and, hence, the decision is not fully autonomous. Neither would such an 
irrational desire represent the expression of individuality, for one of the 
characteristics of the progressive being, the being who is appropriately 
described as having individuality, is an intelligent understanding of the world. 
The desire to be a drug addict indicates that intelligence is lacking.
Another kind of activity that inhibits autonomy is deception and 
manipulation. It is easily seen how these actions affect autonomy, since they 
interfere with the normal decision process. Specifically, deception and 
manipulation reduce the individual's awareness in certain respects as to how 
things really are in the world. Consequently, to put it  in terms of possible 
worlds, the individual makes her choices for a different possible world than 
this one, for the close world that has been constructed for her by the 
deceiver or manipulator. Since the choice or decision made is for some other
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possible world, such a decision represents an expression of autonomy and 
individuality in that world, but not in this world.
Other activities deracinate autonomy, things like hypnosis and subliminal 
advertising. BoU, uf thcse kinds of activities disguise from an individual the 
real motive for her action, desire or belief, thus not allowing the individual 
fair opportunity to reflect on her wants and dear es. Specifically, these 
interferences seem to affect three of the dimensions of autonomy, awareness, 
intentionality and independence. Likewise, if the source of the motive is 
external to the individual, as it is in post hypnotic suggestion and suoliminal 
advertising, the motive for action cannot properly be said to be one's own, 
and, therefore, is not a genuine expression of individuality.
Obviously things like blind allegiance to authority or unconscious 
adherence to customs impair autonomy. The person who surrenders her will to 
an authority is not in control of her life, the authority is; similarly, 
unquestioning and unreflective acceptance of customs denies autonomous 
action. Individuality is likewise lost to authority and custom,. Indeed, following 
custom for custom's sake was one of Mill's chief worries.
Finally, as described previously, a certain amount of power, the ability 
to influence the world around us, is required for autonomy. This of course 
captures an element of Mill's main argument for liberty of actior: liberty is 
required to foster individuality. Persons who are at a stage in their life 
where they are making critical decisions about what long term goals to 
pursue, what plans to make for their life, need free access to information, 
but also need the liberty and ability to conduct some experiments in living, 
they need certain kinds of experience that can only be available in an 
environment that allows and encourages liberty of thought and action. It is
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through open exchange of information and personal experience that individuals 
can properly decide what sort of life best suits them. So it æems clear that 
restrictions in what I have termed the instrumentality dimension of autonomy 
restricts individuality.
In general, increased awareness of the forces that influence our wants, 
desires and preferences, along with increased awareness of the options open 
to us, strengthens the sense in which a decision is autonomous. H snould be 
clear by now that it also strengthens the sense in which the decision is one's 
own, which means the decision is in a strong sense an expression of 
individuality.
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Now I want to focus attention on the chird isu e  of this chapter, that is, 
to show how it  is possible to have an educational system that attempts to 
instill values and not significantly diminish autonomy. This issue is closely 
related to the d ilu te  between the liberal ideal of education and the 
progressive ideal of education. By the liberal ideal of education I understand 
the view that autonomy is taught and is the end product of education; and 
that this product is produced without much exercise of autonomy while under 
the control of the educational institution. The progressive ideal of education, 
as I understand it, entails teaching autonomy by allowing and encouraging the 
exercise of autonomy.^ While i t  is not my intention to defend the liberal 
notion of education for autonomy in its full sense, I am in empathy with the 
view that autonomy is the end product of education, and that certain values 
must be instilled. The age at which autonomy ought to be granted I s u ^ c t
should vary widely depending on the individual child. Further, on my 
conception of autonomy, it is possible to grant autonomy in degrees and in 
different ways, along different dimensions. The problem, then, is that if 
children are encouraged to form certain desires while avoiding others, are 
told some are virtues and some are vices; if they are taught a certain 
conception of rationality as the measure of the value of ideas; if, in other 
words, they are taught what Mill describes as the 'ascertained results of 
human experience," then in what sense are the products of this education 
system really autonomous? In what sense are the desires of children educated 
in this fashion their own? It is tem.pting to say that such persons are merely 
expressing the intellectual and moral values they have been taught, and that, 
while they may use these values to formulate otherwise autonomous choices, 
they are not autonomously expressing these values and desires themselves.
It strikes me that Mill's claim that we ought to teach our children the 
ascertained results of human experience, is an interesting and fruitful claim. 
Just what are the ascertained results of human experience? I would argue 
that the conception of irrational action, as defined in the previous chapter, 
sets out at least some of these results, i.e„ pain, death, loss of freedom and 
so on are recognized by all rational men as evils to be avoided, and that this 
is known via human experience. Anyone who desires such ends without special 
justification is irrational, really insane, in need of psychological therapy. The 
question I want to raise here is this: if a society teaches its children a notion 
of rationality, say the one I have advocated here, along with a corresponding 
moral system aimed at preventing the evils identified by the conception of 
rationality, and further instructs these children in the fundamentals of logic
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and reasoning, does this violate or diminish the autonomy of those who are 
educated by this system?
There are those who think that i t  does, that there is some inconsistency 
in advocating autonomy and teaching what might be described as forms of 
knowledge, a particular conception of rationality. J.C. Walker seems to think 
that teaching a view of rationality creates a big problem, especially for the 
liberals, but really for anyone who advocates a view of rationality as 
fundamental and the acquisition of which is one goal of an educational 
system. His argument is that i t  is impossible to dissent from t±e view without 
automatically, by definition, being irrational. The problem presented by 
Walker is essentially this:
This last point should loom as a serious worry for LRs (though 
apparently i t  doesn't) since, if once again we may take Peters as 
our guide, the "reconceptualization'' of "reason" necessary to avoid 
Platonic elitism and dogmatismi entails that certain LR tenets are 
not open to question since any "rational" person is committed to 
them and rejects them only on pain of becoming irrational. This 
act of theoretic authoritarianism is performed by that LR 
stalwart, FK. For to become a rational person it  is necessary to 
be initiated into the LR forms under the authoritative guidance of 
educators. Rational persons autonomously submit themselves to 
these (and other) norms of reason, albeit after being 
heteronomously habituated into living according to them. We are 
back w ith.^e development/exercise dichotomy and the paradox of 
education.
The "paradox of education" that Walker refers to is the notion that in 
order to develop autonomy our educational systems must deny autonomy 
during the educational process. But his criticism of the approach I have 
adopted in defense of autonomy and individuality runs deeper. He alleges that 
by incorporating a view of rationality into these concepts (autonomy and 
rationality), anyone who disagrees is, by definition, irrational
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In regard to this point, there are two questions that need to be 
answered; first, is this allegation true? And second, if it is true, is it 
necessarily a bad feature of a view of rationality?
In reply to the first question, i t  is not clear to me that the allegation is 
true. There are, of course, different conceptions of rationality. On the view I 
have advocated there is room for a number of disagreements among beliefs 
allowed by, but not required by, reason. So among rational persons it  is 
allowable to have quite different philosophies of life, beliefs about God, 
beliefs about the good life and so on. It is true, however, that it is required 
by reason that all rational men view the desire for pain as irrational, hence 
all rational men must believe pain is evil. But it is not true that all rational 
men must accept this particular conception or approach to rationality. That 
is, it  is not true that all rational persons must agree that the most plausible 
conception of rationality is to rest this concept on irrational action and make 
distinctions between beliefs required by reason and beliefs allowed by reason. 
I take i t  that the fact that pain is undesirable is a fundamental datum of 
human experience. Gert built his conception of rationality, the concept I am 
advocating and defending, on this idea that there are fundamental data of 
human experience. Mill too seems ^mpathetic to this idea. But i t  is not 
required by reason that all rational men accept this view of rationality, or 
reject i t  on pain of being ipso facto irrational. However, it  is required by 
reason that aH rational men accept that the desire for pain for pain's sake is 
irrational It seems that there is a sense in which Walker's allegation is true, 
and a sense in which it  is false. It is false that dissent from a particular 
conception of rationality makes one irrational by virtue oi that dissent. But it
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is true that any view of rationality must square with the facts of human 
existence, although it may provide a different account of those facts.
In regard to the second question raised by Walker's argument I would 
offer this reply. If the answer to the first question was a clear yes, then that 
would be a serious defect of the view of rationality. But the answer to the 
first question is a qualified yes, it  is true that a conception of rationality 
must take account of the fundamental data of human experience. But I cannot 
see why this should not be so. This just means that some conceptions that 
dissent from this view of rationality are plausible and some are not. In other 
words, the intuition that pain is intrinsically undesirable (and other intuitions 
as well) act as a test for tne plausibility of an account of rationality. If a 
particular account does not square with certain intuitions we all share, this 
counts as a prima fade case against the account. This approach, however, 
does not have the undesirable consequence that Walker alleges, i.e., either 
agree with my concept of rationality or disagree on pain of being irrational
I think that i t  will be useful in arguing my case that one can instill 
autonomy in children without violating autonomy to recall a parallel Mill 
suggested between having our own understanding and having our own desires. 
To have my own understanding it  is not required that the understanding I 
have be invented by me, discovered by me, or different from everyone else's. 
In fact, if my understanding is correct, it  will be very much like all other 
correct understandings. For example, I have my own understanding of the 
Pythagorean Theorem if I can state it, know when and how it  applies, can 
make correct calculations with i t  and, perhaps, am able to teach or explain it 
to others. It is not further required that this understanding not have been 
explained or taught to me. The same is true for my desires. Suppose a desire.
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say, the desire to adopt a benevolent attitude towards others is taught to a 
child; then at the appropriate age, and this might be quite young, the 
rationale for this preference is explained to the child. As the child grows 
older and more mature, the explanations can get more complex, considering 
alternative points of view, and, therefore, more complete. As long as all the 
content of intellectual and moral instruction is open to question, the maturing 
child is free to reject the advocated view in favor of one of the alternatives, 
or one of her own design. It is in this sense that the acceptance or rejection 
of benevolence as a preference is her own, and, hence, autonomous.
It may, however, still be objected that as a p^chdogical fact early 
training has a more forceful impact on preference formation than later 
reflection and criticism. This may well be so. There will no doubt be 
individual differences here; some individuals find it  more difficult to rid 
themselves of unwanted early formulated prejudices than others. If this is so, 
perhaps the purely autonomous creature exists only in theory, since children 
must be taught something. But I do not think that this is a big problem for 
developing autonomous human beings. Recall the five dimensions of autonomy 
that I have suggested; education will potentially enhance awareness, 
intentionality, cognition, and to some extent the instrumentality dimension. 
The only dimension that might be impaired by education is independence, and 
this will vary among individuals and educational systems. As we know, some 
persons are naturally more independent than others. But in an educational 
system that encourages independence, even though some impairment may 
result in spite of the best efforts, whatever impairment results is likely to be 
minimal and not a serious threat to autonomy; or perhaps I should say, this is 
as close to autonomy as one can get.
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IV
In this section I want to focus on clarifying how construing paternalism 
as a violation of autonomy is plausible and sheds light on attempts to justify 
paternalism. Once it  is understood how autonomy is a broad and far reaching 
multi-dimensional concept, i t  is not difficult to comprehend how the various 
means or methods (coercion, deception, manipulation and so on) employed by 
the paternalist impair the autonomy or autonomous control of an individual's 
life. In the case of coercive strong direct paternalism the paternalist fails to 
show proper regard for the values, abilities, capacities, wants and desLces of 
an autonomous individual He fails to show proper re^)ect for autonomy. This 
type of paternalism is never justified. The reasons why this is so are identical 
to the three reasons based on individuality that I outlined a t the close of 
chapter 2. First, the existence of autonomous persons establishes rights; 
persons have a right to not have their autonomy restricted for purely 
self-regarding reasons. Second, living as an autonomous individual is an 
immensely satisfying existence; coercive strong direct paternalism acts as a 
countervalue to such an existence. And, finally, to engage in coercive strong 
direct paternalism is to enforce one person's preferences on another person in 
the absence of decisive evidence that either set of preferences is superior to 
the other.
"Coercive strong direct paternalism is always wrong" provides a starting 
point for justifying paternalism. If one employs coercive methods in 
paternalism, then the individual concerned is not a willing recipient of the 
'benefit' being bestowed upon her. If the paternalism is strong, then the
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individual is in the relevant sense competent, informed, aware, independent 
and so on. Hence, there is no justification for the interference. This would 
indicate that to legitimately treat a person paternaüstically we must as a 
minimum believe that: (1) we are not coercing, or (2) the person is not really 
fully competent or aware of what she is doing, not fully autonomous, or (3) 
we are not directly interfering with the autonomy of the agent.
Thus there are three lines of justification for paternalism. First, show 
that the means employed to effect the benefit are not coercive; and then 
argue the merits of paternalistic interference by showing that the advantages 
of the benefit gained outweigh the disadvantages of not behaving 
patemalistically. This argument, to be successful, would need to consider the 
nature of the violation of autonomy. The reason some non-coercLve methods 
of paternalism are exempt from the prohibition is that they are essential to 
the paternalistic act itself in a way that coercive methods are not. 
Persuasion, for example, is always an alternative to coercion. But in some 
instances, e.g. death bed deception, the intended benefit may not be achieved 
by any other means. The second line of justification for paternalism is to 
show that the paternalistic interference is weak, that the individual being 
coerced, manipulated, deceived and so on is not competent in the relevant 
sense. Perhaps we need a notion of moderate paternalism, for not all 
paternalistic acts will fall clearly into the category of strong or weak. In 
general, the less autonomous the recipient the stronger the case for 
paternalism. The presumption is that paternalism violates autonomy in a 
serious way. Justification on this line of defense consists in low ing that the 
presumption is false. The third line of justification is to show that the 
paternalism is indirect. Many of the cases appropriately described as indirect,
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e.g., minimum wage laws, laws establishing a maximum interest rate that may 
be charged for loans, laws requiring that safety equipment be used for certain 
kinds of jobs and sc on, should be '.dewed as preventing one indivi.d'.iai from 
harming another; preventing, at least in some cases, exploitation. However, 
none of these three lines of justification, by itself, is a sufficient condition 
for justifying paternalistic interference with autonomy. That is, i t  is not 
sufficient to say, "the paternalistic act is not coercive (direct/strong}, 
therefore it is not morally objectionable.
In chapter 1 I reviewed a number of cases which are alleged to be 
paternalistic while not restricting liberty. There I argued that liberty, in the 
form of autonomy or individuality, is always impaired in strong paternalism. 
So now, rather than review a new batch of cases, I want to consider an 
accusation by Douglas Husak that i t  is not useful, or even defensible, to 
define paternalism in terms of violations of autonomy. Husak attacks the view 
that I am defending on three fronts. First, he claims that attempts to employ 
the concept of moral autonomy to set a limit on acceptable acts of 
paternalism have failed. Second, he argues that various formulations of 
autonomy are not useful to the antdpatemalist. Third, he attempts to show 
that the explanation of paternalism as an affront to the dignity of persons as 
somehow captured by moral autonomy is not plausible. In general, Husak 
claims that the nature of the connection between autonomy and
Q
antipatemahsm has not been made precise. I am in some agreement with this 
last claim, however, there is, I believe, some confusion in Husak's analysis of 
this issue.
Husak concentrates his attack on the failure of past formulations of 
paternalism as violating autonomy on Dworkin's formulation. He takes Dworkin
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to be advocating autonomy as a prima facie case against paternalism. 
Instances of justified paternalism are distinguished from unjustified instances 
by some kind of consent criterion. Husak finds this criterion paradoxical, for
9
he asks, "How could one consent to an interference?" I believe that Husak is 
right in criticizing actual consent theories this way. Consent may justify 
certain kinds of involvement in a person's life, involvement that under 
appropriate circumstances could aptly be characterized as interference with 
autonomy. But if Smith has Jones' consent to behave in restrictive ways 
towards Jones, Smith may well be justified in her action, but she is not acting 
paternalisticalLy toward Jones. Rather, consistent with my explantion of 
paternalism from chapter 1, she is acting fraternalistically.
However, as Husak claims, i t  really appears that Dworkin is arguing from 
the position of hypothetical consent. Thus, the paradox Husak raises against 
consent theories is resolved. Le., the interference with autonomy is prior to 
consent. This may solve the paradox, but i t  still seems to me that actual 
consent theories are wrongheaded for the reason I just stated, consent 
indicates a fraternal action not a paternal o..c. In addition, there are other 
problems for actual consent theories. If Smith claims to know better than 
Jones what is actually in Jones' own interest, what difference does consent 
make to the validity of this claim? Also, there will be cases where Jones does 
not know his own interest and is in no position now, and perhaps never will 
be (as in some coma cases), to give consent. The consent theory breaks down 
in these cases.
Husak offers the following kind of case as a further difficulty for the 
Dworkin line on justifiable paternalism. Suppose a physician is confronted with 
an unconscious patient in need of a transfusion. The law permits physicians to
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treat patients and recover fees from them when it is reasonable to believe 
the patient, if conscious, would consent to the treatment. Further, suppose 
that the doctor believes the patient would consent to the transfusion, then 
administers the transfusion only to later discover that her patient is a 
member of a religious sect that forbids transfusions; hence she would not give 
her consent. Was the patient's autonomy violated? Husak says: "It seems likely 
that the moral autonomy of the patient has been violated, even though the 
physician was permitted (or perhaps even obligated) to render assistance." 
Husak's point is that even reasonable belief that consent will be forthcoming 
does not prevent violations of autonomy.
Is Husak right in contending that this person's autonomy has been 
violated? I think not. It does not seem to me that this person's autonomy has 
been violated any more than if she was in a coma. If autonomy was violated 
then one of the dimensions of autonomy must have been impaired. But which 
one? Awareness was not reduced, since obviously the woman was not aware 
of anything. Neither was her independence, cognition or power reduced. This 
case is not like that of the Jehovah's Witness from chapter 1; there the 
desire of the patient was known prior to unconsciousness, so his liberty was 
violated. Autonomous control of life was lost by the patient in the present 
case when she became unconscious. So whatever caused her to become 
unconscious caused the loss of autonomy, not the action of the physician. The 
physician was not behaving patemalistically, but merely fulfilling her 
obligation as a physician. Again, this looks like a case of fratemalism, not 
paternalism.
Nonetheless, Husak contends that to modify Dworkin's criteria to allow 
interference with autonomy when it is reasonable to believe the individual
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interfered with will come to appreciate the wisdom of the interference does 
not impart an important role to autonomy in distinguishing justifiable from 
unjustifiable paternalism. In fact, he argues, it  makes consent quite 
unimportant. Husak states his case this way:
That moral autonomy plays no important role in distinguishing 
instances of justified from unjustified paternalism according to 
Dworkin's modified criteria becomes apparent when one inquires: 
"When is it  reasonable to believe that a person would consent to 
an interference?" The only sensible answer to this question, though 
one that may not be particularly illuminating, is that it  is 
reasonable to believe that a person would consent to whatever 
interferences are reasonable. The proper focus, then, is on 
whether an interference is reasonable-not on whether a person 
would consent to it. The notion of consent is retained in the 
criteria to create the impression that a concern for moral 
autonomy is preserved. In, reality, however, consent plays only a 
token role in the criteria.
As previously stated, I agree with Husak that consent is irrelevant to
justifying paternalism, and, further, that hypothetical consent theories, if
they shed any light at aH on paternalism, only provide insight into what is
reasonable and what is not. Talk of consent is only a convenient way of
saying what is reasonable. However, I am not even certain how far this talk
of hypothetical consent will take us in determining what is reasonable. For
example, Rawls apparently believes that a person is behaving autonomously
when he acts "...from principles that we would consent to as free and equal
12rational beings, and that we are to understand in this way." It is not clear 
to me what free and equal rational beings would consent to in the original 
position. As far as legal or coercive paternalism goes I would prefer to take 
my chances that I will err in calculating my interests rather than chance that 
others will not err in calculating those same interests.
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But how are such decisions to be made without a clear understanding of 
autonomy? The real problem for Husak's position is that he fails to understand 
the importance of a deep insight into autonomy for resolving the conflict 
between paternalism and autonomy. Husak seems to think that because 
paternalism is sometimes compatible with autonomy, autonomy is irrelevant to 
the issue. He confuses the justifiable cases of paternalism based on promotion 
of autonomy (as with parental paternalism toward young children) with his 
contention that "autonomy plays no important role" in deciding issues of 
justifiable paternalism. These issues cannot be properly understood or resolved 
without understanding the value and importance of autonomy and weighing 
this against other benefits that might result from impairing autonomy, 
including promotion of autonomy itself over the long term. It is, I take it, this 
last attempt a t justification (promotion of autonomy over the long term) that 
helps justify paternalism toward children.
By defining autonomy in terms of five dimensions, it  is possible to make 
distinctions between different levels of paternalistic interference with 
autonomy. Some paternalism will interfere in more severe and far reaching 
ways than others, and other kinds of paternalism will interfere with more 
than one dimension. Under this conception it makes sense to restrict the 
liberty of children, require a certain amount of education and so forth for the 
sake of increases in the cognitive, awareness and through them the 
independence dimension.
Consider the case of the Jehovah's Witness from chapter 1. Could the 
case be made that forcing a Witness to have a transfusion would be an 
instance of weak rather than strong paternalism. I do not think that the case 
could be argued directly. Le., his refusal to consent to a transfusion is not by
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itself sufficient to demonstrate his incompetence. However, his level of 
independence might be questionable. If enough information is known about the 
background of this individual, and it  turns out that he is the product of an 
oppressive religious upbringing where he was only subjected to a narrow range 
of ideas, where autonomy was discouraged in favor of allegiance to religious 
authorities, and he was not exposed to ideas outside of the limited ones held 
by his family and primary group, then his decision would lack significant 
independence. On this eventuality, his desire not to have a transfusion would 
not be, in a significant sense, his own. I am doubtful, however, that this line 
of argument by itself would justify paternalistic interference, although it  may 
justify downgrading the proposed interference from strong to weak, or at 
least moderate. This is so because the damage done to this particular 
individual's autonomous personality during his formative years may be 
irreversible to such an extent that he could never live any meaningful life 
other than as a Jehovah's Witness. It may be that he could never come to 
accept his life if he had a transfusion. If, on the other hand, he made his 
decision to become a Jehovah's Witness as an autonomous adult, paternalistic 
interference would be both coercive and strong, hence unjustifiable. By 
conceiving autonomy the way that I have, the deep complexity of 
paternalistic issues emerges more clearly, and thereby, hopefully, more 
intelligent and defensible actions will result.
There are two other cases that I think cannot be adequately resolved 
without appeal to autonomy. One recent case in Oklahoma involved a three 
month old baby who died of bronchial pneumonia because his parents, members 
of the Church of the First Bom (which forbids medical treatment) refused to 
call for medical help over a period of weeks while their child suffered and
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died of pneumonia. This couple was recently convicted of second degree 
manslaughter. There were a number of issues involved in the trial: freedom of 
religion, parental obligations to children, and what actions a reasonable 
person would take in this situation. There is an underlying issue of 
paternalism too; not whether or not paternalism is justified, because obviously 
paternalism in some form is necessary with respect to infants. I am assuming 
here that the parents of this child thought, not only that they were carrying 
out their religious duty, but that they were acting in the best interests of 
their child. In other words, they thought that it  was better for the child that 
he die than that he should receive medical treatment. The interesting aspect 
of this case is that the state made an attempt to block certain parental 
practices, to prevent a specific act of paternalism. We normally think of the 
state as the administrator of paternalistic practices, but in this case the 
state is attempting to prevent such practices as it  believes are harmful In 
this particular case the state 's punishment of the parents is not paternalistic, 
since the child is deceased. But the state is attempting to block, or at least 
discourage, similar future practices. Further, the greater social question 
remains, under what circumstances is a state justified in interfering with 
parental paternalism. It seems to me that the interests of the child, the 
child's welfare that courts continually support, cannot be adequately assessed 
apart from the child's development as an autonomous agent. Certain kinds of 
religious child-rearing practices restrict autonomy by restricting the 
education and range of ideas to which a child is exposed.
This last issue is just the sort of issue raised by a 1971 Supreme Court 
decision in the case of Wisconsion vs Yoder.^^ In this case the re^»ndents, 
members of the Amish religion, contrary to Wisconsion state law which
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requires compuisory school at±endance through age sixteen, refused to send 
Amish children to school after they had completed the eighth grade. The 
state court sustained the re^xjndents claim that the state law violated their 
right under the First Amendment to the free exercise of religion. The 
fundamental reasoning of the co^rt was that there was a minimal difference 
between the state requirements and Amish education. The claim was that the 
Amish chüjd would not be unable to carry out the duties of citizenship 
because of this difference. The Supreme Court upheld this ruling, arguing that 
the parents have a right to keep their children out of public schools.
But Justice Douglas argued in his dissenting opinion that the court had 
ignored the future interests of the child. The court had, according to Douglas, 
erroneously assumed an identity of interests between parent and child. 
Douglas argues his point:
It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that 
is imperiled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his child out of 
school beyond the grade schod, then the child will be forever 
barred firom entry into the new and amazing world of diversity 
that we have today. The child may decide that that is the 
preferred course, or he may rebel It is the students judgment, not 
his parents', that is essential if we are to give fuU meaning to 
what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of 
students to be masters of their own destiny. If he is harnessed to 
the Amish way of life by those in authority over him and if his 
education.^ truncated, his entire life may be stunted and 
deformed.
It seems clear to me that Douglas is appealing to autonomy in this case. 
The child's autonomy is impaired on four of the five dimensions: awareness is 
reduced and the growth of the cognitive element is impaired; through these 
independence is reduced and the ability or power to influence one's 
environment is restricted. In shaping a child's education we, to a great 
degree, shape the person, especially by instilling certain basic prejudices,
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wants and desires. It appears to me that it  is instructive to cast cases of 
paternalism as cases of autonomy promoted or autonomy impaired. Husak has 
shown that some cases of paternalism are justified even though they impair 
autonomy. But he erroneously concludes from this that it is poihtless and 
uninstructive to view issues in paternalism as issues over autonomy.
Another line of attack that Husak advances against the view that the 
objectionable attribute about paternalism is that it  violates or somehow 
impairs autonomy, is that if this is true, then there is nothing distinctive 
about paternalism. He says "The conclusion that paternalistic interferences, 
qua interferences, are objectionable, is a good deal less interesting than the 
conclusion  th a t  p a te rn a lis tic  in te rfe re n c e s , qua paternalism , are  
objectionable."^^ The problem, as Husak understands it, is that the autonomy 
impairment strategy places violations of the harm principle in the same 
category with legal paternalism. There are two replies that can be made here. 
First, what is interesting about paternalism is not that the paternalist 
interferes in the lives of persons in unique and imaginative ways, but that the 
interference is justified in the interests of the person interfered with. The 
morally intriguing aspect about this interference is that the motive for 
paternalism is benevolence, usually thought of as a virtue, but in certain 
kinds of benevolence, the paternalistic kind, there are moral objections to 
benevolence based on respect for autonomy. Second, what separates violations 
of the harm principle from paternalism is, again, not unique kinds of 
interference, but that violations of the harm principle are punished as acts of 
immorality, while victims of paternalism are coerced, deceived and 
manipulated, not because they have done something wrong, but for their own 
good.
LOS
One further argument offered by Husak deserves mention. He maintains 
that the most direct strategy for persuading those of us who persist in 
cashing out paternalism in terms of autonomy, is to provide a case of 
paternalism that does not involve loss or impairment of autonomy. The kind of 
case he has in mind is paternalism toward oneself. He says "No conceptual 
problems are raised by the claim that one can treat oneself 
patemalistically.*^^ Of course this claim begs the question. Whether or not 
there are conceptual problems depends on how paternalism is defined. If one 
assumes that paternalism does not involve a violation of autonomy, then there 
are not conceptual problems. The case he cites is that of Odysseus. I have 
argued in chapter 1 why I don't think that this is a case of paternalism. But 
even if it  were, it would only represent a ^>ecial category, self administered 
paternalism, and would not be relevant to cases where A treats 3 
patemalistically.
It would appear, then, that, contrary to Husak's claim, i t  is not only 
useful to discuss issues of paternalism by a detailed analysis of autonomy, but 
that i t  is imperative. Indeed, I cannot think of a more important or relevant 
concept for arguing cases of patemalism. Further, once a deep appreciation 
of autonomy and individuality is gained, i t  is not difficult to understand the 
force of the antipatemalist's position.
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CHAPTER IV 
MILL'S ANTIPATERNALISM
When considering arguments against patemalism it  is natural to turn to 
MilL As previously stated, I believe that I am defending Mill's absolute 
prohibition against certain kinds of patemalism; what I have described as the 
illirnt triad, coercive strong direct patemalism. Perhaps Mill's own target was 
not even that broad, his primary concem was with legal patemalism or the 
coercive use of law to restrict the liberty of an individual in his own interest.
There are, I believe, a t least five distinct arguments in On Liberty 
against patemalism. One of them, the argument from individuality or autonomy 
and the main argument of chapter 3 ,1 have already discussed a t length in this 
paper, so I will not have much more to add a t this time. The other four 
arguments are various utilitarian appeals. First there is Mill's claim that 
society p ro ^ rs  with genuine happiness only if extensive antipatemalistic 
liberty is available. Second, he claims that society has the power of education 
and persuasion in rearing its youth, and, therefore, does not need further 
coercive power. Third, the attempt to coerce individuals for their own good 
will, if they have any grit about them, encourage them to rebel against 
authority. Finally, what Mill calls the strongest of aH the arguments against 
interference in personal conduct, society is apt to be mistaken about its 
interference.
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There is probably even a sdxt±i argument to be retrieved from chapter 4 
of On Liberty. However., it is not developed by MilL It might be described as 
the dilemma of paternalistic punishmenL If the paternalist is forced to punish 
the recipient of his patemalism in order to secure the intended benefit, this 
punishment tends to undermine the benefit. The dilemma can briefly be stated 
this way. If the state does not use punishment to force compliance with its 
paternalistic laws, i t  will fail to secure the intended benefit by virtue of large 
scale violation of the laws. If the state does use punishment to coerce 
offenders into future compliance, it  still fails to produce a net benefit by 
virtue of the negative utility of punishment. I  will elaborate on this argument 
shortly.
I think that not enough attention has been paid to the first three of these 
arguments. In section one of this chapter I shall outline and comment on each 
of these arguments, plus the much discussed fourth argument, the one Mill calls 
the strongest argument. Then in section two I will attempt a defense of Mill's 
strong anfipatemaLsm against what I take to be the most serious challenge to 
his philosophical position; that is, paternalistic arguments for disallowing 
slavery contracts, controlling dangerous drugs and disallowing consent of the 
victim as a defense against assault and murder charges. I will also introduce 
what I take to be the sixth argument against patemalism, the argument from 
patemaLstic punishment.
One argument that Mill advances might be described as a general 
appeal; that liberty, in the form of absence of coercive strong
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direct paternalism, is necessary in order that society can p r o ^ r  or flourish. 
In his essay. Utilitarianism, Mill identifies what he takes to be the chief causes 
of unhappiness. The primary cause, selfishness, caring only for oneself, 
prevents an individual from establishing meaningful attachments to others and 
to projects that affect others, thereby, preventing an enjoyable and meaningful 
life. Another source of misery and unhaf^dness is failure to develop one's 
mental capacities, failure to develop a healthy interest in our world, physical, 
social, aesthetic and so on. Mill argues that anyone with a "moderate amount 
of moral and intellectual requisites" can create a meaningful existence for 
himself. The third cause of unhappiness is positive evils; for example, disease, 
poverty, natural disasters etc... The first two sources of unhappiness have a 
direct bearing on the third; that is, lack of concem for the welfare of others 
and failure to develop oneself in such a way that one can make a contribution 
to social well-being contribute to the continuance and severity of the positive 
evils. Mill was optimistic about the future of the progressive being. Meaningful 
progress, he ^>eculated, was possible through moral and incellectual 
development.^
In On Liberty Mill argues that real understanding and, ultimately,
solutions to our difficult problems is only possible because of a select few.
One in a hundred, he tells us, is able to correctly judge matters that are not
self-evident. But the rest are able to learn from these few geniuses who
2provide moral and intellectual insight. These few gifted, on whom the rest of 
us are dependent for significant progress and discovery, need lots of space, 
liberty, in order to flourish and produce the creative understanding by which 
the rest of us benefit. Hence, to curtail, liberty, e ^ d a H y  by legal
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patemalism, frustrates the development and, therefore, the contribution of 
these ^?ecial individuals.
While this line of argument has some force, especially for fostering a free 
and creative atmo^here of inquiry and experiment in the scientific and 
political arena, it  is difficult to see how it  supports an absolute ban on 
paternalism. For example, i t  is not readily evident how seat belt laws or a 
forced blood transfusion would stifle the kind of creative genius that is 
essential to a progressive society. This line of argument may support 
restraining certain kinds of patemalism, say, preventing an ingenious scientist 
from engaging in dangerous but potentially beneficial medical experiments on 
himself. If he recognizes the risks, but is willing to assume the risks and 
possible sacrifice for the benefit of mankind, then, following this kind of 
argument, such sacrifices should be allowed. But, if Mill is to produce an 
absolute prohibition, he needs a stronger kind of objection.
A second line of argument that Mill employs against those who would 
inflict punishment on the imprudent is that the power of education is sufficient 
power, no other power is needed. His argument seems to be that there are 
three influences at work here which negate any justification of further 
coercion. First, society has ample power and opportunity during an individual's 
formative years to instill a proper sense of conduct for both the 
other-regarding and self-regarding virtues. Second, custom is itself a forceful 
influence, e^jecdally on those who are "least fitted to judge for themselves." In 
other words, those whose life we might be most tempted to influence 
patemalistically are those most easily influenced by existing customs. 
Presumably the custom is exerting the correct, most prudent, sort of influence. 
Third, Mill claims that there are natural penalties associated with irrational
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conduct. Those who experiment with drugs, or fail to wear seat belts, often 
experience unpleasant consequences. Thus, Mill concludes, these forces 
constitute enough coercion by themselves, no further penalty is justified.”
Is this argument convincing? One reply that is tempting to make is that 
education is not very effective, or at least i t  has not been. Seat belt 
campaigns and antismoking campaigns have failed to produce a significant 
reduction in the target behavior. Of course this reply may only telL against 
certain kinds of education, national television campaigns (and perhaps only 
certain kinds of those), and not against other forms of education or persuasion. 
My own senses lead me to believe that the American society, especially the 
public schools, could be more effective than they are. Mill argues in his essay 
Utilitarianism and in On Liberty that a society that fails to properly educate 
its citizens in moral and intellectual matters, to include, I s u ^ c t ,  
self-regarding virtues (rational conduct), will pay a dear price. I think that the 
American society is paying that price now. The public education system has 
more or less failed to  instill any sort of well thought out and coherent moral 
or intellectual outlook. The only moral education that I am aware of which 
takes place on a large scale is what is described as values clarification. The 
deleterious effect of this sort of approach is that it encourages students not 
only to refrain from reflecting critically on their own values, beliefs and 
practices, but to believe that such critical reflection leading to correct moral 
beliefs is not possible.
Consequently, to the objection that Mill has overestimated the value of 
education, a plausible counterclaim might be that no really ambitious and weR 
researched program has ever been attempted. The further criticism of the 
paternalist here is, then, that he is applying his energy in the wrong place.
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Rather than lobby for strong paternalistic laws to counter the effects of a 
haphazard upbringing, beneficent motives would more correctly be vented 
through funding of the discovery and implementation of efficient and 
successful education programs. I think Mill is right in his claim that societies 
that think they need paternalistic laws are those that have failed to properly 
educate their citizens. However, even this line of argument may not establish 
an absolute prohibition. In a society with an ideal education system the strict 
prohibiting of paternalistic laws makes some sense, but under current 
conditions, it  may be argued, some paternalistic laws are necessary.
The other two claims that Mill groups under the rubric of unnecessary 
power, that custom and natural penalties are s u fficien t deterrence, are 
probably even less persuasive. The problem with relying on custom is that 
customs are not always present in any significant degree, or custom may work 
in the wrong direction. To whatever extent i t  makes sense to classify peer 
pressure as a kind of local custom, peer pressure in different groups 
encourages harmful practices. Some of America's youth face tremendous peer 
pressure in their schools to experiment with dangerous drugs. And, as for the 
wearing of seat belts, i t  is not dear that there are any customs a t all 
operating. Natural penalties also are often ineffective in changing behavior or 
attitudes. The natural harmful effects of smoking and drug experimentation 
have failed to diminish their use in a large scale fa^ o n .
There are cases where these last two arguments seem relevant and useful 
in the way that Mill had in mind. For example, sky-diving and handling 
poisonous snakes are not particularly popular hottoies. The explanation for this 
is likely to have something to do with the natural dangers involved. This sort 
of consideration may also be relevant to paternalistic laws against certain
I l l
vices, say, gambling. Most people recognize the dangers of accruing large 
gambling debts or losses and curb their activities accordingly. In addition, a 
person who loses the family fortune by gambling is thought ill of by most of 
society. This may be all the control that is needed for gambling. If so, then 
patemalistically motivated antigambling laws are unjustified.
A third rather interesting argument of Mill's is that there is a ^aecial 
segment of the population, those with "vigorous and independent characters," 
who will consider legal patemalism an insult and a violation of their rights. 
This strong willed group will consider it  a "mark of spirit and courage to fly in 
the face of such usurped authority and do with ostentation the exact oppoàte
4of what it enjoins..." The claim apparently is that there is a group, i t  is not 
clear how sizable, that will especially resent and be particularly insulted by 
patemalistic controls. In On Liberty Mill ^)eaks of individuals with strong 
impulses or energy, these are potential heroes who are quite necessary to 
society.^ Robert PirsLg describes what may well be the same group of persons 
in his book, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. There he refers to 
persons with a personality characteristic he calls gumption. A person with 
gumption is full of enthusiasm, which is connected, for Pirsig, to quality. In 
describing these individuals he says; "A person filled with gumption doesn't sit 
around dissipating and stewing about things. He's at the front of the train of 
his own awareness, watching to see what's up the track and meeting i t  when it 
comes."^ Whatever else this kind of person may be, he has a significantly 
developed state of autonomy that will cause him to resent interference in his 
life when only his own good is a t issue.
One line of argument that is possible from this claim, although Mill did 
not explicitly develop it, is that even if patemalism is justified for some.
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paternalistic laws which cannot distinguish between those with gumption and 
those without gumption, are unjustified. This is so since the state is requiring 
those with gumption to tolerate restrictions which are both unnecessary and 
extremely offensive for the sake of those without this characteristic. The 
state, the argument maintains, has no justification for this demand. Those 
without gumption will simply have to bear the burden of their own stupidity 
and short sightedness,
]t seems to me that if such a group of individuals exists, and I am sure it 
does, then their developed sense of autonomy and sensitivity to interference in 
their lives, at the very least, must be taken into consideration. Here lies one 
of the real difficulties with utilitarian calculations. Even if we had a rough 
estimate of how many gumption filled individuals there are, say even half the 
population, how do we compare the offense against them, the resentment and 
rebellion generated, with the harm that may result from failure to enforce 
some patemalistic laws? Perhaps it  could successfully be argued that, given 
the high value of liberty and autonomy, we should tip the balance in favor of 
liberty. Furthermore, an issue of justice could be raised. How can we justify 
restricting the liberty of the individuals with gumption, if they have done 
nothing to deserve the restriction? Nevertheless, i t  is hard to believe that 
there could never be any exception to patemalism for the sake of those 
without gumption, on utilitarian grounds alone.
Finally, Mill develops what he calls the strongest argument against 
society's coercing influence in purely self-regarding conduct; that is, "the odds 
are that i t  interferes wrongly and in the wrong place,"^ A common reading of 
this argument is that Mill is claiming something like the following: while the 
general public may be able to discem its own interests, able to understand
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situations and œnditions that threaten them, this public is unable to discern, 
with any reliable accuracy, the interests of another. Thus, the harm principle 
is workable, but patemalistic practices are not. The standard rebuttal to this 
line of thinking is the claim that individuals do not really know their own 
interests. Hart, for example, says of Mill's extreme view;
No doubt if we no longer empathize with this criticism this is 
due, in part to a general decline in the belief that individuals 
know their own interests best, and to an increased awareness of a 
great range of factors which diminish the signi&cance to be 
attached to an apparently free choice or to consent.
Hart seems to be advancing two objections to Mill here, one of which is 
that we no longer bebeve that people know their own interests best. K. is 
tempting to argue that in matters like law, medicine and nuclear safety (both 
from bombs and with the use of nuclear power) that individuals do not know 
their own interests, only a few experts do. I am not convinced that, even in 
these matters, individuals do not by and large know their interests. It seems to 
me that experts are needed only as technical advisors on how to accomplish 
interests, not to determine interests, is, I maintain, generally known that 
health is a benefit, that nuclear war or a nuclear accident is not. Experts 
serve, not to toll us our interests, but to help us decide what specific courses 
of action are likely to lead to a secure benefit or avoidance of harm. The 
d i f f i c u l ty ,  h o w ev er, w ith  t ry in g  to  g e n e ra te  ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r 
patemalistic laws from this position is that to be forceful the 
argument must assume those who make law, the legislators, possess 
the relevant knowledge. But do they? Legislators are not medical 
doctors, nor are they nuclear physicists. They, like the general 
population, listen to expert testimony and then decide as best they
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can what sort of laws support the general interests. In an
analogous manner, I cannot see how they have special claim to 
knowing how to protect individuals against themselves.
Actually the point about knowing or not knowing interests is, I think, not 
of central importance as far as Mill's argument goes. For Mill it does not seem 
to be a matter of knowing or not knowing something. Mill is simply su^idous 
of the patemabst's motives. He fears abuse of patemalistic powers. He says:
But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the 
minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct is quite as likely 
to be wrong as right, for in these cases public opinion means, at 
the best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for oüier 
people, while very often it  does not even mean that-the public, 
with the most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or 
convenience of those whoœ conduct they censure and considering 
only their own preference.
Mill's fear apparently is that patemalistic laws invite legal moralism. By 
legal moralism I understand the doctrine that allows a state to enact laws 
when a majority of citizens favor such laws. R  does not matter whether the 
desire for the law is based on mere tastes or even prejudice. Mill thinks that 
the public in general fails to pay enough attention to "universal experience" 
and will, if allowed, legislate mere preferences and prejudices into law. It may
be recalled that in my Introduction I raised the possibility of
inconsistency on Mill's part with regard to this argument which he
calls the strongest of all the arguments. He appears to soften his
hard antdpatemalism with the remark that;
It is easy for anyone to imagine an ideal public which leaves the 
freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters 
undistrurbed and only requires them to abstain from modes of 
conduct which universal experience has condemned. But where has 
there been seen a public which set any such limit to its
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censorship.?, jûr when does the putûic trouble itself about universal 
experience?
This passage indicates more clearly, I believe, that Mill is not arguing 
from the claim that most of us enjoy ^jecdal knowledge concerning our own 
interests, but rather he is arguing from a fear of abuse of power. He does 
apparently think, however, that when we compare values, e.g., competing goods 
or competing evils, each of us know our own preferences better than others. It 
would appear that this argument, according to MiU, is not indefeasible. If a 
world existed with an 'ideal public,' one that made public law soley on the 
firm basis of universal human experience, then this argument would lose its 
forcefulness. But here in the real world, the argument strikes me as quite 
forcefuL
Mill offers what I take to be convincing evidence that abuse of power by 
a majority is common in human history by describing historical cases, e.g., 
Roman Cathbbcs in Spain, Puritans in Great Britain and New England. The 
liberty principle, which disallows legal patemalism, is necessary to prevent this 
abuse of power. In contemporary America these same tendencies stül exist. 
Moralistic arguments are offered to justify laws against consumption of 
alcoholic beverages, gambling and selling nonessential items on Sunday. Just 
consider what kind of laws would be forced upon us all if a group like The 
Moral Majorüy should come to power without Constitutional restraints.
Rolf Sartorius offers an interesting interpretation of this argument in 
Mill He explains that a utilitarian can get an absolute prohibition in the 
following manner:
Asume (a) that most acts of kind K are, on utilitarian grounds, 
wrong, although (b) some acts of kind K are, on utilitarian 
grounds, right, but that (c) most attempts to identd^ exceptions to
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the rule of thumb "Acts of kind K are wrong" are mistaken 
because there is no reliable criterion by means of which 
exceptions to the rule may be identified. When these conditions 
are aH satisfied, the act-utilitarian has good reason, other things 
being equal, for acting SQ.as to prevent anyone from ever 
performing an act of kind K.
Does this argument provide the utilitarian with an exceptionless duty? 
Sartorius holds that first amendment freedoms in the Constitution allowing 
freedom of press can be justified this way. The argument is that in the long 
run an absolute ban on legal restrictions of the press is justified. It seems to 
me that even this argument will not work, i.e. mankind is not a greater gainer, 
when measured in purely utilitarian calculations, by allowing no interference 
with a free press, or in the parallel case of patemalism, no patemalistic 
interference by the law. There are justifiable exceptions to free press. Certain 
investigations are kept secret, national security is protected by classifying 
documents. During World War H when the Manhattan Project was in its fuH 
development extreme censorship was imposed on the press, even comic strips 
were censored; words like "atomic" and "nuclear" were forbidden. The 
government did not want the Axis Powers to get a hint that anyone in America 
was even thinking atomic. The argument was utilitarian, as Sartorius'; i t  is 
better in a few extreme cases to allow censorship than not, even though some 
mistakes may be made. Le., some unjustified censorship may well occur. I do 
not see how a pure act utilitarian, as Sartorius interprets Mill, can object to a 
few cases of patemalism where the stakes are very high.
Sartorius attempts to bolster this argument by claiming that a 100% 
effective criterion is the only acceptable criterion for allowing exceptions to a 
utilitarian based rule.. He argues his case with this example:
11/
Modifying only slightly a hypothetical example found in the classic 
paper by Livermore, Malmquist, and Meehl, le t us assume that 
there is a certain form of mental illness such that virtually all 
those who have it will commit suicide if left a t liberty, and that 
the other conditions of our proposed criterion are satisfied as 
welL Again, assume that one person in a thousand suffers from the 
illness in question, and that our criterion is reliable, distinguishing 
with 95% effectiveness between those who will commit suicide in 
virtue of the illness in question from those who will not. In a 
population of 100,000, ninety-five of the 100 who would commit 
suicide would be identified and presumably benefited by being 
involuntarily committed. Five persons would go undetected 
and—unless they met a natural death first—commit suicide. But out 
of the 99,900 people who would not com mit.suicide, 4,995 would 
also be identified and committed as suicidal!
His claim is that even if we had a criterion for justifiable patemalistic 
interference in a person's life that was 95% effective, i t  would still yield too 
much error and so, on utilitarian grounds, be unacceptable. But the example 
involves a contorted use of statistics. I take i t  that there is an intended shock 
effect meant to overwhelm us by showing that even with a 95% effective 
criterion, we generate nearly 5000 bogus cases in an attempt to single out 100 
legitimate cases of interference. But how can such a criterion be claimed 95% 
effective? Sartorius assumes a 5% error rate generates 5% of error in the 
population that i t  checks. But, as I understand statistics, a 5% error rate 
generates 5% of error out of those i t  identifies as having the characteristic. 
So, if a mechanism picks out 100 exceptions, i t  is mistaken in 5 of them. 
Sartorius reads the 5% error rate as "5 out of every 100 cases examined are 
erroneous." If out of a population of 100,000 a principle identified 5,090 as 
having a trait, where only 100 actually have it, i t  is an understatement to say 
that characterizing the principle as 95% accurate is misleading.
The point for Mill's argument is this, if we could rely on the general 
public to enforce patemalistic controls only in clear cases based on universal 
experience then, from the point of view of this fourth argument, even some
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coercive strong direct patemalism may be permissible. But, of course, we 
cannot rely on the public and there are still other (Ejections to paternalism.
Mill's argument seems not to be as Sartorius suggests, a prohibition based 
on difficulty in determining justifiable from unjustifiable cases, but prohibition 
based on gross abuse of power. Mill's claim is that i t  is human nature to want 
to meddle in the affairs of others, especially to enforce on others what we 
take to be in their interests. And this is as apt to be based on mere shallow 
and biased preferen .e as reasoned argument.
The Sartorius argument seems to fall short of providing grounds for 
absolute prohibition. In order to prevent abuse of patemalistic powers we need 
only have a stringent criterion for interference, e.g., showing severe, long 
term harm is very likely to result from certain actions. This criteria would of 
course need to include a clear and tough standard for what counts as harm. 
This is a difficult problem itself, one which Mill fails to adequately treat. 
However, if an adequately stringent standard could be spelled out, then it 
would, I believe, rule out all of the petty interference Mill was concemed 
with, the sort the Puritans and others have historically been inclined to 
enforce.
It does, then, seem to me that the arguments in chapter 4 of On Liberty, 
as many critics have argued, are good arguments against wide^read and 
severely restrictive patemalistic laws, but do not establish the extreme 
antipatemahsm which Mill advocated. Whatever the historical Mill might have 
believed, a t this point i t  appears that his absolute prohibition should be argued 
from autonomy and individuality. Perhaps i t  could be maintained that all the 
utilitarian arguments taken together constitute an absolute ban on legal 
patemalism. It does seem clear to me that a t the very least Mill's arguments
119
from chapter 4 present a greater challenge to the paternalist than is com monly 
recognized.
There is, I beHeve, the possibility of getting what might be described as a 
provisional absolute prohibition on legal paternalism out of Mill's arguments in 
chapter 4. The argument maintains that paternalism is a dangerous power that 
is too easily abused. The argument further maintains that paternalistic 
arguments are not required for any important laws, e.g., laws against slavery, 
control of dangerous drugs, dueling or safety requirements for construction 
workers and so on. This argument is then strengthened by the claim that there 
are alternatives to coercion, education for instance. In other words, 
paternalistic laws are a dangerous precedent. As long as we can produce 
convincing non-patemalistic arguments against those activities that are most 
troubling to society, then we can maintain an absolute prohibition on legal 
paternalism. So the paternalist is required to seek other non-coerdve avenues 
more diligently. The absolute ban is provisonal in that i t  is always subject to 
novel heretofore unthought of cases.
However, whether or not there can be a successful utilitarian appeal that 
establishes Mill's strong antdpatemalism, as I have argued, it is in Mill's 
understanding of individuality and the nature of man that provide the absolute 
ban on coercive strong direct paternalism (especially legal paternalism) for 
developed or autonomous persons.
I will now turn my attention to what I take to be the strongest challenge 
against this view, the claim that there are good paternalistic arguments for
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not legally recognizing ^ v e ry  contracts, controlling drugs and not allowing
consent to mistreatment to count as a legal defense against assault. Indeed,
even Mill's supporters are critical of him on the issue of slavery and drug
usage laws. Arneson thinks that the absolute prohibition of paternalism in
chapter 1 of On Liberty is inconsistent with the exception he claims Mill
makes for slavery contracts in chapter 5. Ameson's solution is amply to ignore
the chapter 5 exception to the absolute antipatemalism position of chapter
1.^^ Dworkin takes the antislavery contract position of Mill to be espousing
some kind of general principle that allows restriction of liberty for the sake of 
14liberty. This principle frequently is interpreted to justify any interference 
that lowers the risk of death or injury, since, i t  is argued, liberty is increased 
by prolonging life. Feinberg takes Mill's argument to be a claim that we know 
a priori that no one can benefit from a davery contract; and further, that Mill 
has given in to paternalism after alL^^
I think none of these interpretations of Mill are correct. Let us begin by 
examining what Mill actually says:
In this and mo^ other civilized countries, for example, an 
engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow 
himself, to be sold, as a slave would be null and void, neither 
enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his 
power of voluntarily d%x)sing of his own lot in life is apparent, 
and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason for not 
interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's 
voluntary acts is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice 
is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at least 
endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for 
by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by 
selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes 
any future use of i t  beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, 
in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of 
allowing him to di^xase of himself. He is no longer free, but is 
thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in 
its favor that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. 
The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not
121
to be It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his
freedom.
Mill's argument here seems to me very simple. The state's failure to 
acknowledge slavery contracts is not the sort of paternalism to which he 
objects, it  is not coercive and does not restrict liberty in a direct way. The 
argument seems only to claim that the individual who desires to become the 
slave of another is in no position to advance his cause in the name of liberty. 
There is something fundamentally incoherent about an argument that claims it 
is freedom to surrender freedom. The action of submitting oneself to slavery is 
inconsistent with the stateo desire of the individual, to exercise liberty; it is 
like pulling the rug out from under one's own feet. The state may defend its 
refusal to sanction this contract with something like the following remark: "We 
see no reason to recognize slavery contracts and a number of reasons not to. 
The practice is inhuman and subject to great abuse. It is impossible to police. 
For example, an individual could be forcibly apprehended by a would be 
slaveowner, then tortured and threatened with future torture in order to elicit 
public statements on the part of the victim to the effect that he desires to be 
a slave. The state would then be forced to legally recognize and support this 
arrangement."
Mill's point is, then, a simple one: if an individual wishes to become a 
slave and petitions the state to legally recognize this institution, the grounds 
for recognition cannot be liberty. The prospective slave must find other 
arguments to persuade the state to establish the institution of slavery. Mill, in 
this contention, is consistent; he consistently defends liberty. As it turns out, 
in this case, liberty is not on the side of the would be dave.
Another attempted rebuttal to the claim that failure to enforce slavery 
contracts is a violation of liberty is provided by John Hodson. He claims that
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justification for failure to enforce such contracts is only required if there is a 
prima facie obligation to allow them. Since there is no prima fade obligation 
for slavery contracts, the state is not obligated to justify its action, or failure 
to act. There is no interference with the would be slave's liberty. This follows 
for three reasons: first, a person may, without legal slavery, still live in de 
facto slavery; second. United States law does not recognize titles such as 
knight, baron and so forth, and this does not restrict liberty. In a similar way, 
failure to legally recognize a Wave's status does not restrict liberty. Finally, 
in not recognizing the institution of slavery, the state merely fails to provide 
a nonessential service. There is no compelling reason to assert that there is a 
positive right to this service.^^
The main force of this argument is, I believe, correct, but I am not 
convinced that a person can live in de facto slavery, at least not in a full 
sense. If a full-blown slavery institution is on going, as there once was in this 
country, the slave is a t the mercy of the slave owner and the legal system 
that supports the institution. If a slave escapes he can be hunted down, 
punished and returned to his owner. Without a supporting legal system there 
cannot really be slavery. A 'dave' who can quit at any time is not really a 
slave. If an owner attempted to force his 'slave' back in servitude he, not the 
'slave,' would be guilty of several crimes under the existing legal system, 
assault, kidnapping and so on. But the main force of Hodson's argument, I 
believe, is sustained. It is not an infringem ent of liberty by the state to refuse 
to get involved in a practice unless there is some obligation to support the 
practice. Hence, Mill is on firm grounds in his claim that the would be ^ v e  is 
in no position to establish an obligation grounded on liberty for the state to 
support slavery.
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It may be instructive to examine some cases that perhaps are plausible 
candidates for permissible slavery. Here is the first case. Smith sells himself 
into slavery for one million dollars paid in advance, and is allowed one year 
before he must surrender himself to his master for perpetuity. In the second, 
Jones is paid ten million dollars in advance and allowed ten years before he 
surrenders himself to his master. And finally, a case of the beneficent slave. 
An eccentric multimillionaire wants to own a slave and offers to contribute 
ten million dollars to any cause in the name of any person who is willing to 
become his slave. Brown volunteers and has the ten million dollars given to the 
Save the Children Fund, reasoning that his sacrifice will save the lives of 
thousands of children and improve the lives of many others.
None of these cases are in any clear sense irrational If Smith is a young 
man and intends to keep his bargain, actually turn himself over to be a slave, 
then he is at best very ^ort-sighted. On the other hand it  would not be at all 
irrational for Smith and Jones to believe that they could take their 
prepayments and 'disappear' somewhere in the world. While i t  may be true that 
the world is 'shrinking' in the twentieth century, I suspect one person with lots 
of money can still hide with just a little ingenuity. In Brown's case, it  is not 
unreasonable to think of his sacrifice as noble. We think of a person who 
sacrifices his life for the sake of others as especially courageous and virtuous. 
Should we prevent or discourage Brown from making this sacrifice? If, during 
the Iranian hostage crisis, the Shah of Iran had volunteered to return to Iran 
to secure the release of the hostages, where he would certainly have been 
killed, should we have prevented him? Whatever the answer to these questions 
two points remain. First, there are good nonpatemalistic reasons for 
disallowing legal status to slavery. To the ones previously mentioned, i t  is
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inhuman and impossible tx) police, I would add that, as Feinberg suggests, the
legal mechanism by which we would re'view applications for a slavery contract
18would necessarily be complicated, expensive and stringent. Probably one of 
two possibilities would take place. One, the only persons who apply would be 
persons who we think incompetent in one way or another, and, hence, not 
qualify for the contract. Or, two, perhaps a few persons like Brown would 
apply and we think they are being exploited, hence, deny their request. Either 
way we end up with an expensive piece of legal machinery that benefits no 
one.
The second point is this, none of these cases teU against Kill's argument
or Kill's position on paternalism. There is an interesting swapping of arguments
here. In the typical paternalism dispute we encounter a paternalist who is
advocating some benefit at the expense of liberty. The antipatemalist argues
from liberty and autonomy against imposing the benefit. But in the cases of
Smith, Jones and Brown the arguments are reversed. The state is upholding
liberty, a t least in the sense that it  refuses to take part in the restriction of
liberty, by f ailing to recognize slavery contracts as binding; while the
individual who wants a slavery contract is arguing from some benefit to
himself, or others, a t the expense of liberty. Feinberg thinks Mill's argument
against slavery contracts commits him to the view that no slavery contracts 
19are justifiable. But, if my reading of Mill is correct, this is not so. Mill 
simply argues, correctly I believe, that ^ v e ry  contracts cannot be justified on 
the basis of liberty. I t is a mistake to read Mill otherwise. So MüL is not giving 
in to paternalism on this issue.
Another line of argument that is often used to subvert the strong 
antipatemalism of Mill is based on the need to control drug usage. Feinberg
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maintains that Mill's strong position flies in the face of common sense and 
established custom. It is maintained that common sense and common practice 
requires the control of the purchase and distribution of dangerous drugs. 
Feinberg further claims that the justification for laws that control drugs is 
that drugs are always bad for the individual, thus generating a justified 
coercive paternalistic law against the use of drugs, contrary to MilL^  ^ Hart 
accuses Mill of carrying his antipatemalism to lengths that now seem fantastic. 
Mill's reluctance to control drugs for paternalistic reasons is said to simply be 
untenably based on the false assumption that individuals know their own 
interests best.^^ I am not convinced that Mill's view is really subject to such 
criticism.
Part of the justification of drug laws, that part which pertains to the 
seller, is an attempt to prevent one person from harming another. So, even if 
the motive here is paternalistic, i t  is indirect paternalism, not the kind Mill 
was e^iecially concerned with. In fact Mill was troubled by this kind of case 
and remained unsure as to whether or not he should include it in the class of 
absolutely proscribed paternalism. But what justifies punishment of the drug 
user? It is preposterous to claim that a drug user is sentenced to prison in his 
own interest. To believe this claim one must believe that, rather than use 
certain drugs, it  is better for an individual to be stripped of most of his 
citizenship, nearly all of his physical liberties, placed in an environment often 
referred to as a "criminal college" where he is apt to be mistreated and raped 
by inmates and sadistic guards and where he will certainly not be in a drug 
free atmosphere. Perhaps i t  will be argued that we can justify a fine or 
mandatory counseling on paternalistic grounds. But even here there is 
difficulty. If the drug user refuses to pay the fine or attend the counseling
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sessions, then do we send him to prison? If so, we are back to the original 
problem with paternalistic punishment. If not, we have an unenforceable law.
I really believe this problem with paternalistic puniriiment is fatal to 
legal paternalism. The supposed justification for paternalism is benevolence 
toward the individual coerced. But the punishment, to be effective at all, is 
worse than the behavior we try to prevent, especially in the drug cases. Mill 
understood this but did not develop the argument as far as I think i t  can be 
developjed. He said:
We shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear, the whole 
penalty of his error; if he ^» ils  his life by mismanagement, we 
shall not, for that reason, desire to ^xml i t  still further; instead of 
wishing to punish him, we shall rather endeavor to alleviate his 
punishment by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his 
conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be to us an object of 
pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment; we shall 
not treat him like an enemy of society; the worst we shall think 
ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, if we douiot 
interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him.
There are two cases to be considered. First, those who actually suffer
from their imprudence, whether drug usage or some other instance of poor
judgment. Paternalism is supposed to be in the interests of the individual, but
if in addition to the suffering he has already endured due to his own error, we
punish him further by fine or prison, we make his life even more miserable.
Mill’s pxDint seems to be that the only legitimate expression of benevolence,
be., the only action that can honestly claim to be benevolent, is to express our
empathy to the injured individual and offer our advice and aid in reducing the
likelihood of a future injury by the same error. The claim that the individual is
ultimately benefited by punishment is not true in any clear sense. To a large
degree whether or not punishment has a beneficial effect depsends on the
response of the person pxinished. If a short jail sentence for a drug user always
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or nearly always prevented future use and addiction, then there may be some 
plausibility to the paternalist's claim that he is benefiting persons by 
sentencing them to jaiL But even on this assumption whether or not a person is 
benefited by a prison or term depends on what happens to that individual 
while incarcerated. After alb sometimes people get acquainted with other 
criminals while in jail and turn to more serious crime. Also, sometimes people 
are murdered in prisons; or the prison term may even cost a person his career. 
But the assumption that a jail or prison term wüL lead to some good in a 
person's life is probably unfounded in the first place.
The second kind of case that must be considered is the case where the 
paternalist attempts to curb certain behavior by threatened punishment. But 
the threats will not work unless actually carried out. Here again the response 
of the intended beneficiary of paternalism is relevant to whether or not the 
paternalistic intervention actually accomplishes its objective. If everyone 
quietly and quickly gave in to the threat of punishment and modified his 
behavior in order to avoid the punishment, then the claim that coercive laws 
which threaten punishment actually do benefit individuals would be believable. 
And, I suppose, i t  must be admitted that those who yield to the threat of 
punishment without resistance are benefited by abstinence from drug use and 
experimentation. But, for those who violate the law, the threats must be 
carried out; or else the law will lose its coercive power. However, if actually 
carried out, then we end up harming the individual even more than if we did 
not administer the punishment. If we punish individuals, as is typical in drug 
use, it  may have a beneficial effect on others by discouraging use of drugs. 
But then, if this is the justification for the law, the motive is not
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paternalistic. The notion that we can benefit drug users by punishing them is, 
upon examination, implausible; and worse, as I shall argue, unjust.
I think that i t  will be instructive at this point to examine the value of 
paternalistic punishment in the family. The idea here is to extend the notion I 
developed in chapter 1, that unjustified paternalism in the law can be exposed 
for what it  is by finding parallel examples in the family environment that are 
easily seen as bad parenting. The justification for parental punishment of 
children is, first of all, that they are incapable of managing their lives without 
parental intervention and that sometimes punishment is the only way a parent 
can accomplish a necessary benefit for the child. Second, possibly it  can be 
argued that punishment teaches the child, beyond the immediate objective (for 
example, not running out from behind parked cars into the street), discipline 
and respect for authority. Justifiable punishment may take several forms: 
deprivation of privileges, confinement to a room or the house for short periods 
of time, reduction in allowance and (more controversially) mild spankings. The 
point here is that justifiable punishment of children is necessarily of relatively 
short duration and non-severe. The oversight of the legal paternalist is 
twofold. The paternalist fails to recognize that children are generally 
manageable in a way that mature adults are not. Children are apt to accept 
the parental punishment, e ^ d a l ly  in a family environment that is generally 
supportive, where the parents are seen by the child as loving parents. Whereas, 
the recipient of paternalistic punishment by the state is apt to see the state 
as an adversary, as intruding on private interests. And here Mill's argument 
based on the gumption of certain individuals is relevant. The second oversight 
is that there is only so much punishment that can be administered and covered 
by the rationale of benefit to the child. Analogously, there is only so much the
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state can do and still make good its claim that it  is acting in the interest of 
the individual being punished.
What should a parent do with a child who rebels against the punishment, 
the child who refuses to accept it? It is unlikely that harsh, severe or extreme 
punishment could be justified as being in the interest of the child. It is here 
that the loving, nurturing and motivating parent is likely to be more successful 
and beneficial to the child. There really is no parallel in the legal system to 
confining a child to a room or the house for a short period of time, since a jail 
or prison term, even a short one, is a much more severe form of punishment. 
The problem for the paternalistic state is that, for those adults who refuse to 
accept the state's restrictiLons, the state loses its justification for punishment 
based on benefit. It appears that the state must be prepared to escalate 
punishment to a level of severity beyond which i t  can be maintained that it  is 
benefiting the individuals who are punished.
The further the state is willing to go with escalating punishment the less 
plausible is its claim that i t  is acting patemahstLcally. Even if i t  can 
legitimately claim to benefit some individuals merely by the threat of 
punishment, how does the state justify worsening the lives of those who violate 
these paternalistic laws? The justification here cannot be paternalistic. B: must 
be remembered that the victim of paternalistic punishment is not wicked, has 
done nothing to deserve punishment under a public interest proviso; in the 
words of Mill, this person is not the enemy of the state. The justification for 
the punishment is beneficence. But, as we have seen, often the punishment 
results in loss of benefit. If the state argues that i t  is justified in punishing 
this rebellious group for the sake of the non-rebeHious, in order to maintain 
the coercive threat over them, then the state faces yet another allegation of
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injiistice. The state, under this justification, is punishing one group, the 
rebellious, who have done nothing to deserve punishment, for the sake of 
another group. Not only is this argument non paternalistic, I do not see how it 
can be sustained in any system that takes rights, liberty or individuality 
seriously.
What does justify punishment for drug users and sellers? Consider a world 
like ours except that drugs are not popular among the youth. Suppose that the 
only people who experiment with and abuse drugs are mature adults, and then 
only on a small scale. Further imagine that most give up the practice, some 
continue in a light and not very harmful way, and others become addicts. The 
later two groups, when questioned, prefer to take their chances thinking that 
the rest and relaxation they gain from drug usage is worth the risk and pain of 
addiction. In this world there would be little justification for drug control laws 
of any sort. But in the real world there is ample nonpatemalistic justification. 
The illegal drug business is a huge, malicious and ugly social problem. Tc 
constitutes a multibillion dollar industry that pays no taxes, i t  is a breeding 
ground for organized crime, i t  attacks young persons when they are most 
vulnerable to impulsive and short sighted actions and i t  presents a constant 
fear to parents that their children will fall prey to this institution. The 
punishment to individuals who take part in this practice, buyer or seller, is 
justified for their part in this insidious social problem. No paternalistic 
punishment is justified; none is needed.
The final argument against Mill's view that l  want to consider is the 
argument that paternalistic laws against consent to beatings, mutilations and 
death are justified. Feinberg maintains these actions are always harmful and 
justified on paternalistic grounds alone. The trick, he believes, is to stop ^ o r t
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23of outlawing whisky, cigarettes and fried foods. But why stop short of these 
activities? If we think we are justified in interfering where self-harm is highly 
probable, I can hardly think of a better target than the use of tobacco. My 
own view is that we need not worry about stopping short of making these 
activities illegal, since there are no good reasons to ever let legal paternalism 
get off the ground.
Mill's arguments do not commit him to countenancing any of these 
paternalistic actions. First, consider the case of submitting to voluntary 
beatings or mutilations. Theoretically, Mill is committed to allowing any fully 
autonomous person do whatever he likes when the consequences are merely to 
himself. Mill's out on this problem is that the class of autonomous persons who 
wish to be beaten or mistreated is empty. Such desires, the desire for pain, 
disability or mutilation are prima fade  irrational The person who harbors 
these desires is most likely a candidate for institutionalization. Of course, one 
can easily imagine cases which defeat the prima fade  irrationality; say a 
person wants to have his foot amputated to save his life. This person has a 
reason to become disabled, but his desire is not for the disability as such. Nor 
is i t  beneficial to prevent this person from having the amputation. To interfere 
with those who desire the disability for itself, is to act patemalistically in the 
weak sense, not the strong sense to which Mill objected.
Probably an analogous line of argument could be mounted regarding 
consent to beatings, mutilations and being killed as was for slavery contracts. 
That is, we could imagine cases like those of Smith, Jones and Brown who are 
willing to consent to abuse for large sums of money or as a self sacrifice for 
charity. However, analogous replies to those in the slavery cases can be made 
here. Consider a case where a person desires to be beaten in exchange for a
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large sum of money either for himself or for some charity. This sacrifice is not 
clearly irratLonaL But, as with similar contracts involving slavery, there are 
good nonpatemalistic reasons for disallowing this practice. It degrades 
humanity, is easily abused and nearly impossible to police. Further, there is an 
indirect paternalistic argument against such a practice. The person who wishes 
to hire someone to mistreat, is giving vent to sadistic tendencies. These 
tendencies are morally objectionable and should be suppressed and resisted for 
that individual's own good as well as for society's. So the law is justified in 
disallowing Smith to submit to a beating or mutilation from Jones, strange as it  
may sound, for Jones' benefit. On this line of argument, the law resricting 
Jones is coercive strong indirect paternalism with regard to Smith but with 
regard to Jones it  is coercive weak direct paternalism.
The case of a death wish or contracting to have oneself killed is more 
like a case of suicide or euthanasia. The desire for death, or taking steps to 
secure one's death is neither always wrong nor always irrational For example, 
an individual may wish to die a painless and swift death now in order to 
prevent a slow and painful death. There is no clear sense in which this desire 
is irrational If this individual asks for someone else's help in causing the 
death, then, of course, this raises the legal issue of murder. There may well 
be, as with slavery and consent to mistreatment, sold nonpatemalistic 
objections to legal euthanasia or suicide, but I see no convincing patemalistic 
ones. Since this issue w ü  be discussed in chapter 5 a t some length, I will not 
prolong the discussion here.
Mil's arguments against patemalistic laws are, i t  seems to me, persuasive 
and conclusive. The combined utilitarian appeals of chapter 4 of On Liberty 
with the appeals to individuality and liberty of chapter 3 make a formidable
133
challenge to the paternalist. If my investigation here has not badly erred, 
Mill's position against coercive strong direct paternalism is correct.
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CHAPTER V
CHALLENGES TO ANTIPATERNALISM
It is largely maintained that paternalism, even coercive strong direct 
paternalism, is justified when individuals engage in activities that place 
themselves beyond a certain threshold of risk. Some activities that are often 
included as fitting targets of patemalistic interference are, riding a 
motorcycle without a helmet, riding in or operating a car without a seat belt, 
jaywalking and dueling. Other activities that are thought to involve unusual 
risk but are less often the targets of patemalistic intervention are, smoking, 
drinking alcoholic beverages, eating fast foods or junk foods, handling 
dangerous animals such as tigers or poisonous snakes, dangerous hobbies such 
as skydiving, mountain climbing, SCUBA diving and boxing. If convincing 
reasons can be mounted for legal restriction of any of these activities based 
on individual welfare alone, then the strong antdpatemalistic view I am 
advocating will be defeated. In section I of this chapter I will consider in 
some detail what are probably the strongest contenders among these two 
groups of activities for exceptions to antipatemalistic rules, that is, riding a 
motorcycle without a helmet and riding in a car without a seat belt. Then I 
will briefly consider dueling and a case of involuntary commitment based on 
risk of self harm. In section H I will consider a challenge to antipatemalism
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from John Kleinig that is not based so much on counter-examples, but on a 
counter-strategy.
The problem with justifying motorcycle helmet and seat belt laws is set
up for the paternalist by an argument that has its roots in individuality. It
win be useful in introducing this argument fo begin by examining a parallel
argument used by Jeffrie Murphy against killing innocents in war. He makes
use of the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. This
distinction emphasizes the difference between violating Jones' rights and
doing something that would be bad for Jones. For example, if I make a
contract with Jones, he has a right to expect the contract to be kept. On the
other hand, if Jones is in financial distress, i t  will be bad for Jones if I fail
to help, but he has no right, that is, I have no obligation, to come to his
rescue.^ A similar distinction is found in Mill between moral rules that forbid
causing harm (on this point Mill explicitly includes denial of freedom as harm)
and rules that require extending some benefit. The former are more vital than 
2the latter. So when the paternalist interferes with liberty in order to secure 
a benefit, she is, in the language of Kant, allowing an imperfect duty to 
outweigh a perfect duty; and in the language of Mill she is allowing a less 
vital interest to outweigh a more vital interest. In seeking to benefit us all 
via mandatory helmet and seat belt laws the paternalist is tampering with 
vital interests, held by some to be rights.
There are four basic strategies for defeating this argument that I will 
consider in this chapter. The first maintains that by requiring helmets and
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seat belts the state is acting in a manner consistent with the desires of 
individuais. The second maintains that the interests of motorists that are 
denied are not '/ital; in other words, the interference with individuality is 
trivial The third strategy argues that the paternalism is weak not strong 
paternalism. And finally, i t  is sometimes argued that the benefit from these 
restrictions is so great i t  justifies the offense against individuality. This last 
strategy is, I believe, a sound approach. For example, Murphy would not allow 
as justified waging any war in which innocents are intentionally killed. This 
argument leads to the unlikely conclusion that if the only way to defeat the 
Nazis in World War n  was to wage war in such a way that innocents would be 
intentionally killed, then the war was unjustified. The strategy for defeating 
rights maintains that even powerful and important rights may be abandoned to 
prevent catastrophic and horrific consequences. While the strategy seems 
sound, I shall argue that i t  is not available to the paternalist.
Gerald Dworkin a t one time thought that laws requiring motorcyclists to 
wear helmets and passengers in cars to wear seat belts was justified on 
patemalistic grounds.^ More recently, however, he has come to realize the 
issue is more complicated and the justification for patemalistic laws less
4
obvious. I t will, nevertheless, be instructive to examine his earlier reasons 
for favoring such laws. The justification offered was that by requiring 
motorcycle helmets and seat belts the state was promoting a good for the 
individual, safety, that is recognized as such by everyone. I t is assumed, 
correctly I suspect, that most people do not want to be injured while iiuLiig 
on a motorcycle or while riding in a car. John Kleinig offers a similar 
argument, which I will comment on in some detail in section H of this 
chapter, that he refers to as the Argument from Personal Integrity. Dworkin
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maintains that life plans are r e a c te d  even in the face of helmet and seat 
belt legislation because the persons who fail to use them are not in accord 
with their own goals and purposes. The explanation offered as to why people 
so often fail to act in accord with tneir own incertasuj, i.e., fail to wear 
helmets and seat belts, is that sometimes people just fail to exercise good 
judgment in that they miscalculate the weights of some of their values or 
they simply neglect to act in a manner consistent with their own values. So 
patemalistic laws, it is held, are justified to protect our future as rational 
choosers.^
I am not convinced that the description of why people do not use 
helmets and seat belts, that they miscalculate, are careless or thoughtless, is 
accurate. It seems to me that most people have two conflicting desires; they 
desire not to be injured and not to wear helmets or seat belts. But before I 
pursue this line, I first want to consider whether or not the intrusion into 
individuality is really trivial, as is often claimed.
There are some arguments over the issue of triviality that are available 
to the motorcyclists, but not to the motorist. My own experience as a long 
time motorcyclist informs me that persons who ride motorcycles, especially 
the larger ones, say SOOcc's and larger, do so for the enjoyment of 
motorcycling and not simply as an economical means of tran ^ rta tio n . In fact 
some of the larger motorcycles do not achieve as high a gas mileage as some 
of the high mileage automobiles. Kleinig acknowledges what might aptly be 
described as an aesthetic argument against helmet laws for motorcyclists. He 
says: "Motorcyclists, for example, have sometimes made a great deal of the 
sensations involved when the wind beats in the face and rushes through the 
hair-its almost sensual quality, the feeling and celebration of independence, a
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sympatJny with nature or a sense of striving against it."^ There are two other 
arguments that sometimes are combined with this one in order to show that 
mandatory helmet laws are not trivial. One maintains that the danger or 
element of risk that comes from riding without a helmet is part of the basic 
enjoyment of the experience of motorcycle riding. The other maintains that 
the helmet itself creates new danger in several ways; i t  limits peripheral 
vision, fogs up, increases the likelihood of neck injury and sometimes traps 
bees or wasps which increases the likelihood of accident. Thus, mandatory 
helmet laws require the cyclists to accept one kind of risk in favor of 
another.
While Kleinig maintains that in spite of these considerations the balance 
still remains for mandatory helmet legislation, I think a more careful analysis 
is in order. Actually the fogging up problem can be easily dismissed. It is the 
face shield that fogs up, not the helmet. Face shields are generally sold 
separate from helmets. Also, face shield laws should be kept separate from 
helmet laws. Furthermore, there are applications available that will prevent 
fogging; and, should severe fogging occur while riding, the rider can easily 
remove the shield from most helmets.
However, the other considerations, the aesthetic experience argument 
and the argument from additional hazards are not so easily dismissed. From 
my own experience I can say that riding a motorcycle with a helmet is a 
different experience than riding without one. This is especially true if one is 
riding in the open roads or on back roads for the scenic or aesthetic 
experience. Mandatory helmet laws deny the cyclist the opportunii^ to choose 
when to take additional risk by riding without a helmet and when not to. 
Some riders will use a helmet while riding in heavy traffic or on interstate
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highways, but not while tiding in a neighborhood or on back roads, or, in 
general, when riding explicitly for the pleasure. A tangential argument to this 
one that is often overlooked is that in cold or inclement weather the helmet 
and face shield are welcomed friends, but on a hot August afternoon these 
welcomed friends become instruments of torture. Wearing a helmet during the 
summer months in a hot climate can be quite an unpleasant experience. 
Mandatory helmet laws again do not allow what I take to be a perfectly 
defensible choice by the individual rider as to when and under what 
conditions he will assume additional risk by riding without a helmet.
A possible counter to this reply is that, while i t  is true that a 
significant number of motorcycle riders will make defensible and 
discriminating decisions about when to use a helmet and when not to, a 
significant number are just lazy and undisciplined and will never ride with a 
helmet unless coerced to do so by the law. So, in order to protect this latter 
group against themselves, the former group will simply have to forego riding 
without a helmet. There are two düficulties with this reply as a defense of 
paternalism. First, i t  is not dear which group should be made to sacrifice. 
Should the discriminating helmet users lose their right of choice for the sake 
of the undisciplined, or should the undisciplined simply assume the risk and 
responsibility for their faults. One way to decide might be to simply 
determine (assuming this is possible) which group is larger and then decide in 
favor of the larger group. However, I am not convinced that this is the 
correct way to proceed. There are some relevant differences between the 
positions of the two groups. If we decide against the discriminating helmet 
users, then these individuals are forced to conform to a rigid rule they do not 
wish to always obey. Whereas, if we decide against the undisciplined group
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for the sake of preserving the choice of the discriminating group, then the 
members of this group are not forced to take risks they do not wish to take. 
The risks they assume are of their own making and the consequences and 
re^wnsibility should rest with them. If this argument is to succeed it  must 
offer convincing reasons for restricting the liberty of one group for the sake 
of another when the former group has done nothing to deserve the restriction. 
The second problem with this argument as a justification of paternalism is 
that it  is only partially patemalistic. The aim to restrict the liberty of the 
undisciplined group is patemalistic, but the willingness to restrict the liberty 
of the discriminating group is not. So to make this justification of coercion 
work the patemahst needs, in addition to his patemalistic argument, another 
argument showing that the state is justified in restricting the freedom of one 
group for the sake of another.
Do any of the arguments I have been advancing against mandatory 
helmet laws have parallels for mandatory seat belt laws? It is doubtful that 
an aesthetic argument can be mounted, most auto driving is not for the joy or 
even combined joy and transportation. Moreover, seat belts do not have an 
analogous effect on the experience of driving as does a helmet on motorcycle 
riding. Nor do seat belts create restrictions of vision or constitute a 
distraction. But seat belts, like helmets, may be thought by many to be a 
nuisance. Also, the seat belts, like helmets, force us to accept one kind of 
risk, being trapped in a burning or sinking car unable to undo a seat belt, in 
exchange for less risk of other kinds of injury. Likewise, mandatory seat belt 
laws deny the individual opportunity to use seat belts discriminatingly; for 
example, wear them in heavy traffic or during a high speed long trip, but not 
wear them on short trips or in a low traffic environment.
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There are a number of other attempts to legitimize mandatory helmet 
and seat belt legislation, but, as I shall argue, none of them are successful 
patemalistic arguments. One such argument maintains that a large number of 
motorists recognize their laziness and lack of discipline with regard to 
helmets and seat belts and desire that the state help them by passing 
restrictive laws regarding these safety devices. This attempted justification 
suffers from defects similar to the last argument. If we make what I take to 
be a reasonable assumption, that there is a significant number of motorcycle 
and car drivers who will make re^xsnsible decisions about when to use 
helmets and seat belts, and further, that these drivers resent state coercion 
in this way, then by virtue of what line of reasoning does the state require 
these individuals to sacrifice their liberty for the sake of another group's 
foolishness, laziness or lack of discipline. The second problem with this 
approach to justification of patemalistic interference is that the argument is 
based on consent of that segment of the population that desires the state 
intervention and is, therefore, not patemalistic. This case is similar to that 
of Odysseus, lacking self control, he solicits the aid of his friends who justify 
their interference by virtue of his request. This sort of interference is 
fratemalistic, not patemalistic.
A further attempt to justify coercive laws requiring the use of helmets 
and seat belts is what Kleinig refers to as the Public Interest Argument, This 
argument maintains that individuals injured due to failure to take reasonable 
safety measures, e.g., wearing helmets while riding a motorcycle or seat belts 
while riding in a car, create a burden on the public in two ways. First, they 
are absent from their jobs and, thereby, contribute to loss of productivity.
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Second, they often become a putOic charge for an extended period of time 
and consume medical resources that could have been saved for someone e lse j
This attempt to justify helmet and seat belt laws, like the last argument, 
is no help to the paternalist, since i t  is an appeal to general harm not 
harmful self-regarding conduct. But aside from that difficulty, it  is not so 
clear that it  furthers the case for helmet and seat belt laws at alL Some of 
those who fail to use these safety devices die instantly and, had they lived, 
may have gone on to consume public resources via welfare or other prolonged 
illness. But even if the balance of public funds could be proven to be in favor 
of such legislation, I am not convinced that the additional funds expended on 
account of these risk takers justifies the denial of liberty. It costs more 
money to have a legal system that respects privacy and due process than one 
that does not, but that does not justify the denial of privacy or due process. 
It seems to me that the money ^ n t  to protect these liberties is money well 
spent.
However, this argument does raise the interesting question of who bears 
the cost of risk taking where it  can be determined that failure to use a 
helmet or seat belt is a contributing factor in an injury. Higher insurance 
premiums may be justified for non helmet and seat belt users. Additionally, in 
a case of injury in a motorcycle or automobile accident, if it is determined 
that driver A was re^wnsible for the accident causing injury to B, but B's 
injuries were partially caused by failure to wear a helmet or seat belt, then B 
may be justifiably held financialLy liable for a portion of his injuries.
One of the key questions in the debate over these mandatory safety 
regulations is whether or not the additional risk assumed by the vehicle 
operators who fail to use helmets or seat belts is an irrational risk. Does
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taking additional risk indicate these individuals themselves are irrational? If 
so, this will help the paternalist take the first step in justifying coercive 
paternalism, showing that the paternalism is weak rather than strong.
How should we decide whether or not a risk is irrational? Joel Feinberg
offers what I take to be a plausible and useful set of criteria that enables us
to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable risk. The relevant
considerations for determining the reasonableness of any risk are: (1) the
probability that the contemplated course of action will lead to harm, (2) tne
seriousness of the harm that may result from the action, (3) the probability
that the desired value will be obtained by taking the risk, (41 the relative
worth of the desired value itself, and (5) whether or not there are
8alternatives that will produce the value desired.
If we apply these criteria to the motorcycle helmet and seat belt law 
issue, considering each point of the criteria in turn, we get the following 
results. (1) The probability that the action, riding a motorcycle without a 
helmet or riding in a car without a seat belt, will result in harm is reaHy 
very low. After all, most people are never involved in a traffic accident 
involving injury. Perhaps i t  could be argued that there is a deficiency in this 
aspect of the criteria, that i t  should not measure raw probability, but 
increased probability of harm resulting in choosing one course of action over 
another. This is no doubt a relevant consideration, but what really counts is 
the probability of harm. If one course of action has a small probability of 
producing harm, and another course a greater but still small probability of 
leading to harm, the fact that the likelihood of harm is still small seems to 
tell against classifying as irrational anyone who prefers the second course of 
action over the first. R. seems to me that this is what saves the non helmet
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and non seat belt wearers from being irrational They know that when they 
drive with or without these safety devices that the chance of their being in 
an injury producing accident is small This fact combined with their desire not 
to use these devices induces them to abstain. There is no dear sense in which 
this choice is irrational (2) The seriousness of the harm that may result is 
significant, since death may result. Furthermore, i t  is known that more deaths 
do result among non helmet and non seat belt users. It is this statistic that 
really drives the paternalistic motive. Yet it must be acknowledged that 
helmets and seat belts do not eliminate deaths. Death is a possibility both 
with and without these devices. The paternalist's case would be stronger if 
these devices eliminated the severest possible consequences of an accident. 
(3) The probability of the desired value being obtained, le . ,  not wearing a 
helmet or seat belt, is a certainty. (4) The relative worth of being free of 
helmets and seat belts varies from individual to individual, but it seems 
reasonable to suppose that people who do not choose to use these devices 
attach at least some degree of importance to this choice. It is sometimes 
claimed (by Kleinig for example) that it is not a matter of importance but of 
laziness or lack of discipline. Dworkin too once thought this, but more 
recently has come to realize that "while it is possible to relate such cases to 
the soft paternalist thesis by claiming ignorance or weakness of will, the
9
strategy seems too ad hoc to be convincing." (5) There are no alternatives to 
the convenience of not wearing a helmet or seat belt. One achieves this goal 
by simply refraining from their use.
So of the five points in these criteria only the second favors the claim 
that failure to wear helmets and seat belts is unreasonable. Even if a partial 
concession is made on the first point, the balance is still in favor of
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classifying non-use of helmets and seat belts as a rational choice. 
Furthermore, even if more weight is attached to the first two points in the 
criteria, we still do not obtain a clear decision in favor of the paternalist's 
view. Given that we need a justification for interfering with liberty and 
individuality, i t  is reasonable to demand a dear and convincing case for these 
paternalistic restrictions.
The case for mandatory helmet and seat belt laws on grounds of weak
paternalism is made even more difficult if we take seriously the notion of
essential relevance. According to this concept the only persons who are
appropriately classified as irrational or incompetent are those who are
incapable of grasping a fundamental or rudimentar],' relevance that makes
ordinary communication possible. As long as a person understands wnat is
■patently, ludimentarily, and fundamentally relevant" that person is 
10rational. The vast majority of people who fail to use helmets and seat belts 
are quite capable of grasping the essential relevance of their actions and are, 
on this model of rationality, both rational and competent. If this is so, 
paternalistic interference here will require a justification of strong 
paternalism, not weak paternalism.
I think that the implausibility of classifying the interference with liberty 
in these matters as weak paternalism due to unusual, abnormal or irrational 
risk becomes dearer still if we pay some attention to  how much risk we 
accept in the normal course of our life. Consider how many activities we 
engage in that place us at risk. Millions of people smoke dgarettes and drink 
alcoholic beverages excessively. Both these activities increase significantly 
the likelihood of contracting serious life threatening disease. There are 
numerous dangerous hobbies that make physical injury and death more likely:
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mountain climbing, skydiving, SCUBA diving, siding, bicycling, skateboarding 
and so on. Also, there are dangerous occupations; among them are fireman, 
certain circus performers, high-rise construction worker, stunt man, 
poUccman, soldier and so on. Many of us do not eat properly, knowing that we 
are jeopardizing our long term welfare by eating too much high fat and high 
cholesterol fast or junk food. Actually, it  has been proposed that some of 
these activities should be the target of paternalistic interference.
One response is that in these activities, as opposed to failure to wear 
helmets and seat belts, the individual's actions are closely tied to important 
and meaningful events in her life. This may be true for some of these 
activities, fireman, mountain climber and circus performer. However, many 
people engage in SCUBA diving, skiing and bicycling only occasionally; 
therefore, these events are not of unusual significance in their life style. 
Although, I subject the liberty to choose when and under what conditions to 
engage in risky sports or pastimes is of significance to most of us. 
Furthermore, if i t  is laziness and undiscipline that induces us not to use 
helmets and seat belts, why is i t  not the same laziness and undiscdpline that 
allows us to smoke, drink too much and eat fast foods. I s u ^ c t  that the 
probability of serious health problem is actually greater for these activities 
than the probability of serious injury by failure to wear helmets and seat 
belts. I am not trying to establish a slippery slope argument here. In general I 
do not believe that slippery slope arguments prove anything except that there 
are borderline cases. Nor am I accusing the paternalist who argues for helmet 
and seat belt laws, but not for smoking and fast food laws, of inconsistency, 
although there may well be inconsistency in such arguments. Indeed, i t  may be 
wondered, why not helmet laws for cars, especially convertibles; and
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bicycles? Race car drivers wear helmets for extra protection which, no doubt, 
often saves injury and even life in a crash. Laws requiring helmets in cars 
would surely save additional lives each year and reduce the chance of injury. 
But my real point is simply that living is a risky business. We are all prepared 
to accept risks to live in a manner that suits us. Some individuals thrive on 
risk more than others. I recently witnessed an interview with a volcanologist 
who was asked if the dangers in her work were a concern to her. She replied 
that the danger of her work was part of the attractiveness of it. Given all 
the risks that we must accept, and additional risks that we seem willing to 
accept to live out our lives in our own style, i t  is difficult for me to believe 
the paternalist's claim that riding motorcycles without a helmet or riding in a 
car without using a seat belt warrants coercive restrictions on autonomous 
individuals because of the additional risk.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge to the justification of coercive 
interference requiring the use of helmets and seat belts is the difficulcy 
based on a problem raised in chapter 4, the problem of paternalistic 
punishment. If a particular piece of paternalism is to have any chance 
whatsoever of being justified, i t  must actually benefit the individuals who are 
coerced. The problem in this case, as i t  was in the drug case considered in 
the previous chapter, is that it  is doubtful that punishment for failure to use 
helmets and seat belts is beneficial. To some extent it  depends on what 
lengths the state is willing to go to in order to ensure compliance with its 
coercive laws. In general the state is faced with the problem of escalating 
punishment to the point at which i t  no longer becomes plausible to claim that 
i t  is benefiting its citizens. If the state levies fines for failure to comply to 
helmet and seat belt laws, then it  must be dear that it  is better for
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individuals to suffer loss of funds than not use these devices. Also, this 
assumes that fines will produce compliance. But we know tliat fines will not 
achieve universal compliance, so some of the population is harmed for no 
positive benefit to them. Further, from here the states justification gets even 
more difficult. What is the state justified in doing with those who refuse to 
pay the fines? The state could arrest and sentence to jail those who refuse to 
pay, or it could confiscate the motorcycle or car. If such drastic actions are 
implemented, can it seriously be maintained that the motive is still benefit of 
the individual being coerced? IS it plausible that a person is better off going 
to ^ i l  or losing her car rather than ride without a seat belt?
It may be replied that the law benefits the larger and less rebellious 
group and, hence, is justified. However, this raises new problems. The state 
has a number of options available to it. It could refrain from any rigorous and 
serious punishment, much as it does with the 55 mile per hour ^)eed limit. If 
it  selects this option, then helmet and seat belt compliance is apt to go the 
way of this speed limit, large scale violation. Hence, the law has little if any 
benefit. If the state vigorously pursues compliance with stiff fines, jail 
sentences or confiscation of property, then it  is open to a charge of injustice 
by virtue of administering punishment way out of proportion with the offense. 
Remember, we are not dealing with an enemy of the state. If the state 
attempts to justify harsh punishment for violators in order to achieve general 
compliance, i t  is still open to the same charge of injustice plus an additional 
charge of injustice for harming one group, when they have done nothing to 
deserve it, for the sake of another. But even more damaging to the case for 
paternalism, if the state 's argument rests on the general good, then the
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state's argument is no longer paternalistic; hence, i t  can hardly be offered as 
a justification for paternalism.
There is one sort of law regarding helmets and seat belts that might be 
agreeable to paternalist and antLpatemalist alike. A law was recently passed 
in Oklahoma requiring that young children be restrained by a car seat while 
riding in a car. However, there is no penalty for disobeying this law. A 
violator may be stopped and cited by a law enforcement official, but there is 
no fine assessed, no court appearance nor points levied against the violator's 
drivers license. The 'ticket' is advisory in nature. It is as if the state is 
saying to this driver, most likely a parent, "we think that you are behaving in 
an irre^jonsible and dangerous manner toward this child. If you really care 
for this child, you will take steps to secure her safety." A similar kind of law 
could perhaps appease the paternalist. The law is not coercive, but 
instructive. It levels no penalties. This would seem to avoid the main force of 
the objections I have raised against coercive interference. I t is consistent 
with liberty and autonomy. The state, by issuing this sort of citation for 
violation of helmet and seat belt laws is simply appealing to the motorist as 
an autonomous being by saying in effect, "we beheve that you are behaving in 
a dangerous and irresponsible manner toward yourself."
There are two other kinds of cases that deserve mention in connection 
with paternalism and risk. The first is the legal prohibition of dueling. Dueling 
is, like ^ v e ry  and drug use, one of the kinds of cases that are often thought 
to challenge the strong antipatemalism I am defending. The belief is that we 
need paternalistic justifications to prohibit dueling, but, as I shall show, we 
do not, I think that not a great deal needs to be said about dueling. There 
may be cases where there is nothing morally objectionable about allowing two
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individuals to fight a duel. But there may be dif&culties properly policing this 
endeavor. The objection here is that, as with slavery, we would devise an 
intricate and expensive piece of legal machinery only to have few, if any, 
applications for a permit to fight a duel
There are, of course, more substantial objections. The practice of 
settling d ilu te s  this way is uncivilized and barbaric. It sets the wrong sort 
of example for the rest of the population, especially children. Rather than 
resolve disagreements by fair rules with an impartial judge, the duelists resort 
to a strategy of survival of the strongest, or at least the most adept with the 
selected weapons for the duel Hence, dueling undermines civilized rule of 
law.
My suspicion is that the great majority of people do not wish to be 
challenged to a duel any more than they wish to be mugged. Therefore, the 
state has the consent of those restricted. This not only helps justify the 
restriction, but also indicates that the restriction is not paternalistic.
The final case I will consider under the rubric of paternalism and risk is 
a case of involuntary commitment. The case is reported by Beauchamp and 
involves an elderly lady by the name of Mrs. Lake. Mrs. Lake suffered from 
arteriosclerosis which caused temporary periods of confusion and mild memory 
losses. It was agreed that she was no threat to anyone but herself. She 
testified at her hearing, while appearing fully rational and competent, that 
she understood the risks of living outside of an institution, but preferred to 
take the risk that she may injure herself during a period of disorientation 
rather than be institutionalized. The court denied her petition to remain free 
arguing that she was not competent to take care of herself, presented a 
danger to herself and was mentally üL Beauchamp concludes his description
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of this case with this remark: "Such reasoning is wide^read today, despite 
forceful arguments by p^chiatrists that the harmless 'mentally sick' are often 
competent to make rational judgments."
Was Mrs. Lake's desire to live in feeedom and accept the additional risk 
of injury due to her illness an irrational desire, or a sign of irrationality? Let 
me again appeal to the five point criteria of unreasonable risk outlined 
eacber in this chapter, (i) the probability that the contemplated course of 
action will lead to harm is not precisely determinable. If Mrs. Lake does not 
intend to drive a car, her chances of injury are reduced. It is fair to assume 
that she does not, since according to the description of the case there was no 
danger she might harm others; and, if A e intended to drive there would be 
danger of harm to others. The probability of self-inflicted injury is also 
reduced if she has a close friend or relative who will check on her daily. The 
fact that her loss of memory was mild and periods of confusion short seems to 
indicate no significant danger to herself. (2) The seriousness of the harm that 
may result from her decision is potentially dangerous. She could 
absentmindedLy wander into traffic, i t  is not dear from the information given 
if serious harm is a real possibility or not. To some extent i t  depends on 
where she lives and if someone is checking on her periodically. 5: is certainly 
easy to imagine situations where the potential for serious harm is not 
significantly increased by her choice to remain away from an institution. (3) 
The probability that the desired value ( to remain free) by taking the risk is a 
certainty. (4) The worth of the desired value (liberty) is extremely high. (5) 
Are there alternatives? Again it is not dear from the description of this case 
if Mrs. Lake has alternatives; none are mentioned. If she has friends or
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relatives with whom she could live, or who could check on her daily, this 
would surely be a preferable alternative to institutionalization.
How does Mrs. Lake score on this criteria? Given the high value of 
liberty and the seemingly low probability of sLgnifiv-ant self inflicted injury, I 
am inclined to think that Mrs. Lake was the victim of misguided paternalism. 
Patrick Henry said "Give me liberty, or give me death." For this we hold him 
up as noble and as embodying an important ideal Why then, when Mrs. Lake 
makes a similar appeal do our courts feel justified to label her crazy and 
institutionalize her? It appears to me that Mil's worst fears about the 
dangers of paternalism opening a wide door to abuse by which one group is 
able to enforce its own prejudiced view of the good on another group have 
been fulfilled in this and similar cases. Of course the judge may argue that 
this is a case of weak paternalism. This indicates that we need stringent 
criteria for weak paternalism in order to prevent cases of coercive strong 
direct paternalism from being passed off as cases of weak paternalism.
John Kleinig presents an interesting strategy which he beleves defeats
the strong antipatemalism of MU, and others as well He refers to his
12strategy as the "Argument from Personal Integrity." What is interesting 
about this approach is that it begins by granting the liberal assumptions about 
human nature and rests more on principle rather thar. difficult cases for the 
antipatemalisL
Kleinig begins his explcatiLon with an account of the liberal description 
of human nature. Each human is bom into the world with different capacities.
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In order to achieve a meaningful and fulfilling existence each of us must 
develop these capacities. Distressingly, there is no single or uniform 
procedure for development, hence, each individual is required to deliberate 
and experiment in order to formulate her most promising plan of life. In our 
formative years we need lots of guidance and schooling. As we mature we 
come to realize that we have capacities that are intimately connected to our 
well-being and, consequently, we begin to take re^xjnsibiLity for our own 
development. We formulate a plan of life that shapes our personalities, our 
identity, and become mature autonomous creatures. We begin to approximate 
the liberal idea of individuality. Unfortunately, we do not always act 
consistently with our own designs for our life; we are sometimes shortsighted, 
impulsive and negligent with r e ^ c t  to our important lifetime ambitions and 
plans. In other words, we are infected with self-regarding vices. Some of our 
departures from dedication and commitment to our lifelong plans are trivial in 
that they merely divert our attention a bit or risk minor setbacks to our 
progress. But sometimes we err in our judgments in potentially life 
threatening or otherwise catastrophic ways. In these latter kinds of cases our 
risk is totally out of proportion to the possible gain.^^
Kleinig argues that even coercive strong direct paternalism is consistent 
with this picture of human nature. He argues as foUows: (1) Coercing 
competent persons under certain conditions does not violate their integrity. 
When individuals act on present desires that are inconsistent with their 
permanent desires and this action places them in jeopardy of catastrophic 
harm, then coercive intervention into their lives is justified. Since 
paternalistic intervention under these conditions is consistent with the 
individual's life plan, i t  is not moralistic. Further, the paternalism does not
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introduce alien values, it merely reveals a tension between permanent and
present wants. Where an individual places her self-identity a t risk in a way
that is inconsistent with her most serious commitments in life, denial of
autonomy is permissible. (2) The antipatemalism based on oppression of
individuality sees individuals too monochromatically; i t  views people in terms
14of immediate presentation.
This approach is probably only a ^)eciat version of what is sometimes 
referred to as the "real will" argument. The real will argument relies on a 
distinction between the real will, roughly equivalent to a previously expressed 
preference for a plan of life, and an empirical will, the desire of the moment. 
Kleinig himself is critical of the real will argument on grounds that it has 
totalitarian tendencies and that it has the potential to allow the overriding of 
any present desire. Nevertheless, he is willing to make an exception to this 
objection if the "real will" is cast in the guise of "well-established 
life-plans."^^ My own inclination is that Kleinig's first intuition, that this 
strategy is slightly totalitarian, is the correct one.
Ic might be tempting to present this kind of argument as an attempt to 
defeat what Mill referred to as the strongest argument of all, that the 
paternalist will interfere in the wrong place and in the wrong way. Mill, it 
may be recalled, conjectured that this argument might be defeated in a 
possible world where there existed an ideal public that confined its 
paternalistic intervention to  what could properly be described as those 
interventions strictly based on the assertained results of human experience. 
On this approach i t  would be argued that the appeal to a well-established 
plan of life limits the abuse of paternalism in the same way that Mill's ideal 
public would, if one existed. One reply to this argument is that, like MiU, I
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am skeptical that there is or will be an ideal public who would limit the use 
of paternalistic power in the appropriate way that the argument describes. I 
would fear creeping leyol moralism.
This reply to the Personal Integrity Strategy may not be persuasive in a 
powerful way, however, I believe an even more convincing reply is possible. 
One claim that Kleinig makes in his attack on antipatemalism is that the 
antipatemalist portrays humans monochromatically, a creature with a single 
important desire, the present one, e.g., to cUmb a mountain, ride a 
motorcycle without a helmet or drive a car without wearing a seatbelt. First, 
I am not quite sure that this is true. If the antipatemalist attempts to wam 
of possible harmful consequences or persuade the person who is s u ^ c te d  of 
foolish shortsightedness, then this is evidence that other, perhaps more 
important, desires are recognized. Sometimes Kleinig talks as though the 
antipatemalist is callous, thinking to herself on the occasion of an auto 
accident where seat belts were not used, "they deserved their injuries." There 
is no reason to attribute such lack of empathy to the antipatemalist. The 
antipatemalist simply takes liberty and individuality more seriously than the 
patemalisL Second, is i t  not the case that the accusation of holding a 
monochromatic image of humanity is a two edged sword? It seems to me that 
i t  is the patemalist who subscribes to a monochromatic description of human 
nature in that the patemalist only allows a single, tight, consistent and fully 
developed plan of life. The patemalist does not allow for variation from a 
prerdous plan that may well have been expressed and adhered to by an 
individual. So, if a plan previously expressed does not allow for much risk, the 
patemalist stands ready to enforce consistency. But most of us are 
continually developing and experimenting and updating our interests and life
158
plans. The patemalist does not allow for excursions into new and possibly 
risky adventures; she does not allow for spontaneous and perhaps sometimes 
even capricious actions which an autonomous person may wish to indulge in.
The argument from Personal Integrity cries out for some crisp and 
telling examples. Unfortunately, the two provided by Kleinig are unconvincing. 
The first example he suggests in which the serious consequences of acting in 
a manner appropriately inconsistent with a plan of life is that of a student 
who wants to quit school just prior to final exams. It is in this kind of case, 
he argues, that something more than persuasion is ju stified .H ow ever, it is 
not clear at all what more can be done in the way of coercion. It would seem 
pointless to physically force someone to sit at a desk, since this does not 
ensure that any learning will take place. I don't see what recourse friends, 
teachers or counsellors have other than to persuasion and reason. A parent 
could apply coercive pressure. Parents could threaten to disown, disinherit or 
refuse to financially support a return to college at a future time. For 
example, a parent could say to this student, *I have invested a great deal of 
money in your education. If you quit now, I will have wasted most of that 
past investment and all of my investment for the current semester. Unless you 
finish your final exams this semester, I will never again finance your 
education." Would a good parent make such a remark? Perhaps, in certain 
circumstances. But, generally speaking, I would say no. This kind of remark 
might be justified as a bluff to test the seriousness of the student's desire to 
quit. This student may be questioning her previous decision to attend college, 
deciding a college education is not worth the effort or merely expressing the 
desire for a break while she reevaluates her life, it  is not dear that this 
person may not be benefited by working or traveling for a time until she
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reaches more settled commitments for her life. If the parent is serious in the 
threat that I hypothesized, then I would argue that this 'parental beneficence' 
is misguided; more realistically in^âred ty  anger and frustration than the 
interests of the student. This individual may simply need some time to reflect, 
experiment and grow.
The second case that Kleinig connects to this argument is mandatory
seat belt and motorcycle helmet laws.^^ The argument is that these devices
will not interfere with significant pursuits and win prevent risk taking where
the stakes are high. Since I have discussed seat belt and helmet Jaws at
length earlier, I wüL only summarize my reply here. It is not clear that the
risk is unreasonable or irrational This is especially so in light of the risks we
accept on a routine basis in order to live our lives in our own way. There
remains the problem of punishment based on paternalistic grounds. The
paternalist continually forgets that there is only so much that he can do to a
person and continue to plausibly claim that he is benefiting the recipient of
his "beneficence." Kleinig admits that for persons who feel quite strongly
18over this issue, coercive measures may not be justified. If this is admitted, 
then, as I previously argued, the state is not justified in coercing this group 
for the sake of those who do not feel strongly. Further, the argument 
justifying this latter coercion would not be a paternalistic one.
m this and the previous chapter I have evaluated a number of what are 
usually considered the strongest attempts to legitimize coercive strong direct 
paternalism. These attempts include arguments for the state's refusal to 
recognize slavery contracts, for laws forisidding the use of dangerous drugs 
and consent of the victim as a legal defense of assault or murder, laws 
against dueling, and laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets and
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motorists to wear seat belts. I have attempted to show that there are 
powerful and persuasive arguments against a state's interference in the lives 
of its citizens for their own benefit. To begin with, r e ^ c t  for liberty, 
individuality and autonomy require a presumption against all paternalistic 
interference. In the case of coercive strong direct paternalism arguments 
based on autonomy or individuality provide conclusive reason for an 
exceptionless prohibition. But there are other grounds for prohibition as well. 
At the very least the paternalistic state, following the model of good 
parenting, should look for alternatives to coercion. When the state cannot 
find alternatives, or chooses not to seek them, and attempts to counter the 
presumption against coercive interference with overriding considerations of 
benefit to the individual, it  is met with more difficulties. History teaches us 
that paternalistic powers are subject to abuse, so society is better off if the 
state is restrained from exercising these powers. Further, for those activities 
that the paternalist would most like to prohibit, ^ v e ry , drug abuse and so 
on, paternalistic arguments are, a t best, superfluous. But perhaps the most 
troublesome problem for justifying state paternalism is the dilemma of 
paternalistic punishment; paternalistic laws are not enforcable on 
paternalistic grounds. It is a wise parent who knows the limit of her ability to 
coerce her children for their own good. There are as far as I can determine, 
no justifications for coercive paternalistic powers for the state.
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CONCLUSION
Having employed, as an opening gambit to this paper, a quotation from 
the Grand Inquisitor, perhaps it  is no less appropriate to close by appealing to 
the wisdom of Dostoevski once again. In Dostoevski's charactery of the 
ultimate altruist, the Grand Inquisitor, we see the real ugliness of coercive 
paternalism run amuck. One of the interesting discoveries in the investigation 
of paternalism is that there are moral objections to certain expressions of 
altruism and beneficence.
As we have seen, the reasons why paternalism (the denial of autonomy 
on grounds of beneficence ) is so objectionable have been well laid out by J. S. 
Mill While his position has often been described as radical fantastic and 
indefensible, i t  strikes one as much less radical less fantastic and totally 
defensible once his position is placed in pergjective. Mill's arguments focus on 
showing that paternalistic acts which are appropriately described as coercive, 
strong and direct constitute an illicit triad. This does not mean that state or 
individual actions that interfere with the autonomous control of a person's Me 
are always wrong; i t  does mean, however, that autonomous individuals ought 
always be treated as such and that certain i^cdfic kinds of paternalistic acts 
are always wrong. While I have not tried to develop and defend an elaborate 
rights based argument, and notwithstanding the notorious difficulty with 
establishing rights, surely it  must be the case that if we humans have rights at
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aHf the case can be made that autonomous persons have a right to be treated 
autonomously;
I think that the real power of Mill's antipatemalism resides in four 
arguments. The first maintains the supreme worth of individuality or autonomy. 
It is a basic and necessary human experience to live as an independent 
operator in the world. This innate capacity is intimately connected to our self 
concept and sense of esteem and worth. Thus, when individuality is violated on 
the grounds of beneficence toward the person whose individuality is denied, 
this constitutes a violation of what ought to be seen as a private rohere. 
Arguments which attempt to show that certain kinds of risk, e.g., failure to 
wear seat belts in cars or failure  to wear helmets while riding a motorcycle, 
are excessively risky and irrational or irrational enough to warrant 
paternalistic restrictions, either fail in their attempts to demonstrate that the 
target behavior actually does involve an irrational risk, or subvert the attempt 
to justify coercive strong direct paternalism by virtue of the fact that the 
more powerful the demonstration that a particular act is irrational the more 
implausible the claim that the paternalism is strong. The second line of 
argument that supports Mill's antipatemalism is the line that Mill himself 
seemed to think was the strongest, he., the fear of legal moralism. 
Paternalistic power is too much power, e^cLaHy for a state and especially 
when it  is realized that paternalistic arguments are unnecessary for the most 
serious kinds of behavior that concern paternalists, e.g., the control of 
dangerous drugs. Third, The model of good parenting instructs us to act liJte 
good parents. It is a wise parent who knows how to control his or her children 
without the use of coercive power and who realizes that there are strict limits 
to the extent that coercion can be exercised over another and still claim.
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credibly, that beneficence is the motive. The closest Mill comes to advancing 
this argument is probably in his claim that the state has the power of 
education and early training and this power is sufficient. The final argument 
that I find particularly persuasive is the dilemma of paternalistic punishment. 
In order for paternalistic laws to work they must be enforced. But any 
enforcement strong enough to allow the law to achieve the intended benefit 
founders on loss of benefit because the means of punishment undermine the 
intended benefit. Further, such paternalistic punishment is open to accusations 
of injustice; the person who is fined or imprisoned on paternalistic grounds is 
treated as though he is the enemy of the state when in fact he is not.
The usual objections advanced against Mill based on paternalistic 
arguments for such things as the denial of legal recognition to slavery 
contracts (including a charge on inconsistency on Mill's part) and the need to 
control dangerous drugs are unconvincing. We neither need nor is it desirable 
to restrict these activities for paternalistic reasons. Furthermore, it  is 
difficult to substantiate the claim that, in these matters, we are coercing 
individuals for their own good.
As a final comment, I would urge the patemalist who feels an 
irresistible urge to deny my free expression of myself as an autonomous person 
to take a lesson from Thoreau when he observed that, "If a plant cannot live 
according to its nature i t  dies, and so a man."
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